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Two-substance theory Submitted by Chris Cathcart on Tue, 2006-05-30 04:04.
I wasn't sure where else to post theoretical topics other than to the general forum.... I had recently read some reference to a Binswanger lecture, where apparently he defends, in some terms or other, a "dual substance" position as regard mind and body. I've been going through some thinking now and then on this topic -- how exactly the concept "form" works in an Aristotelian metaphysics. I think the real simple solution to the whole mind-body pseudo-problem is to speak of mind as the form of a certain kind of material entity. I think, ultimately, form pertains to the arrangement that the matter takes on. Aristotelianism proper -- Aristotle's own ideas -- is still too infused with Platonism to make a fully rational understanding of this. I'm sure some hardcore Aristotle scholars could fill us in on this, but as I understand it, form for Aristotle is not to be treated simply as a (product of) specific arrangement of matter. Form can't be actualized except for in a material body, but the manner in which form is united with matter seems Platonic-influenced. It just happens that form -- that "thing" that one could in principle conceive of as existing on its own (and indeed, this comes out in the end with Aristotle's Prime Mover) -- comes in some fashion to meld or merge with matter. Form and matter get treated as two separate ontological categories that, in terms of actual existence (save for the Prime Mover), could only occur together. But they're still two separate ontological categories -- the remnants of Platonism. Is there a cause of form lying only in the particular arrangement of matter? Here Aristotle does some further splitting, with his four-fold theory of cause, conceived as independent but in actuality working together. But yes, it would seem that form is its own cause, independent of matter being arranged in a particular way. But Aristotle's thinking was instructive and pointed in the direction of a fully correct answer: namely, that form-matter unity literally means that -- that matter cannot be conceived of as apart from form, or vice versa. Form simply is the particular arrangment of matter. The human mind is the form of the human body. It's not just the form of the brain, but the whole nervous system, and the whole arrangement of matter that constitutes the human body; it's a necessary consequence of the way that the human body is constructed. So the correct way to speak of consciousness is as the formal principle of matter as it is arranged to make up a conscious entity. This doesn't strike me as having any of the mysteriousness of the Platonic remnants of Aristotelianism proper. It doesn't have any mysteriousness, period. It doesn't require positing a substance dualism -- that mind and matter are two different kinds of things. Rather, the phenomenon of consciousness is simply a characteristic of a very unique arrangement of matter. We just speak of it in terms that we don't speak of other material beings because, well, of course, it's consciousness! Of course it's going to have its own characteristics! And so we need a specific, unique set of concepts for which to refer to and discuss the characteristics of consciousness. But note that this doesn't put consciousness into some special realm all its own, operating as a substance all its own, operating on principles that are distinct from those upon which matter (in general) operates. (Volition is an instantiation of causality; it's a characteristic of how the arrangement of matter that constitutes the human body operates.) After all, every material entity takes on a certain form, and we form concepts that refer to the specific manner in which any material entity operates -- and any material entity is unique in form. So this doesn't put consciousness into a fundamentally different kind of existence. It's just an aspect of existence that characterizes, in form, certain material entities. That we need unique concepts by which to refer to this unique phenomenon, is simply a reflection of an objective conceptual need, as we think about aspects of existence in abstraction. But abstraction doesn't affect the real order of things, now does it. In short, treating of consciousness in the abstract (in our thinking about it), as a particular form of material existence, doesn't make consciousness a separate substance in any way in actual reality. To regard consciousness as a different kind of substance in contradistinction to matter, is to engage in a fallacy of rationalism -- to think that our conceptualization of something must mean that reality must follow suit. It is to confuse epistemology with ontology. The two-substance theory ultimately collapses into a huge-number-of-susbtances theory, if our speaking of any characteristic in the abstract were meant to imply that this characteristic is a substance all its own in reality. The color blue, for instance, is a formal characteristic of matter having been arranged in a certain way. Why not, then, just treat the color blue as its own substance? Consciousness is unique, yes. But it's just an aspect of existence like everything else is. This implies nothing about multiple substances. (I'm not even sure what use there would be for the notion of "substance" as it's used here, but that may be its own can of worms.)
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Substance as "independent"
"The idea of a "substance" as I understand it is that it's self-subsisting, independent. It would be strange, indeed, for an Objectivist to entertain as a possibility that consciousness could constitute its own independent, self-subsistent substance, akin to the ghost seeking out its machine to steer."
The idea of substance as "independent and self-subsistent" is the Cartesian version. Contrast that with the Aristotelian version, in Categories: substance is that which is acting, that which has qualities, that which has measurement - the subject of predication. When you are thinking, it is not the brain which is thinking - an argument is not a neural process, concepts aren't neurons, etc - so there is no other entity which can account for the process. Certainly, the brain is a causal agent in all this, as well as a mechanism, but a process of thought can not be described as a chemical event. The two are distinct - there are at least two events going on.
Mind as form?
Chris,
Tricky stuff.
(It's been awhile since I've done any thinking on this subject, so I hope you can follow.)
"Form simply is the particular arrangment of matter."
Now, by "form" I think Aristotle means something more than the arrangement of matter. Your formulation presumes that matter is prior to form, i.e., that there's something called "matter" that can then be arranged any number of ways (forms) - a prior, independent, formless matter - whereas for Aristotle the world is made of "primary beings," subjects of predication in which form and matter are inseparable. Form is thus more than an arrangment or organization of bodies, but the principle of their arrangement, organization, behavior, etc. (I think you might have used a similar description somewhere in your post, so I guess I'm not sure which definition of Aristotelian form you're committed to.)
An entity's form is the cause of the entity's distinct characteristics and variations, including its actions; it's what makes the entity what it is, subsisting through change (thereby making it intelligible). Yet, it has no separate existence apart from the entity...
Applying this to mind and body: first, I don't see how consciousness (or mind) could be the form of the human body. I think Aristotle's definition of "soul" as the form of a living body is instructive, here. A man dies; his cells, his organs begin to die as well, and slowly the body decomposes. It is still a human body, however - the body certainly exists as a material, living being apart from mind/consciousness. So "mind" doesn't look like it fulfills the criteria of form, here. Besides, a mind is a particular -- an individual, primary and irreducible being in its own right. In what way is it the "form" of anything?
"The human mind is the form of the human body. It's not just the form of the brain, but the whole nervous system, and the whole arrangement of matter that constitutes the human body; it's a necessary consequence of the way that the human body is constructed."
I'm just not sure what this means. How is the human mind the "whole arrangement of matter that constitutes the human body.."? And if that's true, how is it then possible that "[the human mind] is a necessary consequence of the way that the human body is constructed"? Isn't the "way the human body is constructed" the same thing as the "whole arrangement of matter that constitutes the human body"? Does it follow that the human mind is the necessary consequence of the human mind? ;)b
Hope (pray?) that this makes some sense.
form
I'll also add, if I hadn't yet made it clear, that the use of form, as in referring to form-matter unity, is a rational alternative to a two-substance view. It locates the integration of mind and body in the unity of form and matter, which simply makes more sense than having to resort to some metaphysical notions of separate substances.
Consciousness as having causal efficacy
That's one thing that you couldn't get on a Cartesian view. Descartes could well assert that consciousness somehow has causal efficacy -- that the ghost can affect a steering of the ship -- but is totally at a loss to say how it's even possible. I have the suspicion that any variant of a two-substance theory is going to eventually run into the same problem. If there is causal interaction between consciousness and other aspects of existence, then they have a common causal basis. A two-substance theory turns this picture pretty murky. The idea of a "substance" as I understand it is that it's self-subsisting, independent. It would be strange, indeed, for an Objectivist to entertain as a possibility that consciousness could constitute its own independent, self-subsistent substance, akin to the ghost seeking out its machine to steer.
Stuff
Oh crap:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivist_metaphysics
(Binswanger proposing a dual substance theory.)
It's in wikipedia, the very encyclopedia of the arbitrary itself. That's where I saw it!
Anyway, yes, Penelope, I like to think of myself as just as vigilant as anyone on keeping the boundaries between philosophy and science clear. I think that in speaking about matter, we ought to be most careful not to make pronouncements, qua philosophers, about the specific character of matter. I think of matter more in terms of how an ancient like Aristotle would have -- that it's just the "stuff" of existence. It's just whatever it is that we encounter with the senses, that we encounter as hard, as hot or cold (which we now scientifically understand as matter taking on the form of energy), etc. What its specific character is, is not for a philosopher to say.
As for speaking of form, I'm bringing an Aristotelian perspective to the discussion. I think Aristotle provided the basis for a correct answer (he was actually speaking in terms of soul as the form of a living body) long before the moderns like Descartes came around to muck things up. Descartes was a chief source of the "two susbtances" notion, and it's disastrous, because when he and his ilk speak of substance, he's talking about fundamentally different principles of existence each with their own mode of operation. The result is lack of a proper understanding of mind-body integration -- i.e., he doesn't have a view of mind-body integration at all, just some mysterious and unaccounted-for semblance of "interaction," when in reality his theory makes it impossible for them to be integrated.
I think that the view that consciousness is the result of a certain arrangement of matter is pretty clear-cut as the right answer, matter being the "stuff" of existence that we encounter via the senses, and consciousness being an aspect of existence. And it's the only way to understand man as an integrated whole (in terms of mind-body or any other relation). It's really just clearing the way in terms of groundwork as we proceed to build upward, so that the other philosophical screw-ups like Descartes and Plato don't get a foothold.
Metaphysics of Information
I hope that the ascription of a "dual substance" position to Binswanger is some kind of misattribution. Let's not forget that philosophy is the integration of all the sciences. "Dual substance" conjectures were attempts to solve problems that now, thanks to advances in the information sciences over the last half-century, have known solutions that are firmly grounded in measurements of reality. Doing "philosophy" in contradiction of available science is the way of the crackpot. It is crackpottery when Nathaniel Branden does it - and/or anybody else.
I don't know what Harry
I don't know what Harry Binswanger's view is, but I don't think philosophy has anything to say on this question. Neither that mind and matter are two different "substances," nor that consciousness is merely the result a certain arrangement of matter. I think both those are instances of confusing philosophy with science. All philosophy can say on this point, in my humblest of opinions, is that there is existence and awareness of existence, and that these don't conflict.
Beyond that, I'm stil not sure how it's clarifying to say that consciousness is the form of matter. Why bring in all that baggage when what you really seem to be saying is, "consciousness is a natural faculty that arises from a certain arrangement of matter"? There are terms in philosophy worth fighting for. Why is "form" one of them? Why do we need it? What mistakes in our thinking will we make if we don't form that concept?
Oh and I honestly don't know much about philosophy in general, so if I'm missing some obvious point here, please let me know!