There are currently 2 users and 30 guests online.
Linz's Mario Book—Updated!
Obleftivist Yawon Bwook says Donald Twump is "THE villain of our time." Which of the following best accords with your view?
Yes he is
He's not a villain but a hero
Putin might be a bigger villain
The mullahs might be bigger villains
ISIS might be bigger villains
Ugly Wimmin might be bigger villains
Black Lives Matter might be bigger villains
Snowflake moronnials might be bigger villains
College professors might be bigger villains
Fake News outlets might be bigger villains
Pomowankers might be bigger villains
Obleftivists might be bigger villains
None of the above—specify
Total votes: 10
The Ground Zero Mosque and Acts of War
Submitted by Grant Jones on Fri, 2016-02-26 08:14
I wrote the following response to Biddle's drivel several years ago. He has yet to explain how the imported jihad should be dealt with, how importing Moslem barbarians is in the interest of the American people and how bombing Iran will end the jihad (including stealth jihad) in the West.
The Ground Zero Mosque and Acts of War:
All warfare is based on deception. – Sun Tzu
In the Fall 2010 issue of The Objective Standard, Craig Biddle wrote an article, “The Ground Zero Mosque, the Spread of Islam, and How America Should Deal with Such Efforts,” that compounds several errors held by many Objectivists on this issue. He argues that although America is at war with "Islamists," governmental force to prevent the building of the mosque would violate property rights. However, Biddle does not suffer from any illusions about the nature of Islam or the current struggle. He points out that America “is in a (shamefully) undeclared but nevertheless real military war with Islamists” (10). The enemy includes states that support terrorism, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the enemy is not limited to nation-states:
"This military war is a part of a broader cultural war—a war of ideas, principles, and norms—and our enemies in this broader war include more than those Muslims who enact or call for violence against Americans. Our enemies in this broader war include any Muslims who seek via any means—whether violent or peaceful—to destroy America and establish an Islamic state in its place…The general goal is to saturate America with Muslims, Islamic ideas, Islamic institutions, and Islamic norms such that America gradually and peacefully becomes an Islamic state." (10).
The above is a good summation of the methods and goals of the stealth jihad not only in America but also around the world. In Western Europe today Americans can view their future if the stealth jihadists continue their successful infiltration.
All thoughtful, patriotic Americans—including Objectivists—agree on the seriousness of Islamic aggression upon the West. However, there is much disagreement on how to fight the stealth jihad. Biddle recommends a solution with a strong emphasis on ending jihad supporting regimes starting with Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, he advocates that when dealing with the stealth jihad on American soil the only recourse is debate, boycott and moral suasion.
Besides declaring war upon Iran and—if necessary—Saudi Arabia, Biddle’s three point plan for dealing with the stealth jihad on American soil is for private citizens to “morally condemn Islam in particular and creeds of faith and dogma in general…recognize and uphold the principle that tolerance is not a virtue but a vice…ostracize individuals and boycott businesses” that are involved in building the Ground Zero mosque” (19-20). There are several problems with Biddle’s recommendation, not the least of which is his view that it is the responsibility of private citizens to thwart sedition of this magnitude, which also has a foreign source[s].
To begin with, Biddle mischaracterizes the motives of those who oppose the Ground Zero mosque. Several times in his essay he states that the primary reason for opposing the mosque is its “insulting nature.” This denigrates opposing views as merely emotional. He argues (correctly) that “insults” are not a valid reason for depriving Americans of their property rights. He then launches into several paragraphs on the principles of property rights. His premise being that those who disagree with him (including individuals who have been Objectivists for decades) are not “thinking in principles” (16).
Biddle begins his essay by acknowledging that “some [who oppose the mosque] say that property rights do not apply in this case because the mosque backers are aiding the enemy” (9). He dismisses this argument. The only way the government could legitimately prohibit the mosque’s building is if it were providing “material aid” to the enemy (15). With this position, Biddle’s demonstrates his lack of knowledge on the type of war we are now engaged in, along with a more general ignorance of military history.
The morale of a nation under attack is central to whether that country will survive and emerge victorious. Churchill’s exceptional leadership in the summer of 1940 is a classic example of how one man changed a nation from defeatism to trumpeting that surrender is not option. As Ayn Rand observed,
"A country’s morale is crucially important, in wartime. In World War II, the British Lord Haw-Haw was, properly, regarded as a traitor—for the crime of trying to undercut the British soldiers’ morale by broadcasting scare stories about Nazi Germany’s invincible power." 
Here, Rand is reiterating Napoleon’s famous maxim of war, “the moral is to the physical as three to one.” And clearly, the purpose of the Ground Zero mosque is to undercut American morale in the continuing, one-sided campaign against the stealth jihad in the West, while emboldening the warriors of Mohammed. Biddle’s strict separation between the physical and psychological factors of warfare is completely invalid and reeks of the mind/body dichotomy. Jihadists are waging psychological and ideological war against the West, which dovetails nicely with their terrorism. There is no safe way to draw a sharp line between the two. Terrorism and the stealth jihad are two halves that form one whole.
The false dichotomy between the material and moral in warfare that Biddle propounds is the result of his not understanding the kind of war the United States, and our Western allies, are engaged in. For example, Biddle claims that if the United States declared war on Iran and then quickly destroyed that regime (without endless handwringing over Iranian civilian deaths), “we would demonstrate the hopelessness of the Islamic cause, deflate their motivation to kill, and effectively collapse their nihilistic movement” (18). He provides absolutely no evidence for this assertion except by noting that such a strategy worked against Germany and Japan during and after World War II. There are obviously vast differences between these cultures. What worked with Germany and a quickly Westernizing Japan may not work with a culture largely based on Islam and its adherence to the Arab tribal mindset.
He states that taking out Iran would eliminate “the main sources of spiritual and financial support for Islamists”—another dubious assertion. Islam has suffered many devastating military set-backs from the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 to the slaughter of the Mahdi’s forces at Omdurman in 1898. From the ashes of numerous defeats, Islamic conquest, in its many forms, rebounded once the victors became tired, soft or converted. Biddle seems unaware that it is for this very reason that the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928. Hassan al-Banna’s purpose was to revitalize Islamic resolve after the overwhelming defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The Caliphate was dissolved and large sections of the Moslem world were under foreign domination. This disaster did not “deflate their motivations to kill.” Instead, the Islamists became ever more vicious, as their alliance with Nazi Germany makes clear.
Yet another faulty premise of Biddle’s is his reversing cause and effect on the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. He seems to believe that a more rational foreign policy can precede domestic reform. In other words, how can America in its present state possibly embark on the policy of declaring war upon Iran and other jihad supporting regimes? The short answer is that it cannot. It is bad enough that so many on both the left and the right remain clueless on the threat of jihad in all its forms. Furthermore, a reexamining of American foreign policy is made much more difficult by the government and civilian institutions that have been compromised by stealth jihadists spreading disinformation or worse. I contend that the stealth jihad now occurring on American soil will have to be dealt with before we can expect the government to adopt a rational foreign policy.
Perhaps Biddle’s worst blunder is his belief that warfare is something that can only transpire between nation-states. Of course, nothing can be further from the truth. This is particularly true when dealing with Islam. Moslems self-consciously think of themselves as part of an international community-of-believers called the ummah. Jihadists (of all varieties) operate as members of the ummah, not for any particular government. Their justification for perpetual war against the infidel is located in the Koran, the Hadith and countless fatwas. The ummah is their source of legitimacy to wage war. They function as a worldwide state within numerous territorial states. Eminent military historian John Keegan describes the Islamic view of war:
"Islam dissolved the two principles on which war had so often been fought before: territoriality and kinship. There could be no territoriality in Islam, because its destiny was to bring the whole world to submission to the will of God…The Arab armies benefited greatly from the presence in the settled lands they invaded of the musta’riba, Arabs who had given up the desert life but who felt strong cultural bonds with them and proved willing to fight at their side as soon as they heard a doctrine of brotherhood preached in the name of Islam." 
This is the enemy the West faces. Thinking in terms of fighting and defeating nation-states ignores the enemy’s nature. Vanquishing such an unprecedented enemy will require much rethinking on the part of Americans. It will also require taking steps that may seem extreme, but are necessary. For example, Robert Spencer is one of our top scholars on Islam and the stealth jihad. In his important work Stealth Jihad, Spencer describes and documents the nature of the stealth jihad and how it operates in America. He reaches the stark conclusion that as “a simple matter of national security” the United States should end further Moslem immigration. He argues that such a policy is inescapable unless and until sharia law supremacy is no longer a part of Islam.  Given the facts, history and nature of Islamic supremacy, Spencer’s is a logical conclusion. In contrast, Biddle’s call for boycotts in the face of invasion seems silly and entirely beside the point.
 Ayn Rand, “The Wreckage of the Consensus,” in Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal (New York: Signet, 1967), 252.
 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 194, 196-7.
 Robert Spencer, Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam is Subverting America without Guns or Bombs (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2008), 278.
More SOLO Store
The Fountainhead by Ayn Rand
Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand