"Why don't we move this discussion back to your KANT AND ETHICS thread"

Agreed.

“he implied innate ideas, in spite [of the fact that] he denied their existence.”

You win. If you’re going to maintain your claim in the face of Kant’s explicit denial, then you have in effect left me no weapons of defense. Your attitude is, “the hell with what Kant said, I know what he REALLY meant.

“You didn't answer my question. We are discussing synthetic a priori judgment in which connection of the predicate with the subject is ‘thought without identity.’ Now, what exactly means synthetic knowledge, that is-connection without identity?”

What Kant means is that in synthetic a priori knowledge, you need more than just identity to justify your use of a given predicate. Let’s do the complete enumeration. To answer the question, “What justifies one combining a given predicate to a given subject?”
1. analytic a priori – identity.
2. Synthetic a posteriori – experience (identity still applies to both subject and predicate, but is not enough to justify their connection in a judgment.
3. Synthetic a priori – contribution of the understanding (understanding to be understood in Kant’s technical meaning.)

“how Kant can call this JUDGMENT a priori when the SUBJECT itself is perceptual knowledge.” (Emphasis added)

Because one deals with the subject, the other deals with the judgment. The subject, say this body that I see, is based on experience, but the judgment “all bodies are extended” is a priori because the judgment (not the subject) is analytic. You must keep these notions clear in your mind of you will never understand Kant. He is hard.

Fred

PS Why don't we move this discussion back to your KANT AND ETHICS thread, since the discussion seems to be between just you and me. I shall post this answer there as well. What do ou think?

You didn't answer my question. We are discussing synthetic a priori judgement in which connection of the predicate with the subject is “thought without identity. In your response you refer to the "thought through identity" which is analytic a priori judgment. But even in this case how Kant can call this judgment a priori when the subject itself is perceptual knowledge. Kant considered certain subjects (time, space, mathematics) as pure a priori knowledge, that is, prior to experience, and so he implied innate ideas, in spite he denied their existence.

Now ,what exactly means synthetic knowledge, that is-connection without identity?

You should read my posts. Synthetic means the predicate is not contained in the subject. But what gives us the right to connect a predicate with a subject. Kant gives two answers: (1) experience and the result is synthetic a posteriori; (2) they are functions of the human understanidng (e.g., the categories, and the result is a synthetic a priori judgment..

"According to Kant this is the knowledge which is prior to experience in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought without identity, in other words, doesn't exist."

Wrong again. What Kant means by the expression "thought through identity" is equivalent to "analyse" the concept.

Perhaps you should re-read the entire section IV of the Introduction. Carefully.

Fred

It even easier to refute me if you don't read my posts. Previously I gave Kantian definition :""Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic " Now ,what exactly means synthetic knowledge, that is-connection without identity? Kant gives an example "bodies have attribute of heaviness" Why Kant doesn't consider heaviness as connection of identity? Just because it is observable fact, the connection is not established by the thought alone. So what would be definition of synthetic a priory knowledge? According to Kant this is the knowledge which is prior to experience in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought without identity, in other words, doesn't exist. Now, you may untangle this riddle, what kind of knowledge is it.

"'A priori' means knowledge which is prior to experience, basically innate ideas. Synthetic knowledge is based on experience. Synthetic apriori knowledge means knowledge which is based on experience prior to experience. As I said before I don't get contradictions"
You're getting better; just two errors in three lines. Let me explain.

The forms of intuition and the categories are, Kant tells us in OD, "not innate" and "presuppose nothing innate." (See OD 233)

"Synthetic knowledge is based on experience."

Close, but no cigar. There are two kinds of synthetic knowledge; synthetic a posteriori knowledge and synthetic a priori knowledge. It is only the former that is based on experience, not the latter. So there is no contradiction for you to get! BTW, Synthetic does not mean "based on experience." Synthetic means that the predicate is not contained in the subject, as opposed to analytic in which the predicate is contained in the subject. A posteriori means after experience; a priori means prior to experience.
It is so easy to refute Kant if you simply ignore what he says.

Fred

"I’m confused. If we discard the distinction, then how does that integrate them? "

"A priori" means knowledge which is prior to experience, basically innate ideas. Synthetic knowledge is based on experience. Synthetic apriori knowledge means knowledge which is based on experience prior to experience. As I said before I don't get contradictions and I don't think that the mind who invented them is so great. If you discard this analytic-synthetic distinction then you would be able to define the knowledge, any knowledge- including mathematics-as result of mental integration of perceptual experience.

“How these two could be integrated? Only if the whole concept of a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic dichotomy is discarded as invalid."

I’m confused. If we discard the distinction, then how does that integrate them?

“If so , what a point to have this distinction at all?”

To account for those sciences that actually contain synthetic a priori judgments, like arithmetic and geometry.

"Objects are given to intuition before they can be thought."- and than Kant says that a priori judgment is independent of any experience. You sort out this contradiction if you can.”

Experience and knowledge is a package-deal; both the object and the subject make their respective contributions. And just like O-ism, the subject contributes the form and the object the matter. Isn’t that nice. See Kelley’s ES for details on how we contribute the form—we get reality in a certain form that is due to us. Great minds think alike.

Fred

"Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic "
According to this syntethetic judgement " all bodies are heavy" doesn't connect heaviness with identity of the bodies which is direct violation of the law of identity.

"Objects are given to intuition before they can be thought."- and than Kant says that a priori judgment is independent of any experience. You sort out this contradiction if you can.
" I made a statement about the relation between the synthetic and the a priori, claiming, against you, that they can be integrated? If so , what a point to have this distinction at all? Synthetic judgement is based on the lack of mental connection between identity of the subject and the predicate. Apparently, that what thought without identity means. It's basis is experience. A priori statement has no connection with any experience whatsoever. How these two could be integrated? Only if the whole concept of a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic dichotomy is discarded as invalid.

My source is http://www.marxists.org/refere...

You’re confused again. I made a statement about the relation between the synthetic and the a priori, claiming, against you, that they can be integrated, i.e., there are synthetic a priori judgments. You then write that Kant claims, “that a priori and a posteriori knowledge have two different sources and a priori knowledge is INDEPENDENT of experience.” But that was not your original topic nor my reply. Let me go slowly. I was talking about “synthetic” and “a priori”, not “a priori and a posteriori.” Can you see the difference? Are you aware that you switched the context by switching the words. You dropped “synthetic” and inserted “a posteriori.” Communication is aided if the context is not arbitrarily switched.

“But when I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment." That is, heaviness has no connection with body!!”

What??!! Your conclusion, “heaviness has no connection with body” doesn’t follow. Kant even says we find in experience that “weight [heaviness] is invariably connected with” body. How can you claim he thinks they have no connection?

Fred

"’But both judgments deal with reality.’
I know that, but Kant apparently not. He said ‘But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition’"

So what. I (nor Kant) never denied that there was a temporal process involved in experience. Just as Rand admits that we perceive objects before we can abstract similarities from them, likewise with Kant. Objects are given to intuition before they can be thought. And notice I was talking about “judgments,” while you were quoting Kant on ‘appearances. (I think this is known as dropping the context.) They are ‘downstream’ of both intuition and thought.

Just out of curiosity. Are you using different translations of CPR. The first is from Kemp Smith, but the second isn’t. Notice you gave only the year and neither the page number nor the translator. Anyway, I think it is A46/B63. Would you like to settle on one translation? I have several and Smith is one of them. What would you prefer? If you want to use different translations, please alert me. Also, I would appreciate the page numbers.

“So with which reality [do the?] Kantian [analytic/synthetic] judgments deal?”

Let’s ask Kant. At A7/B11 (I’ll use Smith) He gives “all bodies are extended” as an example of an analytic judgment and “all bodies are heavy” as a synthetic judgment.

Fred

"If you keep this up, you’re going to unseat me from my position as “the world’s most misleading secondary source ever.” -it is easier to say than to do since you apparently in the business of creative re-righting of Kant.
"You claim that Kant denies we can integrate the synthetic with the a priori."
Let see what Kant has to say about it.
" This, then, is a question...whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience."

Kant clearly indicated that a priori and a posteriori knowledge have two different sources and a priori knowledge is INDEPENDENT of experience. Moreover, Kant says " a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience." So, you should argue with Kant, not with me. In the view of the quoted above , Kant's statement "“looking back at the experience from which I have ABSTRACTED this concept…” is stark contradiction. Your interpretation of analytic-synthetic dichotomy is also belongs to Fred, not Kant. Kant's position is quite different. "Either the predicate to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic. Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic...But when I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment."
That is, heaviness has no connection with body!!
(All citations from The Itroduction to Critique of Pure Reason (1787). Norman Kemp Smith version from Chinese University of Hong Kong, with text of Kant's second edition extracted.)
PS. I'll be away for 2 weeks and won't be able to participate in this ongoing discussion. But if after 2 weeks you wouldn't exost this topic I'd be glad to contribute.

"But both judgments deal with reality. "

I know that, but Kant apparently not. He said "“But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition" (A 90-91, Norman Kemp Smith translation, 1929, St. Martin's, 1965) "What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. Not only are the raindrops mere appearances, but even their circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensible intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781.)":"But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. (A 297/B 354)." So with which reality Kantian judgments deal?

If you keep this up, you’re going to unseat me from my position as “the world’s most misleading secondary source ever.”

After your first sentence, which is true (yikes), you write an almost incoherent second sentence. You claim that Kant denies we can integrate the synthetic with the a priori. Good God! (If I may quote Rand) In the Introduction (A10/B14) Kant entitles section V. “All Theoretical Sciences of Reason Contain Synthetic A Priori Judgments as Principles” This is written in an enlarged and bolded font so that even a careless reader might not miss it. Kant doesn’t deny there are synthetic a priori judgments, he insists that there are. I point this out in my elementary Kant class.

Sentences three and four owe more to Peikoff than to Kant, and represent a misunderstanding of Kant. Your sentence four is a re wording of the italicized sentence on p. 93 of ITOE.

The statement “here is a tree” does have something to do with mind, contrary to your assertion. “Here” is a spatial word and space is contributed by the mind, according to Kant. As for “tree” if you mean, as Kant did, a substance with properties, this is a contribution of the mind, specifically the category of substance/inherence. So much for that sentence.

As for “bachelor is unmarried man” not having anything to do with reality, you’re are wrong again. The concept bachelor is got from experience, in much the same way as Rand says we form concepts, by abstraction. [Kant writes, “looking back at the experience from which I have ABSTRACTED this concept…” emphasis mine.] After we have the concept, we can go on to make judgments. If the predicate merely elucidates the subject, then the judgment is analytic and no additional experience is needed. If the predicate expands the subject, then the judgment is synthetic and additional experience is needed to get the predicate. But both judgments deal with reality.

Fred

Kant didn't deny the validity of sensory experience. He only denied that human mind can integrate this experience (synthetic truths) into conceptual knowledge (analytic or self-evident truths). By invention of analytic-synthetic dichotomy Kant efficiently divorced realm of senses from the realm of mind and rendered mind as impotent. For him a statement “here is a tree” has nothing to do with mind and “bachelor is unmarried man “with reality. Plato at least allowed some means to know his world of Form but Kant denied any possibility to know “things as they are”.

This note continues Plato-Rand Note.

In Metaphysics Aristotle writes:

“The understanding understands itself by participating in what can be understood. For it becomes something that can be understood itself when it grasps and understands, so that the understanding and what can be understood are the same thing” (1072b19–21).

“But it seems that knowledge, perception, belief, and thought are always of something else on each occasion, and of themselves on the side” (1074b35–36).

The first passage is consistent with Rand’s conception of consciousness as identification. The two passages together are consistent with Rand’s “before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something” (AS 1015).

From On the Soul:

“It is necessary, therefore, that [the understanding], since it understands everything, is uncompounded, so that it may ‘have mastery’, as Anaxagoras says—that is, so that it may comprehend. For if it manifests itself alongside, it hinders and obstructs what is extraneous. Consequently, it does not have any nature of its own at all except this, namely, that it is able [to understand]. Therefore, what is called the soul’s understanding . . . is in actuality none of the things that are until it understands. Hence, it makes sense that it is not compounded with the body at all” (429a18–25).

We might underscore the qualification “in actuality” in that last sentence. The understanding is only the potential for understanding until it understands and bears the identity of its objects. Perhaps Aristotle is not in the river that speaks: “Consciousness has no identity.” But he is at the whispering headwaters of that river.

Rand checks that flow:

“Accept the fact that consciousness, like any other existent, possesses identity, that it is a faculty of a specific nature, functioning through specific means. . . . [They err who] regard identity as the disqualifying element of consciousness. / [That] is a revolt, not only against being conscious, but against being alive . . . . / All knowledge is processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual, or conceptual level. . . . The satisfaction of every need of a living organism requires an act of processing by that organism, be it the need of air, of food, or of knowledge” (ITOE 79–81).

See also.

Compare Aristotle:

“For the activity of the understanding is life” (Metaph. 1072b26–27). “One always wishes to live, because one always wishes to know” (Eud. eth. 1245a8–9).

Translations of Aristotle are by Victor Caston.

"Go read Copleston or something to bone up on Plato."

First of all I teach Plato every semester, but in a spirit of fellowship I took your advice and pulled my Copletson down from the shelf and he writes on p. 141, "[I]f my treatment of Plato's philosophy leads the reader to turn his attention to the actual dialogues of Plato, the author will consider himself amply rewarded for any pains he has taken."

So that gets us back to my original question. Do you have anything in Plato's actual dialogues to back up anything you said about Plato?

Fred

"I wonder if you can tell us if there is any difference between the views of Augustine and Aquinas on the relation of so-called eternal truths to the divine liberty."

For the book I limited myself to the primacy of existence stuff. But let me nose around and if I find anything I'll get back to you.

Fred

PS The article in Aquinas is 8, not 9 as my book says.

"Citations! Hee haaa haa haa haa haa haa haa! Citations! Hooh hoo!""

I.e., you've got nothing. I have contributed to the literature on this subject--see chapter one of my Objectivist book.

Fred

"Citations? Yeah, I've got citations. Just let me check with the boys down at the philosophy-crimes lab. We've got four more detectives working on the case. They've got us working in shifts! Citations! Hee haaa haa haa haa haa haa haa! Citations! Hooh hoo!"

Get a grip, will ya Fred? I'm going on perfectly adequate general knowledge about Plato, and frankly don't feel like spending the time plowing through the literature for, uh, leads. It bores me. Go read Copleston or something to bone up on Plato. This is SOLO, not a citation-worship society. You wanna suggest that I've mis-learned things about Plato -- that he didn't posit an independent realm of Forms? The whole allegory of the cave[1] doesn't adequately convey Plato's project? What?

[1] There, there's a "cite" for ya.

Fred Seddon,

Thank you for posting your Note 101. It induced me to open your book, which I had recently acquired.

I wonder if you can tell us if there is any difference between the views of Augustine and Aquinas on the relation of so-called eternal truths to the divine liberty. I mean truths such as that the sum of the angles of any triangle equals two right angles.* Does Aquinas follow Augustine on this in the way that Descartes later follows Augustine? Or does Aquinas make eternal truths coeternal with the divine understanding, as we find in Newton and in Leibniz.

*(I realize that in our modern geometry this proposition is true only if we suitably restrict by assumptions the character of the plane under consideration; but for the Euclidean plane as rigorously specified in modern geometry, this old proposition remains true as ever.)

Stephen

I posted this a while back but it seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle.

"As for Plato. Do you have any citations in mind to back up anything you say about Plato?"

Thanks,

Fred

I wrote this note on the primacy of consciousness in both Augustine and Aquinas in a footnote in my book on Objectivism. Don't know if you can use these cites but you are welcome to them.

101 Heimsoeth probably has in mind, though he doesn't say, passages like the one to be found in De Trinitate, XV, 13, where Augustine writes, "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." (In an interesting quotation from The City of God (not mentioned by Heimsoeth) we find the Saint on both sides of the primacy of consciousness vs. the primacy of existence question. The last sentence of XI, 10, says "... this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known by God.") I think Heimsoeth is wrong to restrict this distinction to Augustine and the Augustinians. Thomas Aquinas has written extensively on the same subject matter and arrives at the same conclusion. The most pertinent quotation can be found at ST, I, Q14, A8 where he writes, "The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art."

Enjoy,

Fred

Stephen, I grant you that Augustine, on his own terms, does not argue for *human* primacy of consciousness. But even apart from his belief that existence is a consciousness, though not ours (it is God's), there is the important element in his view that we can declare the nature of reality - in effect, to create a reality of our own desiring - from our minds. Our minds determine what reality is.

I mean, it is not as if Augustine looks out into the world and sees a God or the consciousness of a God. That is his own mental creation. I grant you, though, that is not how he sees it. But that in fact is what he is doing. That is his primacy of consciousness.

Something of the same thing is going on with Plato. While he asserts that the Forms are independent of us (I grant you that - that he asserts/claims that), where does the idea of the Forms come from? It can't come from any empirical investigation. All such investigations would be based on "shadows". So, the Forms don't come from looking. They come from "thinking", i.e. imputing the nature of reality from a mental exercise.

True, Plato is still a Greek, so he would never say reality is what we say it is or that reality is some kind of figment of our imagination. He is certainly no subjectivist. But still, he establishes the foundations for such views - which emerge later - by bifurcating the sources of our knowledge, one part of which - and actually the most important part - does not come from looking, i.e. from (actual)reality.

I was careful enough to avoid saying that Plato subjectivizes the Forms. I specifically said that his orientation was one of primacy of consciousness. That doesn't mean that he can't ascribe to the forms some "objective" self-subsistent being. The primacy of consciousness comes in when, as I basically said before, he takes our having concepts of things as a primary, and proceeds from there to ascribing "objective" self-subsistent being to the (formal) objects of those concepts, as the alleged basis for those concepts having objectivity or constituting knowledge. And he's getting things bass-ackwards. Rand's orientation is to trace back the source of our concepts, not taking for granted (and falsely so!) that concepts must have a 1:1 correspondence to an object (Form).

[Note the spelling of my first name.]

Fred Weiss,

Yes, we are in agreement with each other in seeing Augustine's view as holding to the primacy of a consciousness, the infinite intelligence of a posited creator of the world. Our mentor, Ayn Rand, pointed that out to us in "Galt's Speech" and in "For the New Intellectual." We concur with her on that.

That does not make for the primacy of human consciousness over existence. On the view of Augustine, both God and the world are simply there already, waiting for our cognizance. When Nietzsche whines about the death of God, one of the things he stresses is the loss of objective moral standards given to humans. From the human standpoint, their world, their existence in it, and some moral standards had been formerly seen as objective circumstances. Nietzsche rejoices that with the death of God, the human mind is free to make up its own standards of morality. He paints himself as rejoicing in the primacy of human consciousness over moral rightness and even over the splendid hard sciences of his age.

Nietzsche's rejoicing is what I called "wallowing" in the preceding post. His mature writings (GS, Z, BGE, GM) are pigsties of subjectivism. With Augustine there was for man the primacy of existence.

Concerning Plato I think that you and Chris Cathcart are subjectivizing the world of Forms and diminishing the power Plato awards to human reason to apprend them. The Platonic Forms are not subjective any more than the One of Parmenides' school is subjective. For Plato the Forms are not subjective structures any more than geometry is a subjective structure. These are objective realms of being, and they are comprehensible by human reason.

Steven Boydstun asks, "What about Augustine? Is he plausibly a progenitor of the primacy of consciousness?"

He then quotes Augustine from "The Confessions":

"We therefore see these things which Thou madest, because they are; but they are because Thou seest they are."

One could say this isn't the primacy of *human* consciousness, but it certainly is of *a* consciousness, namely God's. Why do things exist? Because God's sees them: "they are because Thou seest they are".

Now, if things exist because of God's consciousness, then what we are perceiving is the product of a consciousness - not an existence which exists independently but an existence which is dependent for its existence on a consciousness. What we are perceiving therefore is a consciousness - God's. Existence is, if you will, a consciousness.

If that's not "primacy of consciousness", I don't know what is.

As for Plato, he tells us that what we perceive is only "a shadow". What is real then? It is the essence or truth of things buried deep within us in some past life and which we must somehow dredge up out of our memory by some not very clear means - but which wise men will somehow know. The source of our knowledge, then? Our own consciousness, not external reality our perception of which is only a shadow.

If that's not "primacy of consciousness", what is it?

"Ouija boards aren't mysticism if we can define the rules, is that what you're saying?"

No, But I think I'm missing your point. Could you expand?

Fred

Stephen,
Plato was making the assumption that for an idea to have validity, that it must have a corresponding object in reality. That's pretty standard realism (in the sense applicable here). He took the existence of abstract ideas that we have, as a basis for holding that there must be a corresponding Form in reality. He was proceeding from that basic orientation, rather than a primacy-of-existence one that recognizes that independent of consciousness, we observe only individual entities.

Mr. Cathcart:

What do you find in Plato's texts that would make him a "progenitor of the primacy of consciousness"?

What about Augustine? Is he plausibly a progenitor of the primacy of consciousness? He writes in The Confessions:

"We therefore see these things which Thou madest, because they are; but they are because Thou seest they are."

As far as human consciousness is concerned, Augustine holds to the primacy of existence: we see what is because it is. Only the mind of God has primacy over existence.

Descartes and Leibniz concur with that general position. Leibniz contracts the divine will considerably. He places truths of logic and mathematics, and even moral truths, in the divine understanding, not subject to divine will. These truths are simply eternally locked solid with the unchanging divine understanding. For human consciousness, existence has primacy.

I would not look to these two moderns, nor to Spinoza, for any doctrines proclaiming the primacy of human consciousness. When we come to Nietzsche, we find a philosopher wallowing in such a doctrine for sure. Who are his progenitors in this sordid respect? Are they philosophers? Are they literary folk?

Here is a pulse of kinship between Plato and Rand that may be of interest to readers here. It pertains to Rand's well-known argument for the primacy of existence vis-a-vis its relation to consciousness. You remember that little argument in Galt's Speech?

"A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something [else]" (Rand 1957, 1015).

There is a kindred argument in Theatetus, where Plato writes (in the voice of Socrates):

"But I must necessarily become percipient of something when I become percipient; it is impossible to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing" (160b)

Plato is speaking only of the percipient in sensory perception in this passage. I do not find him generalizing the argument to knowledge of being. Perhaps a reader here could correct me on this impression.

In addition I should say that for Plato, perception does not grasp being. Knowledge of being is not "in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are" (187a).

A good philosopher to generalize Plato's argument kindred to Rand's would be Aristotle. For he writes in On the Soul:

"Thinking and understanding are regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as the other, the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is" (427a20-22).

Could the "something which is" be only a soul itself, not partly something beyond itself? Aristotle, as Plato, does not seem to rule out that possibility.

Kinship has its limits.

Fred S.,

I'll check it out, but should I take that as a "no"? Ouija boards aren't mysticism if we can define the rules, is that what you're saying?

George,

I just found out that you are still living. Congratulations!

What you were describing as an intuition in Rand's philosophy would really be closer to what was called an intellectual intuition in Kant's time and in his texts. He didn't think we have such a faculty, and Rand and I think he was correct about that. When it comes to what he called sensory intuition, yes, there is a correlate of that in Rand's philosophy. It is called the percept. This concept percept was introduced by Thomas Reid, of Scottish-Common-Sense fame, in his epistemological work contra Hume. Kant and his generation in Germany were influenced by Reid and pals. There is a marvellous study of this influence. Its author is Manfred Kuehn, and its title is Scottish Common Sense in Germany 1768-1800.

Stephen

Thanks for the comments. I loved Vancouver and you were a big part of the reason why.

Fred

Fortunately, Kant actually wrote a (for him) popular work on mysticism in which he distinguishes between three types of cognition vs. mysticism and he writes "mystical illumination is the death of all philosophy." This is from p. 62 of a book of Kant's late essays entitled RAISING THE TONE OF PHILOSOPHY. The essay from which the quotation is taken is entitled "On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy" and the "tone" that Kant is referring to is mysticism (he calls it "intimation of the supersensible.") He rails against those who prefer mystical illumination and intimation to the "rational yet painful research into nature." (110) They want a short cut to knowledge. They don't want to work. Check it out. See what you think.

Fred

*This is the one in which Kant defends his view that it is NEVER morally permissible to lie EVEN IF IT MEANS TELLING A MURDERER WHERE HIS INTENDED VICTIM IS HIDING

This of course is common knowledge about Kant, who is often described as a "pietist" or moral "rigorist." But it would be a mistake to dismiss as worthless everything he has to say about ethics, just as it would be a mistake to dismiss Rand's theory based on her statement that she would never vote for a woman president.

Kant did arrive at a very libertarian conception of individual rights (though he failed to apply it consistently). This in my judgment is the most valuable aspect of his philosophy. Most of his stuff on epistemology strikes me as so contrived as not to be of much value, though he does make arresting generalizations about methodology from time to time that are very interesting. (E.g., his argument against using examples in the course of presenting a philosophical system.)

Ghs

1) My understanding is that, for Kant, appearances are not perceived per se, but are the result of perception. Part of the problem here is that I must deal with translations, and Kant often gave very technical meanings to terms. For example, I don't recall him ever saying that the phenomenal world, or the world as it is perceived, is somehow unreal. But I don't claim to be a Kant expert, so I suppose he could have made this claim somewhere.

2) I don't know why Kant employed the concept of the noumenal as he did. He doesn't discuss it very much, as I recall. The quest for the "thing in itself" was largely a post-Kantian phenomenon.

3) I never meant to suggest that Kant was a proto-Objectivist, or anything like this. But neither do I believe that Kant set out to destroy man's conceptual ability, as Rand somewhere states (or something to that effect.) Frankly, when I read a philosopher, I don't give a rat's ass whether I agree with him or not; rather, I find value in what I can learn from him, and I have benefited from reading Kant -- though I would be hard-pressed to name a single doctrine that I agree with him about. (I find his writings on ethics especially interesting, since they analyze in detail what it means to act according to a principle).

(4) The passage you mention was intended to describe Kant's views, not my own.

(5) You don't need to lecture me about the problem with "appearances." I discussed similar issues over 30 years ago in ATCAG.

Ghs

"I'm surprised there wasn't more comment on those ghastly letters from Immanuel to Maria." - Linz

Actually I thought the commentator on the linked page did a pretty good job of it. I was previously familiar with these letters but I have bookmarked it so that in future when I describe Kant's as an "ethics for zombies" and get shocked outrage ("Oh, no, no, he was an Enlightenment figure who supported the American Revolution, blah, blah"), I'll just send them there (and for the coup de grace to the one about the "Murderer at the Inn"*).

*This is the one in which Kant defends his view that it is NEVER morally permissible to lie EVEN IF IT MEANS TELLING A MURDERER WHERE HIS INTENDED VICTIM IS HIDING.

(But - as Fred S. and GHS are doing now in regard to Kant's epistemology - I've also heard Kantian apologists argue that Kant's ethics aren't that different from Rand's. But look, this isn't all bad. I think it was Rand who said that when your opponents start telling you how much they really agree with you, despite the differences, you know that you've won).

"My colleague the Irish vegetarian contrarian O'Cresswell thinks Fred's the most evil thing since meat-eating..."

How can you be evil if you're just a dishonest fool?

Cheers, Peter Cresswell

'NOT PC.'
**Setting Brushfires In People's Minds**

ORGANON ARCHITECTURE
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You asked what I thought Hartnack meant by "valid" in this quote: "[For Kant]sense impressions, in order to be sense impressions at all, must be subject to certain conditions. If these conditions were not fulfilled, no sense impressions could be perceived by us. These conditions are universally valid and necessary."

I don't know. Does he say? But perhaps he gives us a clue when he says that what we perceive are "sense impressions". Kant says that what we perceive are "appearances". Is that what you think we perceive? When you look out into the yard are you perceiving a tree or "the appearance of a tree"?

If you think the concept of the "noumenal" is useless, why do you think that Kant concocted it? Remember, we are discussing Kant here not your highly generous view that he is some kind of proto-Objectivist?

Btw, is this you or Kant talking when you say, "our senses give us knowledge of the phenomenal world -- i.e., the world as it is processed by our "forms" of peception and "categories" of understanding." I hope this is Kant talking and not you because surely you don't think that our knowledge is "of the phenomenal world". Whatever differences you may have with Objectivism, I'm sure this is not one of them and you believe that our knowledge is *of reality*, period - not reality merely "as it appears to us".

Ask yourself, if what we perceive are appearances, how are we able to distinguish illusions from actualities. Are illusions then appearances of appearances?

Which aspect of what our awareness gives us -- or which fact of reality -- is the "contribution" of an independent reality for Kant, then?

Even the law of contradiction seems to be a feature of consciousness for Kant. (If only logic really were "built in" to humans!)

This does not yet provide objectivity, i.e. it does not tell us what the sense impressions are *of*, i.e. most especially if they are *of reality*.

What do you suppose Hartnack meant by "valid"?

Kant distinguished between the "matter" and "form" of perception. The matter is that which is provided by experience via our sensory organs; the "form" is the particular manner in which we perceive that experience.

Kant did not believe that sense perception can give us knowledge of the "thing in itself," because this, by definition, is reality as it exists unperceived; and as soon as our senses perceive reality it is no longer unperceived -- obviously. (I think this is rather useless notion of the "noumental" world, but that's another subject.) Rather, our senses give us knowledge of the phenomenal world -- i.e., the world as it is processed by our "forms" of peception and "categories" of understanding.

But this phenomenal world is not "subjective" in the sense that it is not a creation of our senses or minds. Rather, it is reality as processed by our senses and minds. As Jeffrie G. Murphy (Kant: The Philosophy of Right) puts it: "The view that Kant is presenting here is simply this: Experience furnishes the materials of our knowledge, whereas the mind arranges these materials in a form made necessary by its own nature."

Now, I don't wish to press the parallels too far, given the many and radical differences between Rand and Kant, but this notion of knowledge as a reality that has been perceived and processed according to the nature of the knowing agent is quite similar to Rand's notion of "objective" knowledge.

Ghs

When I stickied this last night NZ time (nice piece, btw, Chris) I laughed like a drain at the thought that by morning Fred Seddon would have jumped on to claim that Plato & Kant were proto-Objectivists. Now, Fred's a good guy. He's not one of the baddies. My colleague the Irish vegetarian contrarian O'Cresswell thinks Fred's the most evil thing since meat-eating, but of course he's wrong on both counts.

I think I've got Fred sussed. Fred & I both lectured at KASSless-Vancouver, 2004. We hit it off famously. Like me, Fred would go to church—to fart. So there's an element of that when he hops on SOLO & acclaims Plato & Kant (& Hegel, too, if you ask him) as Rand's precursors. But there's a serious side to it as well. One night, in the midst of the customary convivialities, Fred excused himself early, saying he had "to spend some time with Kant." See, he takes these guys to bed, & they seduce him! So make allowances—he's love-struck, & sees only the good in the objects of his affections.

Still, seems to me with dear old Immanuel there's no escaping his lethal & totally arbitrary epistemological division of labour. Render unto science the things that are science's & unto faith the things that are faith's. It won't do to say, of course he acknowledges that the senses give us knowledge, when by his lights they give us knowledge of things as they really aren't.

And of course there's the little matter of the chickens' homecoming. I'm surprised there wasn't more comment on those ghastly letters from Immanuel to Maria.

Linz

A claim to knowledge by any means other than reason, as she understands this, is "mysticism" for Rand. One does not lose the quality of being a "mystic" merely by being able to somehow "define" or "identify" one's alleged non-rational means of knowledge. Right?

"Knowledge is a grasp of a fact of reality."

Eloquently put, don't you think?

JR

I will keep my thoughts about Kant on the Vacation with Leonard Peikoff thread and restrict myself here to Plato. (I do find myself in basic agreement with George Smith's interpretation of Kant).

As for Plato. Do you have any citations in mind to back up anything you say about Plato?

On mysticism you write,

"mysticism? It's the claim to a non-sensory means of knowledge of reality."

I prefer Rand's definition from PWNI. "Mysticism is the claim to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-definable, non-identifiable means of knowledge, such as 'instinct,' 'intuition,' 'revelation,' or any form of 'just knowing." (75-6 hc) Your definition is much narrower than hers.

Fred

Too many words, JR? Unable to follow it, were you?

"When you say that '[Kant] sought to restore the objectivity of our knowledge, especially our scientific knowledge,' are you saying that Kant argued that reality independent of our consciousness was the 'objective' contribution to such 'knowledge,' or was it some regularity of consciousness itself? Was Kant saying that empirical science does get us in touch with reality by its discoveries, i.e., that we are perceiving existence, albeit by a certain mode which cannot be held to be the disqualifying feature of consciousness, but a necessary means or cause of it?

"Wow, that would have been a 'revolution.'

"Although, upon reflection, it seems he could have spared himself a few thousands of words and run-on sentences, if that were the case."

I'm betting the Southern California ambulance chaser doesn't even know what a run-on sentence is. I'm betting he doesn't read German, either.

JR

When you say that "[Kant] sought to restore the objectivity of our knowledge, especially our scientific knowledge," are you saying that Kant argued that reality independent of our consciousness was the "objective" contribution to such "knowledge," or was it some regularity of consciousness itself? Was Kant saying that empirical science does get us in touch with reality by its discoveries, i.e., that we are perceiving existence, albeit by a certain mode which cannot be held to be the disqualifying feature of consciousness, but a necessary means or cause of it?

Wow, that would have been a "revolution."

Although, upon reflection, it seems he could have spared himself a few thousands of words and run-on sentences, if that were the case.

You quote Justus Hartnack:

"[For Kant]sense impressions, in order to be sense impressions at all, must be subject to certain conditions. If these conditions were not fulfilled, no sense impressions could be perceived by us. These conditions are universally valid and necessary."

I agree with James. This does not yet provide objectivity, i.e. it does not tell us what the sense impressions are *of*, i.e. most especially if they are *of reality*.

George, promise or no, you were attempting to back-up your claim that : "[Kant] sought to restore the objectivity of our knowledge, especially our scientific knowledge."

Was that "Copernican Revolution" simply an "emphasis on the contribution" of the perceiver? Yawn.

I didn't promise anything.

Moreover, I obviously didn't quote the entire discussion by Hartnack. His point (as indicated by his use of "valid") is essentially the same point I made.

As for Kant's concern with establishing the foundations of objective knowledge, you merely need read his two prefaces to Critique of Pure Reason.

Lastly, Kant was not an epistemological subjectivist; far from it.

If all you mean to say is that Kant emphasized the contribution of the knowing "subject" in the process of gaining knowledge, then Rand would qualify as a "subjectivist" as well. Except she called this "objectivism," in contrast to the extremes of "subjectivism" and "intrinsicism."

Labels can be tricky and misleading things. It is far better to focus on the substance of what a philosopher has to say.

Ghs

Arguing for "universally valid and necessary conditions" for perception is hardly the defense of "the objectivity of our knowledge, especially scientific knowledge" that you promised. "Subjectivism," in this context, is a position on the relation between subject and object, not the assertion that consciousness is all the result of arbitrary choice.

My interpretation of Kant (regarding sense perception) is an exceedingly common one. For example, in Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Justus Hartnack writes:

"[For Kant]sense impressions, in order to be sense impressions at all, must be subject to certain conditions. If these conditions were not fulfilled, no sense impressions could be perceived by us. These conditions are universally valid and necessary."

I doubt if Hartnack read OPAR either. (This is the first book on Kant that I happened to pull off a shelf. I have read other accounts that mirror my remarks even more closely.)

Of course, Kant would not say that empirical knowledge gives us knowledge of the "thing in itself," but that is a different issue from the "objectivity" of such knowledge. If you have a specific passage in mind, then I would need to see it.

Ghs

Unfortunately, we have two threads going now on Kant both covering essentially the same material.

Anyway to be brief, George, you quote Kant, "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of our experience."

To an Objectivist (and Aristotelian) it does - and that is the essential difference ( vs. Kant and Plato). Knowledge is a grasp of a fact of reality. If it is not that, then what is it and, specifically as it pertains to Kant, what is it *of*. If it is not grasping reality and based on reality, then what?

Lastly, when you say, "He can be understood as saying that we cannot perceive reality without a means of perception, and that this means does not invalidate the objectivity of our knowledge."

Sorry, but Kant didn't read OPAR. You are imputing a view to him, filtered through your Objectivist-influenced lens which goes well beyond a generous interpretation of him. He explicitly says that our means of perception - our "sensibility" - in the very fact that its content is only "appearances" does in fact limit the objectivity of the knowledge it provides.

My apologies; I think I neglected to clarify the sense in which I was using the term "mysticism." I use it in the sense of "belief that the world or some part of it is forever beyond human knowledge." It encompases the theism that you so thoroughly debunked several decades ago as well as its predecessors in Greece (most notably Plato and Anaximander) and its descendants such as Kant and, to a lesser degree, Descartes.

"Seems to me that Kant wasn't out to mount a defense of reason and reality, but of a religious world-view."

According to several Kant biographies that I read during my study, his goal wasn't either of those things, at least not explicitly. Implicitly, yes, we can infer that Kant had religious biases and sought to justify a religious worldview; he incorporates much of this into the Critique of Practical Reason. His explicit goal, however, was to erase the dichotomy between empiricism and rationalism. However, he failed to provide a philosophy that is useful for living because he sought to unify empiricism and rationalism without rejecting the dichotomy between the body and mind. In not doing so, he conceded the argument from the very first, because mind and body are names for identifiable but inseparable parts of man. Neither functions without the other, and any theory of knowledge that posits a dichotomy between the two is fatally flawed from the start.

If I had to choose, I'd opt for Hume's skepticism every time. For one thing, Hume is more fun to read. For another, he did indeed delightfully "disturb" a few mystics, didn't he?

And Hume did not propose a whole revolution in what we consider to be the object of perception itself or provide rationalizations for mystical concepts. Seems to me that Kant wasn't out to mount a defense of reason and reality, but of a religious world-view.

I don't think the term "mysticism" can properly be applied to Kant, in this context.

He does of course appeal to "intuition," but, in the broad sense, this merely stands in contrast to discursive reasoning. Even Rand believed in this kind of "intuitive" knowledge, e.g, when we grasp self-evident truths.

Ghs

I finished an in-depth study of Kant about 16 months ago, so like you I can't cite any specifics without breaking open my copy of Critique of Pure Reason, but I find that your conclusions about Kant are similar to mine. Kant's fault, however, was never in his views about the validity of sense perception, but rather in his views about its epistemological status. Kant's view is that knowledge gained by sense perception is that, while true, it is fundamentally incomplete. Our senses can never give us full knowledge of reality, regardless of the truth or falsehood of the knowledge that they do give us. That's what Chris was referring to when he called Kant mystical, and it's what made Kant so repugnant to Rand, because it forms the base of his concept of duty.

Kant did have a noble goal; he saw that rationalism and empiricism were both utterly useless for living one's life. His own philosophy, however, is undercut by the same currents of mysticism that had been lurking on the outskirts of the Enlightenment.

My take on Kant differs a bit from yours. But before I get into this, let me state that I haven't read him seriously for around six years, and I don't recall a number of specifics -- or I should say that I may not be able to cite specific references to support my claims. The following, in short, is off the top of my head; these are conclusions I reached after I did devote considerable time to a study of Kant by reading his works rather than relying overmuch on secondary sources.

One can give a more favorable interpretation of Kant's "thing in itself" (which he really doesn't emphasize much -- that was left to later philosophers like Fichte). He can be understood as saying that we cannot perceive reality without a means of perception, and that this means does not invalidate the objectivity of our knowledge.

Kant, as is well known, was deeply disturbed by Hume's skepticism. and he sought to restore the objectivity of our knowledge, especially our scientific knowledge. Like Rand, he rejected the alternatives of traditional empiricism and rationalism and mapped out another course, one that recognizes the roles that our "forms of perception" and "categories of understanding" play in the formation of knowledge.

As Kant put it in his Critique of Pure Reason: "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of our experience."

In short, I think there is a distinct similarily between Kant and Rand in regard to what both were attempting to do. Kant thought it was pointless to speak about what reality is "really like," apart from how it is perceived; and he argued that the fact that we know reality only as it is perceived (phenomenal knowledge) does not somehow render that knowledge unreliable or "subjective" in the Humean sense.

I think Kant failed in his effort to find an alternative to empiricism and rationalism, but I also think it was a noble failure.

I shall sign off for now and wait to be attacked. I seem to have a real knack for making myself unpopular around here.

Ghs