I'm here to match reasoning and evidence, not wits.

bis bald,

Nick

Your debate has been filmed and is available here:

                     http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3EkBuKQEkio 

-rg

I didn't watch that Black Knight video. I can't get it to work on my computer. I don't want to download the stuff that is necessary to show it. The last time I did that a terrible virus attacked my computer, and it cost me hundreds of dollars to get it cleared. I'm not sure what is being directed at me.

I don't always win. I have been proven wrong in the past, and I have admitted it and apologized. I've done so on this board with other posters.

I don't like being called a looney or dishonest. I don't like having someone following me around writing things about me but not engaging me or responding to me. It doesn't take much talent or ability to do such things. It is childish and cowardly. I'd expect more from Objectivists who value reason and logic.

bis bald,

Nick

BK: "The Black Knight Always Triumphs!"

BK" "I'm Invincible!"

Sartre’s tart
this man is who he is not
and is not who he is
just who is he?

Jameson has yet to accept my challenge to prove he knows what logic is and can define validity.

Nick

logic monster
two parts Sartre, one part Rand
Frankenstein objectivist
howls at moon

Jameson has yet to accept my challenge to prove he knows what logic is and can define validity.

Nick

I see no argumentation or evidence in your post, just accusation and derision. At least Greg tried.

My posts, by themselves, still stand. They show that Rand has inconsistencies in her discussion of knowledge and axioms. The fact that someone else, a PhD who wrote a book on Rand, shares my views, adds to my credibility. If we are both wrong, someone who thinks so should prove it.

Your attack is not persuasion. It is a violation of the posting guidelines for dealing with dissidents.

bis bald,

Nick

Pol Potpourri
the à la carte king
amok in the killing fields
of philosophy

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA

Nick, your last post is a riot. Let me sum it up for you:

"I'm not the only one who is wrong. This guy is wrong too. Therefore we must be right. Im a scholar!"

That you can't see what's wrong with that professors comments on Axioms is no surprise to me. You should hang out with him and congratulate each other on your brain power.

You've given me a good laugh.

Black Knight indeed!

I like the way William F. O’Neill, one of my professors at the University of Southern California, summarizes just a few of the problems with Ayn Rand’s epistemology:

She sets up an ostensibly objective epistemology, but she does so on a totally subjective and, ultimately, mystical basis. Her axiomatic concepts are, as she herself admits, beyond proof. They are merely true, because they are true.

She violates her own theory of axiomatic truth. She states that “all definitions are contextual.” She defines “axiomatic concepts” as true independent of any particular context and therefore beyond specification in terms of attributes or characteristics. She then proceeds to “define” the axiomatic concept of “consciousness” as possessing two attributes: content and action. She compounds this inconsistency by going on to suggest that all axiomatic concepts need to be identified in conceptual form. The question is, of course, if they cannot be defined in the first place, how can they be conceptualized in explicit form?

---O’Niell, William F. With Charity Toward None: An Analysis of Ayn Rand’s Philosophy, 1972, p.120

See? I’m not the only scholar to see inconsistencies in Rand’s work.

Bis bald,

Nick

Farewell, Black Knight.

Greg

Farewell, Black Knight.

Greg

Nick writes, "This completely ignores Nathaniel Branden's explanation that perception is not enough for knowledge. There must be comprehension, mental grasp, too."

In raising this red herring, you have conveniently avoided addressing the fundamental confusion I identified via your test. Can't answer it?

There is no red herring on my part. I am pointing out inconsistencies in the statements Rand makes about knowledge. She doesn't say, "This is the broader sense of knowledge, and this is the narrower sense. She is talking about "knowledge" She says it is always derived, processed, and contextual but axiomatic knowledge is not. You try to excuse this by talking about two senses of knowledge, but this is what you add to the literature to make it more consistent to you. You sound like a Christian excusing the two versions of the creation story in Genesis.

Nick

I think you are the dishonest one, Greg. I quoted several times that Rand defines man as volitionally conscious, a rational animal by choice. You did not refute or even address this.

I also said, “According to Rand, the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are implicit in all human awareness, human experience. They are necessary for knowing itself.” This is a true statement.

At least twice, I pointed out that Nick has been confusing the concept with the referent in such statements. The key Rand quote on this (from the ITOE chapter on Axiomatic Concepts) is perfectly clear that people have direct awareness of the FACTS named by those terms, NOT THE CONCEPTS:

The referent is the concept, the fact, the knowledge. Your quotes do not impact this.

"After the first discriminated sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously. The awareness of this need can be reached only at an advanced stage of conceptual development, when one has acquired a sufficient volume of knowledge—and the identification, the fully conscious grasp, can be achieved only by a process of abstraction.

This quote does not say that basic facts are different from the axiomatic concepts. It says that subsequent knowledge adds nothing to them and that at an advanced stage of conceptual development, they can be made explicit by a process of abstraction. They are still necessary for knowing, itself.

"The fact that axioms are available to perception does not mean that all human beings accept or even grasp axioms in conscious, conceptual terms. Vast numbers of men, such as primitives, never progress beyond implicit knowledge of the axioms. Lacking explicit philosophic identification of this knowledge, they have no way to adhere to the axioms consistently and typically fall into some form of contradicting the self-evident, as in the various magical world views, which (implicitly) deny the law of identity. Such men stunt their minds by subjecting themselves to an undeclared epistemological civil war. The war pits their professed outlook on the world against the implicit knowledge on which they are actually counting in order to survive." [OPAR 9, bold mine]

You used this quote in your first failed attempt to refute me. I told you then how it doesn’t refute but actually supports my point. It says that even primitives have this knowledge implicit within them. They count on it to survive, even if they don’t grasp it conceptually. They don't have to grasp something conceptually for the axiomatic concepts, terms, to be implicit in their awareness. The concepts are implicit but not explicit. My statement: "According to Rand, the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are implicit in all human awareness, human experience," is not a mischaracterization of Rand.

Nick

Nick writes, "This completely ignores Nathaniel Branden's explanation that perception is not enough for knowledge. There must be comprehension, mental grasp, too."

Please recall my recent post talking about the two senses of 'knowledge'. Branden was talking about knowledge in the narrower, conceptual sense. That is not necessarily in conflict with Rand talking about knowledge in the broader sense in the definition you quoted: What she says of the broader sense needs to be true of the narrower, but not the other way around. (c.f., What is true about dogs is true about poodles, but what is true about poodles may not be true about dogs.)

In raising this red herring, you have conveniently avoided addressing the fundamental confusion I identified via your test. Can't answer it?

Greg

There are endless issues to address, but I think this one is almost as fundamental, and clearing it up would clear up many seeming 'incoherencies'.

Rootie wrote, "Being concious doesn't mean a person knows the concepts "identity" "conciousness" nor "existence". They may recall where they parked their car at the mall, but that has no bearing on their ability to define or utilize these concepts correctly."

And Nick responded, "What quote did Greg provide which refuted this? I provided quotes which affirmed it, and I don’t recall Greg even addressing it. According to Rand, the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are implicit in all human awareness, human experience. They are necessary for knowing itself. I don’t think you are really following this debate.

In fact, Rootie is the one who has followed the discussion perfectly in this respect. At least twice, I pointed out that Nick has been confusing the concept with the referent in such statements. The key Rand quote on this (from the ITOE chapter on Axiomatic Concepts) is perfectly clear that people have direct awareness of the FACTS named by those terms, NOT THE CONCEPTS:

"After the first discriminated sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously. The awareness of this need can be reached only at an advanced stage of conceptual development, when one has acquired a sufficient volume of knowledge—and the identification, the fully conscious grasp, can be achieved only by a process of abstraction.
It is not the abstraction of an attribute from a group of existents, but of a basic fact from all facts." [ITOE 56, bold mine]

And here in his OPAR section on these three basic axioms, Peikoff is likewise crystal clear that this implicit knowledge is NOT CONCEPTUAL:

"The fact that axioms are available to perception does not mean that all human beings accept or even grasp axioms in conscious, conceptual terms. Vast numbers of men, such as primitives, never progress beyond implicit knowledge of the axioms. Lacking explicit philosophic identification of this knowledge, they have no way to adhere to the axioms consistently and typically fall into some form of contradicting the self-evident, as in the various magical world views, which (implicitly) deny the law of identity. Such men stunt their minds by subjecting themselves to an undeclared epistemological civil war. The war pits their professed outlook on the world against the implicit knowledge on which they are actually counting in order to survive." [OPAR 9, bold mine]

Nick, we know none of this is news to you by any stretch. Yet even on direct query you persist in mischaracterizing Rand and the Objectivist position in support of a point you want to make about them: "According to Rand, the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are implicit in all human awareness, human experience." [Nick, bold mine]

This looks bad, Nick. Intellectually-dishonest bad. Please clear this up if you can. Otherwise, I am taking my leave as well.

Greg

This completely ignores Nathaniel Branden's explanation that perception is not enough for knowledge. There must be comprehension, mental grasp, too.

If you want to wind up your participation in this debate, simply go back and review everything, adding no new argument or evidence, and summarize why you think you won and I lost. I'll do the same, and we can leave it to the readers to determine for themselves who is more right.

Or, we can keep going and going and going.

bis bald,

Nick

There are endless issues to address, but I think this is the most fundamental.

In response to my puzzled query, Nick explained, 'I quoted Rand saying, “Knowledge is a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.” And, I asked if perception was a mental grasp of itself. If it is not, then it is not knowledge according to that definition.'

Nick, your test here indicates a serious confusion on your part, and it is right at the heart of your argument. Contra your test, NO form of knowledge is a mental grasp of PERCEPTION according to Objectivism -- knowledge is a mental grasp of FACT(S). Perception is (direct) awareness of fact(s) according to Objectivism, and is unsurprisingly regarded as "a mental grasp of fact(s)", which is just what Rand is talking about in this definition. So, in Objectivism, perception is regarded as a direct form of knowledge, and conception as an indirect form which is ultimately based on the direct form. Say hello to the broad sense of knowledge. It includes perceptual AND conceptual forms of awareness -- and your revisiting the Objectivist epistemology with this understanding should clear up innumerable 'incoherencies' you have struggled with.

Thank you for your inquiry, please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Regards,
Greg

You accuse me of mixing you and Rand. I'm pretty clear that you are confused on what Rand actually said.
"All humans are, by definition, objectively conscious. Therefore, they know axiomatic truth." Nope. Greg already pointed this one out with relevant Rand quote, and I pointed it out with real world examples. Being concious doesn't mean a person knows the concepts "identity" "conciousness" nor "existence". They may recall where they parked their car at the mall, but that has no bearing on their ability to define or utilize these concepts correctly.

What quote did Greg provide which refuted this? I provided quotes which affirmed it, and I don’t recall Greg even addressing it. According to Rand, the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are implicit in all human awareness, human experience. They are necessary for knowing itself. I don’t think you are really following this debate.

"From axiomatic truth, all other truth is derivable, including moral truth, by logical demonstration." You've got the direction of derivation wrong. No combination of existence, identity, or conciousness will construct the right to grow your own food. The right to grow your own food assumes that you exist, that you possess conciousness, and that food has some purpose to your existence.

Nope, your existence is not an assumption, according to Rand. It is an axiom. That axiom, existence exists, is basically A is A, the law of identity, which has all the other laws of logic, including causation, as corollaries, according to Rand. It is also a corollary that man has a specific nature which requires conditions of existence for his proper survival, natural rights. From axiomatic truth, all other ultimate truth is derivable, including moral truth, by logical demonstration, according to Rand and Peikoff. If you disagree with this, you don’t understand Objectivism.

"axiomatic truth, ... is not experienced but experienced directly." The concept of existence is never experienced directly. The fact of existence is experienced every time you open your eyes. There is no contradiction here. "not experienced" refers to the concept, "experienced directly" refers to the fact.
Axiomatic truth is axiomatic fact and it refers to the axiomatic concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity.

"Tautologies have nothing to do with experience. They tell us nothing of the outside world" If existence didn't exist, you couldn't experience the outside world. If you didn't exist, you couldn't experience the outside world. If a golf ball was really an ocean, and the direction up smelled like happy, then nothing would make any sense. (A is A, a golf ball is a golf ball, an ocean is an ocean, smell doesn't apply to directions, and an emotional state isn't a scent) Tautologies such as these are simple ways to describe enormously complex problems, and keep people from tripping themselves up by trying to dive into a golf ball.

Identity, A is A, is a procedural rule formalized by Aristotle to keep the identities of variables constant in communication and thinking. It does not necessarily say something about reality, which may not be constant. And, A is A tells us that, for purposes of communication and thinking, a tree is a tree, but it does not tell us if it is raining outside.

"One cannot logically derive as much as Rand derives from one, two, or three metaphysical assumptions" Again, you have the direction of the derivation wrong. This is like saying you can't build a computer because it is too complex to build such a system using a NAND gate.
Nope, this is true. Rand sneaks many other axioms into her system, like that causation is just the law of identity applied to action. Causation is inductive. It relies on experience for verification. The law of identity is tautological. It is true independent of experience, a-priori. However, Rand and Peikoff also reject the whole analytic/synthetic dichotomy, and induction v. deduction is part of it.

"Implicit in Rand's concept of objective reality is a world where men obtain value only from the acquisition of, or control over, material objects" Rand/Peikoff define a "value" as "that which one acts to gain or keep" and says nothing about material objects. I may act to gain or keep a friendship, promote the health and welfare of my wife, and even pay voluntarily to support a government to protect my individual rights. These are not material objects. Material objects are only a part of the needs of man.

One supports a government if the government secures one’s rights, and one has a natural right to pursue happiness. The only way one’s rights can be recognized completely is in a complete capitalistic system where value is exchanged voluntarily for value. A friendship, in this case, is treated exactly the same as any other value, one ought not initiate force on another. All transactions must be voluntary.

"all men are free and morally responsible regardless of circumstantial considerations" show me a society without hucksters. Peikoff (opar 363) "[government] is the agent of man's self-defense" -- if everyone were morally responsible, there would be no need of self-defense. If there were never innocent differences of interpretation in contracts, there would be no need of courts. From this, you can see that objectivism's view is that muggers and theives will continue to exist, and disagreements can still happen, even in "morally responsible" society.

The reason why we have courts is because men are responsible for their actions. The courts enforce those responsibilities.

"even though freedom is in conflict with determinism" ummm, hmmm, say what? if we define "freedom" as objectivist rights-respecting individual responsibility freedom, and "determinism" as "deterministic / mechanistic philosophy where things can't happen any other way", then you are comparing apples and oranges. If by "freedom" you mean non-rights-respecting anarchy, and by "determinism" the ability of a man to set and control his own direction, you are still comparing apples and oranges. These terms are undefined and highly ambiguous. Perhaps you could eludicate?

Freedom is in conflict with determinism. If there is unbroken cause and effect and all actions have sufficient reason, there can be no such thing as free-will.
"causality is a corollary of identity" and this is a problem because...?

This is a big problem because causality is inductive while identity is deductive. Causality depends on experience. It is from specific to general. It is inconclusive. Deduction is analytical. It is logically true, independent of experience. It is tautological. One cannot get from “A is A” to “If A, then B,” with logical deduction. It doesn’t work. Objectivists simply accept it as true because Rand says it is. It is blind faith acceptance.

"Basically, all the laws of logic can also be declared axiomatic. " who said anything about changing laws of logic? Logic just has no path to deal with "open your eyes and look around". Deductive logic won't change one iota.

Which is what Rand does. Since all the laws of logic, according to her, are derived from the law of identity, and the law of identity is axiomatic, all laws of logic, according to her, are axiomatic.

"Tautologies like" it is raining outside or not" can be axioms since they cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Even statements in the form of "It seems this is true." may be considered axioms since they cannot be denied without saying something which cannot be proven to be true." With your definition of "logic" it's a good thing conciousness can look out the window and see the rain for itself. The whole "or not" clause doesn't show up anywhere in the objectivist axioms except for the "or not" clause showing up to highlight the degree to which "or not" isn't really an option.

Objectivists don’t know what logic is. It’s a good thing they can look out the window. My definition of logic is the one used by logicians, not Objectivists. Do you know what logic is? Can you define validity for me, in your own words?

"It [concept of existence] can't be defined. " well, actually, we're debating it, so clearly it *can* be defined. (unless you don't exist, or your existence is somehow different from mine) You just aren't happy that the definition only requires you to open your eyes as a form of proof. If you are still in doubt on the definition of these concepts, (re)read OPAR chapter 1 where these concepts are all clearly and concisely defined and defended.

They are not clearly defined there. You should read something other than Objectivist literature.

I'm tired of this. My participation in this thread is now ended. I'll probably follow other threads as interest and time permits.

I thought as such. You’ll come on and say a bunch of stuff which clearly needs follow-up, but you won’t be interested in pursuing it further. It’s willful ignorance. It is no different from the Jehovah’s Witnesses who come to my door. They want to tell me stuff, but they don’t want to listen to me. They don’t think they can learn, and it’s true. They can’t.

Bis bald,

Nick

Yes, the hot stove is direct perception, but "indirect", as Rand is using the term in her epistemology, is not learning from the experience of others. I provided the quote which explains her use of "direct" and "indirect". Perceptions and axioms are direct, but conceptual knowledge is indirect. It is processed through cognition. Later on, this gets into the more abstract concepts like "man" and "human". This is the problem of universals about which Aristotle and Abelard spoke. We don't directly perceive "man", only individual men.

bis bald,

Nick

Rand is very coherent in that quote. She is describes all knowledge as being processed. She furthers her prior statement and builds on previous material highlighting the cognitive nature and origins of knowledge by highlighting how silly it would be if it were otherwise: "An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition." This is perfectly coherent; knowledge doesn't come built-in, or by magic, you have to think to gain it.

I understand this. It is like someone describing a circle as being not like a square and then describing a square circle as contradictory. This only supports my argument that direct perception is not processed, therefore not knowledge, and neither are axioms. However, axioms are knowledge. This is inconsistent. It is what the first point in my initial post is saying.

bis bald,

Nick

Nick,

You accuse me of mixing you and Rand.  I'm pretty clear that you are confused on what Rand actually said. 

"All humans are, by definition, objectively conscious. Therefore, they know axiomatic truth."  Nope.  Greg already pointed this one out with relevant Rand quote, and I pointed it out with real world examples.  Being concious doesn't mean a person knows the concepts "identity" "conciousness" nor "existence".  They may recall where they parked their car at the mall, but that has no bearing on their ability to define or utilize these concepts correctly. 

"From axiomatic truth, all other truth is derivable, including moral truth, by logical demonstration."  You've got the direction of derivation wrong.  No combination of existence, identity, or conciousness will construct the right to grow your own food.  The right to grow your own food assumes that you exist, that you possess conciousness, and that food has some purpose to your existence.

"axiomatic truth, ... is not experienced but experienced directly."  The concept of existence is never experienced directly.  The fact of existence is experienced every time you open your eyes.  There is no contradiction here.  "not experienced" refers to the concept, "experienced directly" refers to the fact.

"Tautologies have nothing to do with experience. They tell us nothing of the outside world" If existence didn't exist, you couldn't experience the outside world.  If you didn't exist, you couldn't experience the outside world.  If a golf ball was really an ocean, and the direction up smelled like happy, then nothing would make any sense.  (A is A, a golf ball is a golf ball, an ocean is an ocean, smell doesn't apply to directions, and an emotional state isn't a scent)  Tautologies such as these are simple ways to describe enormously complex problems, and keep people from tripping themselves up by trying to dive into a golf ball. 

"One cannot logically derive as much as Rand derives from one, two, or three metaphysical assumptions" Again, you have the direction of the derivation wrong.  This is like saying you can't build a computer because it is too complex to build such a system using a NAND gate.

"Implicit in Rand's concept of objective reality is a world where men obtain value only from the acquisition of, or control over, material objects"  Rand/Peikoff define a "value" as "that which one acts to gain or keep" and says nothing about material objects.  I may act to gain or keep a friendship, promote the health and welfare of my wife, and even pay voluntarily to support a government to protect my individual rights.  These are not material objects.  Material objects are only a part of the needs of man.

"all men are free and morally responsible regardless of circumstantial considerations" show me a society without hucksters.  Peikoff (opar 363) "[government] is the agent of man's self-defense" -- if everyone were morally responsible, there would be no need of self-defense.  If there were never innocent differences of interpretation in contracts, there would be no need of courts.  From this, you can see that objectivism's view is that muggers and theives will continue to exist, and disagreements can still happen, even in "morally responsible" society.

"even though freedom is in conflict with determinism" ummm, hmmm, say what?  if we define "freedom" as objectivist rights-respecting individual responsibility freedom, and "determinism" as "deterministic / mechanistic philosophy where things can't happen any other way", then you are comparing apples and oranges.  If by "freedom" you mean non-rights-respecting anarchy, and by "determinism" the ability of a man to set and control his own direction, you are still comparing apples and oranges.  These terms are undefined and highly ambiguous.  Perhaps you could eludicate?

"causality is a corollary of identity"  and this is a problem because...?

"Basically, all the laws of logic can also be declared axiomatic. "  who said anything about changing laws of logic?  Logic just has no path to deal with "open your eyes and look around".  Deductive logic won't change one iota.

"Tautologies like" it is raining outside or not" can be axioms since they cannot be denied without self-contradiction.   Even statements in the form of "It seems this is true." may be considered axioms since they cannot be denied without saying something which cannot be proven to be true."  With your definition of "logic" it's a good thing conciousness can look out the window and see the rain for itself.   The whole "or not" clause doesn't show up anywhere in the objectivist axioms except for the "or not" clause showing up to highlight the degree to which "or not" isn't really an option. 

"It [concept of existence] can't be defined. "  well, actually, we're debating it, so clearly it *can* be defined.  (unless you don't exist, or your existence is somehow different from mine) You just aren't happy that the definition only requires you to open your eyes as a form of proof.  If you are still in doubt on the definition of these concepts, (re)read OPAR chapter 1 where these concepts are all clearly and concisely defined and defended. 

I'm tired of this.  My participation in this thread is now ended.  I'll probably follow other threads as interest and time permits.

rootie

Nick,

How does touching a hot stove *not* have to do with direct perceptual experience? 

rootie

Nick wrote:  "Also, note the inconsistency in the quote above from ITOE 81: It says that all knowledge is processed knowledge, then it gives an example of “unprocessed” knowledge. This is not coherent."

Rand is very coherent in that quote.  She is describes all knowledge as being processed.  She furthers her prior statement and builds on previous material highlighting the cognitive nature and origins of knowledge by highlighting how silly it would be if it were otherwise:  "An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition."  This is perfectly coherent; knowledge doesn't come built-in, or by magic, you have to think to gain it. 

rootie

Can we substitute "gained" for "experienced" without changing the meaning of your statement? specifically: "all knowledge is gained indirectly" (just checking that we agree on the meaning of your statement)

I don’t see anything wrong with “derived.” It is the word Rand used. “Acquired” is another word that means the same thing. “Apprehended” is another word. They are all good or bad. I really don’t care.

I believe my hot stove example correlates exactly with the Rand quote you gave. If I touch a hot stove, I have a direct perceptual experience of it. If you touch a hot stove, I do not have that same direct perceptual experience. In both cases, I can gain knowledge of the stove -- in one instance it is direct knowledge, in the other instance it is indirectly obtained knowledge.
My definition of direct is where I gain knowledge through first-hand experience. Yours seems to be gaining knowledge through...something that doesn't involve perception? Is that a correct assessment? Perhaps you can elaborate on what you mean by "indirectly"?

Well, you just go ahead and think that if you want. I told you it wasn’t Rand’s interpretation, but you won’t believe me. There’s not much more I can do.

As for the ITOE Rand quote you gave: "The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery" This quote is speaking specifically to the knowledge of the concept that (sense inputs are integrated into perceptions). That in no way contradicts or invalidates the "direct" / "indirect" nature of the hot stove example ... unless you have some different meaning of indirect than I do?

I was telling you how Rand uses the terms direct and indirect. They have nothing to do with your example. They don’t invalidate it. They just don’t have anything to do with it.

Bis bald,

Nick

Rand, like many philosophers, uses both a broader and a narrower sense of 'knowledge' (the narrower being reserved for humans' distinctive form of knowledge, conceptual knowledge). Here is an example of her using the broad sense, and it certainly includes perception as a species of knowledge: "All knowledge is processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition."[ITOE 81]

I’m just using the definition of knowledge she, herself, provided, which I quoted as a mental gasp of a fact of reality reached by perception, not just the perception. It requires comprehension. Yes, she may use a broader sense of the term in some places. That is just more evidence of her inconsistency. Back when Nathaniel Branden was speaking for Objectivism, he said, in the “Intellectual Ammunition Department,” of The Objectivist Newsletter, II, (January 1963), p4, that for something to be “known,” in short, it is not enough that it be “perceived” to be. It must also be comprehended as a particular type of object or event complete with a specific meaning. Also, note the inconsistency in the quote above from ITOE 81: It says that all knowledge is processed knowledge, then it gives an example of “unprocessed” knowledge. This is not coherent.

And here is Peikoff likewise regarding perception as a species of knowledge: "Few men flout their perceptual knowledge." [OPAR 259]

Peikoff is being ironic or sarcastic here. He uses the example of people on LSD or Jim Jones, people who are clearly irrational, not acting on knowledge but feeling, people who would walk into the path of a speeding truck “because I feel like it” or “because the leader expects it.” On the conceptual level, he goes on to explain, the consequences of flouting one’s knowledge are not thus inescapable.

And perception it is not "a mental grasp of itself" (where did that come from?);

I don’t know. I didn’t say it was. I quoted Rand saying, “Knowledge is a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.” And, I asked if perception was a mental grasp of itself. If it is not, then it is not knowledge according to that definition.

Peikoff is clear that Objectivism recognizes that the perceptual form of awareness -- perceptual knowledge -- involves direct awareness of reality: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96]

That quote does not call perception knowledge. I addressed this in my previous two posts to Greg.

Rand of course recognizes that axiomatic concepts are special/peculiar in various ways -- in fact, she has an entire chapter on them in ITOE -- and in that chapter she is clearly regarding perceptual awareness of the fundamental facts identified by axiomatic concepts as knowledge of those facts: 'After the first discriminated sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously. The awareness of this need can be reached only at an advanced stage of conceptual development, when one has acquired a sufficient volume of knowledge—and the identification, the fully conscious grasp, can be achieved only by a process of abstraction.
It is not the abstraction of an attribute from a group of existents, but of a basic fact from all facts.' [ITOE 56, underline mine]

This quote does not say the subsequent knowledge is sensation or percept. It just says subsequent knowledge, after axiomatic knowledge, adds nothing to that implicit axiomatic knowledge.

As for your comments on tabula rasa, you have simply confused the essential with the incidental. First, tabula rasa does not mean no AUTOMATIC knowledge (that after all would be excluding perceptual knowledge, which IS automatic and infallible); rather, it means no INNATE ideas (i.e., no innate conceptual knowledge). Once you understand that, you can see that "at birth" is not the important detail (and picking the real, non-poetic point in time is a matter for science, which seems clear now that perception is possible for some time before birth). The unproblematic philosophic essential is that no conceptul knowledge could be present prior to perception. Peikoff is clear on what is being said: "Since concepts, according to Objectivism, are integrations of perceptual data, there can be no concepts apart from sense experience. There are no innate ideas, ideas in the mind at birth. Consciousness begins as a tabula rasa (a blank slate); all of its conceptual content is derived from the evidence of the senses." [OPAR 38]

None of this conflicts with my point that perception is not knowledge. And, that Rand says all knowledge is derived, but axiomatic knowledge is not.

Moving on, I had written: 'And according to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123, bold mine]'
Nick comments, "Your quote here leaves aside axioms, which are not contextual. However, on page 121 of OPAR, under the title of “Knowledge as Contextual”, Peikoff begins the third paragraph saying “Concepts are a relational form of knowledge.” He doesn’t say “some” concepts. However, axiomatic concepts are clearly not contextual. They are fundamentally given and true independent of any context and implied in any state of awareness. They are irreducible primaries. So, give Peikoff your lecture on intellectual sloppiness."
Peikoff was of course giving a structured presentation and it is not out of line to assume his reader will pay attention to his development through the end of a section. A handful of paragraphs later he had built up to the fuller and more precise formulations about the implications of context, which I drew from. (It is a bit ironic that you would quote Peikoff out of context in his section on context.)

What I quoted was from a section on context, but it was not out of context. Peikoff was talking about concepts in general as being relational, contextual, but he did not qualify them as being non-axiomatic concepts, which are clearly not contextual.

Greg, you are doing everything you can to discredit my discrediting of Rand. Keep working. You aren’t there yet.

Bis bald,

Nick

Nick,

Can we substitute "gained" for "experienced" without changing the meaning of your statement?  specifically:  "all knowledge is gained indirectly" (just checking that we agree on the meaning of your statement)

I believe my hot stove example correlates exactly with the Rand quote you gave.  If I touch a hot stove, I have a direct perceptual experience of it.  If you touch a hot stove, I do not have that same direct perceptual experience.  In both cases, I can gain knowledge of the stove -- in one instance it is direct knowledge, in the other instance it is indirectly obtained knowledge.

My definition of direct is where I gain knowledge through first-hand experience.  Yours seems to be gaining knowledge through...something that doesn't involve perception?  Is that a correct assessment?  Perhaps you can elaborate on what you mean by "indirectly"?

As for the ITOE Rand quote you gave: "The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery"  This quote is speaking specifically to the knowledge of the concept that (sense inputs are integrated into perceptions).   That in no way contradicts or invalidates the "direct" / "indirect" nature of the hot stove example ... unless you have some different meaning of indirect than I do?

rootie

Nick writes, "Your quote from page 96 of OPAR is not talking about knowledge. It is talking about perception in the context of concept formation. Perception, as I explained, is not, by itself, what Rand considers knowledge. What does Rand consider knowledge? Rand defines it as “a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.” Is a perception, by itself, a mental grasp of itself? Apparently not. Rand also talks about how babies are born tabula rasa, with no automatic knowledge. However, it is a given that all sorts of sensations and perceptions take place in the womb. Rand is, evidently, not considering that knowledge yet. Knowledge implies not only a recognition of a phenomenon but some degree of comprehension as well."

Rand, like many philosophers, uses both a broader and a narrower sense of 'knowledge' (the narrower being reserved for humans' distinctive form of knowledge, conceptual knowledge). Here is an example of her using the broad sense, and it certainly includes perception as a species of knowledge: "All knowledge is processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition."[ITOE 81] And here is Peikoff likewise regarding perception as a species of knowledge: "Few men flout their perceptual knowledge." [OPAR 259] And perception it is not "a mental grasp of itself" (where did that come from?); Peikoff is clear that Objectivism recognizes that the perceptual form of awareness -- perceptual knowledge -- involves direct awareness of reality: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96]

Rand of course recognizes that axiomatic concepts are special/peculiar in various ways -- in fact, she has an entire chapter on them in ITOE -- and in that chapter she is clearly regarding perceptual awareness of the fundamental facts identified by axiomatic concepts as knowledge of those facts: 'After the first discriminated sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously. The awareness of this need can be reached only at an advanced stage of conceptual development, when one has acquired a sufficient volume of knowledge—and the identification, the fully conscious grasp, can be achieved only by a process of abstraction.
It is not the abstraction of an attribute from a group of existents, but of a basic fact from all facts.' [ITOE 56, underline mine]

As for your comments on tabula rasa, you have simply confused the essential with the incidental. First, tabula rasa does not mean no AUTOMATIC knowledge (that after all would be excluding perceptual knowledge, which IS automatic and infallible); rather, it means no INNATE ideas (i.e., no innate conceptual knowledge). Once you understand that, you can see that "at birth" is not the important detail (and picking the real, non-poetic point in time is a matter for science, which seems clear now that perception is possible for some time before birth). The unproblematic philosophic essential is that no conceptul knowledge could be present prior to perception. Peikoff is clear on what is being said: "Since concepts, according to Objectivism, are integrations of perceptual data, there can be no concepts apart from sense experience. There are no innate ideas, ideas in the mind at birth. Consciousness begins as a tabula rasa (a blank slate); all of its conceptual content is derived from the evidence of the senses." [OPAR 38]

Moving on, I had written: 'And according to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123, bold mine]'

Nick comments, "Your quote here leaves aside axioms, which are not contextual. However, on page 121 of OPAR, under the title of “Knowledge as Contextual”, Peikoff begins the third paragraph saying “Concepts are a relational form of knowledge.” He doesn’t say “some” concepts. However, axiomatic concepts are clearly not contextual. They are fundamentally given and true independent of any context and implied in any state of awareness. They are irreducible primaries. So, give Peikoff your lecture on intellectual sloppiness."

Peikoff was of course giving a structured presentation and it is not out of line to assume his reader will pay attention to his development through the end of a section. A handful of paragraphs later he had built up to the fuller and more precise formulations about the implications of context, which I drew from. (It is a bit ironic that you would quote Peikoff out of context in his section on context.)

So we return to my observation: As written, bullet #1 is a misrepresentation of Objectivism that your argument depends on -- would you care to try rewriting it again? By all means, please do give it a shot if you really think you can rescue your argument from its current complete failure.

Greg

In #1: "all knowledge is experienced indirectly" You don't experience knowledge -- "knowledge" is as intangible as "concept" -- you can't see it, touch it or stack it on the table. We can observe the effects of it in our interaction with our surroundings and our interactions with others.

Are you saying we can’t “experience” intangible things, like love or hate? Sure we can. I thought “experienced” would be a better word than “derived”, but you can find flaws in it too. Words in spoken languages are often inexact. Einstein used calculus, a more precise language, to explain his theories.

We each build knowledge from experience. That experience can be direct, such as when I touch a hot stove and get burned and I gain knowledge that the stove is hot. That experience can also be indirect where you touch a hot stove and get burned, then you tell me the stove is hot, and again, I gain knowledge from experience. Knowledge is therefore acquired either directly or "indirectly".

That is not what Rand means by “direct” and “indirect.” In ITOE, 5, she says, “When we speak of “direct perception” or “direct awareness,” we mean the perceptual level. Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery.”

Your inclusion of "senses" in the same sentence with "indirectly" suggests you believe there is some other way to gain this information, or that sensory input is not direct?

Sensory input is direct, but conceptual knowledge is not, except for the axiomatic concepts.

In #3, "Axioms are experienced directly", again, "axiom" like "knowledge" and "concept" cannot be experienced directly.

Yes it can, according to Rand. That’s why I think she is inconsistent.

Being somewhat more precise, "existence" is experienced directly. It is experienced just as directly as putting a hand on a hot stove. There is nothing to derive, and it is *very* contextual. I put my hand on the stove and it was hot. My hand and the stove both exist. If there were no hand or no stove, or no motion to place hand on stove, there would be no knowledge of existence nor of surface temperature gained.

Nope, there is a difference between the experience of the hot stove and the experience of existence. The hot stove may not be as hot to someone who has been working at a foundry all day pouring molten metal into molds. The stove, to him or her, may be cooler by comparison. However, it could be very hot to someone coming in from the cold, playing in the snow. Existence is not like that. It is not relative or relational. It is the same for everybody, and it is implied in the experience itself. It has to be known before the conceptual knowledge of the hotness of the stove is known.

There are sensations of light and motion, and as infants we learn that light and motion has real meaning because we can interact with it, touch it. Sometimes it is warm and soft (mom), sometimes it is scratchy (dad's razor stubble), sometimes it tickles (kitty's tail). This is how we learn about existence. We see it, we touch it, we taste it. Hot sunshine, cold tile floor, scratchy stubble -- all just part of the experience of existence.

We learn from experience. I have no problem with this. I tried to tell you this before, and you told me I was lost. Rand would say we need reason, laws of logic, derived from axioms, to help us integrate our perceptions. Pragmatist say we learn logic just as we learn everything else, from experience. Rand doesn’t like pragmatism because she thinks it denies real reality and axioms in favor of only what appears to work. However, this is her bias. Pragmatism, as the Mad Hatter testified, is more committed to reason than is Objectivism. They hold that reality is rational because they experience to be thus. The Objectivist hold it because it is axiomatic and self-evident, true because it is true.

It isn't until years later that we actually have a name for everything around us, and that name is "existence". The concept that name "existence" represents is definitely derived from and supported by our lifelong experiences.
But existence cannot be defined except ostensively. And

Rand and her followers project a lot of stuff onto it. They say it proves that reality is objective and that everything has a specific nature which determines what it does at any given moment and the laws of logic exist, including causation, the law of identity applied to action etc. They seem oblivious to all the problems with the simple word “is”. It can mean a lot of things, not just that A is A, and A is A doesn’t mean as much as Rand wants it to mean.

We experience identity and conciousness the same way. We see the cat interact with us. It runs when we chase it, and scratches, yowls and bites when we pull its tail. Again, it isn't until we have sufficient knowledge and context that can we actually understand that the cat running from us demonstrates "conciousness" and that the bites are a form of "identity".

Yes, but Rand says this axiomatic knowledge is implicit in our experience of the cat etc.

The fundamental nature of axiomatic concepts of existence, identity, and conciousness is most definitely experienced directly, but as a form of conceptual knowledge, they are derived from our lifetime of experiences.

This is what Rand says. I think it is inconsistent when she says these concepts are implicit in all experience. It means they had to be known before anything, including themselves, could be known.

Bis bald,

Nick

FALSE PARAPHRASE. According to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is experienced indirectly: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96, bold mine]

Your quote from page 96 of OPAR is not talking about knowledge. It is talking about perception in the context of concept formation. Perception, as I explained, is not, by itself, what Rand considers knowledge. What does Rand consider knowledge? Rand defines it as “a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.” Is a perception, by itself, a mental grasp of itself? Apparently not. Rand also talks about how babies are born tabula rasa, with no automatic knowledge. However, it is a given that all sorts of sensations and perceptions take place in the womb. Rand is, evidently, not considering that knowledge yet. Knowledge implies not only a recognition of a phenomenon but some degree of comprehension as well.

And according to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123, bold mine]

Your quote here leaves aside axioms, which are not contextual. However, on page 121 of OPAR, under the title of “Knowledge as Contextual”, Peikoff begins the third paragraph saying “Concepts are a relational form of knowledge.” He doesn’t say “some” concepts. However, axiomatic concepts are clearly not contextual. They are fundamentally given and true independent of any context and implied in any state of awareness. They are irreducible primaries. So, give Peikoff your lecture on intellectual sloppiness.

bis bald,

Nick

Nick,

In #1: "all knowledge is experienced indirectly"  You don't experience knowledge -- "knowledge" is as intangible as "concept" -- you can't see it, touch it or stack it on the table.  We can observe the effects of it in our interaction with our surroundings and our interactions with others. 

We each build knowledge from experience.  That experience can be direct, such as when I touch a hot stove and get burned and I gain knowledge that the stove is hot.  That experience can also be indirect where you touch a hot stove and get burned, then you tell me the stove is hot, and again, I gain knowledge from experience.  Knowledge is therefore acquired either directly or "indirectly". 

Your inclusion of "senses" in the same sentence with "indirectly" suggests you believe there is some other way to gain this information, or that sensory input is not direct?

In #3, "Axioms are experienced directly", again, "axiom" like "knowledge" and "concept" cannot be experienced directly.  Being somewhat more precise, "existence" is experienced directly.  It is experienced just as directly as putting a hand on a hot stove.  There is nothing to derive, and it is *very* contextual.  I put my hand on the stove and it was hot.  My hand and the stove both exist.  If there were no hand or no stove, or no motion to place hand on stove, there would be no knowledge of existence nor of surface temperature gained. 

There are sensations of light and motion, and as infants we learn that light and motion has real meaning because we can interact with it, touch it.  Sometimes it is warm and soft (mom), sometimes it is scratchy (dad's razor stubble), sometimes it tickles (kitty's tail).  This is how we learn about existence.  We see it, we touch it, we taste it.  Hot sunshine, cold tile floor, scratchy stubble -- all just part of the experience of existence. 

It isn't until years later that we actually have a name for everything around us, and that name is "existence".  The concept that name "existence" represents is definitely derived from and supported by our lifelong experiences. 

We experience identity and conciousness the same way.  We see the cat interact with us.  It runs when we chase it, and scratches, yowls and bites when we pull its tail.  Again, it isn't until we have sufficient knowledge and context that can we actually understand that the cat running from us demonstrates "conciousness" and that the bites are a form of "identity".  The fundamental nature of axiomatic concepts of existence, identity, and conciousness is most definitely experienced directly, but as a form of conceptual knowledge, they are derived from our lifetime of experiences. 

rootie

“I blame Rand and Peikoff. This is their sloppiness. I am merely pointing it out. It is they I am quoting and paraphrasing in my bullets and in my initial argument.”

Nick, here's what I wrote again, mildly updated to try to help you understand what you are looking at:

“1. All knowledge is derived, meaning all knowledge is experienced indirectly, from the senses, and contextual, relative.”

FALSE PARAPHRASE. According to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is experienced indirectly: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96, bold mine] And according to Objectivism, NOT ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123, bold mine]

As written, bullet #1 is a misrepresentation of Objectivism and your argument depends on it -- would you care to try rewriting it again? By all means, please do give it a shot if you really think you can rescue your argument from its current complete failure.

Greg

Nick, you carefully crafted bullet #1 to talk about ALL knowledge -- yet what it said is not true of SOME knowledge. If you didn't really mean ALL, you shouldn't have talked about ALL. Please don't blame others for the consequences of your intellectual sloppiness.

I blame Rand and Peikoff. This is their sloppiness. I am merely pointing it out. It is they I am quoting and paraphrasing in my bullets and in my initial argument. What does Rand consider knowledge? Rand defines it as “a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.” Is a perception, by itself, a mental grasp of itself? Apparently not. Rand also talks about how babies are born tabula rasa, with no automatic knowledge. However, it is a given that all sorts of sensations and perceptions take place in the womb. Rand is, evidently, not considering that knowledge yet. Knowledge implies not only a recognition of a phenomenon but some degree of comprehension as well.

On page 121 of OPAR, under the title of “Knowledge as Contextual”, Peikoff begins the third paragraph saying “Concepts are a relational form of knowledge.” He doesn’t say “some” concepts. However, axiomatic concepts are clearly not contextual. They are fundamentally given and true independent of any context and implied in any state of awareness. They are irreducible primaries. So, give Peikoff your lecture on intellectual sloppiness.

As written, bullet #1 has been proven simply false -- do you care to try rewriting it again? By all means, please do give it a shot if you really think you can rescue your argument from its current complete failure.

No. The argument has to be challenged first. My statement above is enough to make your attempt at a challenge go away. Please do give it another shot if you really think you can.

"Yes she does claim [axioms] are true because they are true."
Objectivism holds that we know the axioms are true because we validate them via sense perception. We experience their truth directly; we don't need to make up or assume their truth.
'"Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception.' [OPAR 8]

First, validation is not “proof”. It is weaker than proof. It is one step up from apology, saying, “I’m sorry. I can’t prove this but at least I can validate it.” Logic gets treated this way, since we can’t use logic to prove logic. We vindicate its use. It’s all we have. Existentialist also ues validation to talk about their own exitence, which they admit they can't prove. They reject Descartes' cogito as circular, but they say they can validate their own existence as the experience other things. Second, sense perception is not pure, not self-evident and not always accurate. Science tells us that because of the construction of the eye, we have a blind spot which we fill with illusions. So, our perception of reality is not necessarily what reality is. It is not really great proof or validation, as was illustrated by the blind man, the turkey, and the frog in the first part of the Alice series.

“..I say [axioms] have to be there before we can even experience other knowledge, and that’s the inconsistency..."
Sorry, but this is an inadmissibly vague statement. Please indicate what you are actually talking about: "be there" in what sense? In the sense of being facts of reality? Of being facts available to our direct awareness, at least implicitly? Of being grasped explicitly? Being grasped explicitly in conceptual form? Something else? What could it be?? You seem to think this is crucial, so I'm on pins and needles.
Please, dazzle us with your potential for scholarly precision and rewrite your bullets again. As it stands, your argument proves nothing but an inability to establish your point.

Perhaps I can’t establish my point to you. I would have trouble establishing it to my pet hamster also. That doesn’t mean it is not an establishable point. When I say axioms have to be there before we can experience other knowledge, I am paraphrasing Rand. She is the one saying they are the base of knowledge and necessarily contained in all knowledge. According to Rand, and John Galt, there can be no consciousness without their prior existence and our knowledge of them. “Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axioms remain the same: that it exists and that you know it.” Since Rand later defines man as a volitionally conscious being, she is saying we already know, by virtue of being human, the axiomatic knowledge. They have to be there before we can have any knowledge. This is the inconsistency of treating all knowledge as something which is derived but axiomatic knowledge is not derived, it is implied in what is derived. It is necessary in the process of deriving knowledge, although she tries to make it seem axiomatic knowledge comes at exactly the same time as non-axiomatic knowledge and differs only in that it is more direct and not contextual.

Bis bald,

Nick

Nick, you carefully crafted bullet #1 to talk about ALL knowledge -- yet what it said is not true of SOME knowledge. If you didn't really mean ALL, you shouldn't have talked about ALL. Please don't blame others for the consequences of your intellectual sloppiness. As written, bullet #1 has been proven simply false -- do you care to try rewriting it again? By all means, please do give it a shot if you really think you can rescue your argument from its current complete failure.

"Yes she does claim [axioms] are true because they are true."

Objectivism holds that we know the axioms are true because we validate them via sense perception. We experience their truth directly; we don't need to make up or assume their truth.

'"Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception.' [OPAR 8]

"...I say [axioms] have to be there before we can even experience other knowledge, and that’s the inconsistency..."

Sorry, but this is an inadmissibly vague statement. Please indicate what you are actually talking about: "be there" in what sense? In the sense of being facts of reality? Of being facts available to our direct awareness, at least implicitly? Of being grasped explicitly? Being grasped explicitly in conceptual form? Something else? What could it be?? You seem to think this is crucial, so I'm on pins and needles.

Please, dazzle us with your potential for scholarly precision and rewrite your bullets again. As it stands, your argument proves nothing but an inability to establish your point.

Greg

FALSE. Not ALL knowledge is experienced indirectly: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96] And not ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123]

When I said Rand said all knowledge is derived and that that means it is experienced indirectly, I meant that she meant that it is experienced through the senses first and then processed by cognition and based on context. The initial perception, of course, is direct. However, this isn’t conceptual knowledge. Even animals have perceptions.

But Rand DOES NOT claim these are true because they are true, and this is a shocking mischaracterization for a supposed Rand scholar; she is perfectly clear that we know axiomatic facts not by fiat or assumption, but because we experience them directly via the senses.

Yes she does claim they are true because they are true. They may be experienced directly along with our awareness of anything else, I say they have to be there before we can even experience other knowledge, and that’s the inconsistency, but that is not how we know they are true. We know they are true because they are, according to her, self-evident. They are the primaries of cognition. It’s the pragmatist who says they are true because we experience them to be so.

Gee, Greg’s mischaracterization of Rand is shocking!

Bis bald,

Nick

Thanks for prompting Nick to be more clear, guys! Nick corrected the three-bullet breakdown of his argument to his satisfaction with this revision:

“1. All knowledge is derived, meaning all knowledge is experienced indirectly, from the senses, and contextual, relative.”

FALSE. Not ALL knowledge is experienced indirectly: “The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality; a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.” [OPAR 96] And not ALL knowledge is formed in and given meaning by a context: “Leaving aside the primaries of cognition, which are self-evident, all knowledge depends on a certain relationship: it is based on a context of earlier information.” [OPAR 123]

“2. Axioms are knowledge.”

TRUE. Though one should be careful when using the term ‘axiom’ to make it clear whether one is talking about the fundamental facts axioms name, or the awareness/identification of said fundamental facts.

“3. Axioms are experienced directly, thus derived, but not contextually like non-axiomatic knowledge. ... “

TRUE. Though this of course only conflicts with Nick’s misunderstanding in [1], not with Objectivism.

“... Axioms have to be present to integrate contextual knowledge.”

AMBIGUOUS ala my note in [2]. Here are two senses I can think of where it is true, though: First, the fundamental facts named by axioms are available in any act of awareness, so they do “have to be present” for any cognitive act in the simple sense that it is impossible for them to NOT be available. And second, it is these fundamental *facts* which enable and demand integration -- even before one is consciously aware of them. If Existence, Identity, and Consciousness were not true, integration would be neither necessary nor possible. Oh, and on their truth, Nick added, “Pragmatists don't claim that axioms like A is A are true because they are true, like Rand does. They say they are true because they are experienced as such.” But Rand DOES NOT claim these are true because they are true, and this is a shocking mischaracterization for a supposed Rand scholar; she is perfectly clear that we know axiomatic facts not by fiat or assumption, but because we experience them directly via the senses.

So Nick’s claimed demonstration of a problem with Objectivism turns out to be nothing more than a compelling demonstration of problems with his scholarship.

Greg

Jameson said he tried reasoning with me but, like everyone else, he couldn't get through my illogic barrier.

I challenged him, then, to prove to me that he new what logic was. I asked him to form an original syllogism and demonstrate validity.

He hasn’t accepted this challenge.

He continues to violate posting guidelines set down by Lindsey. He continues to disgust rather than persuade.

Bis bald,

Nick

Michelin Man
round and round he goes
dangerously inflated
on a threadbare tread

Traditionally writers aren't supposed to review their own work Nick.

I'm proud of this work. I know it's good. There are people who don't like it. There are people also who don't like The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. It's their problem and their loss. I feel a little sorry for them. However, it's like Rick Nelson said, "If you can't please everybody, you gott'a learn to please yourself."

bis bald,

Nick

"My take-off on it is creative and also informative about Objectivism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism."

Traditionally writers aren't supposed to review their own work Nick.

Regarding Nick’s explicit defense of his first-point argument, I had said: ‘This is an inconsistency on your part, Nick. She indeed said that the primary fact an axiom identifies IS directly perceived -- and that certainly coheres with the usage of ‘derived’ you just approvingly quoted: “DIRECTLY or indirectly … derived from one’s awareness of the external world”.’
Nick began, “Yes,” apparently conceding that his argument had fallen flat. (There must be a god! :^)

I said yes to indicate that Rand said what you were quoting, not to concede that my argument had fallen flat.

In fact, he abandoned it and seamlessly moved to something else:

No, I quoted other passages to better explain the passage you quoted and show that it doesn’t cohere with the usage of ‘derived’ I quoted before. When ‘derived’ was used before, it was talking about sense experience which is indirect and contextual. Axiomatic knowledge is implicit in the state of awareness.

‘... but, “They are implicit in every state of awareness, from the first sensation to the first percept to the sum of all concepts.” (Ibid) So, they had to be implicit in themselves when they were first experienced. They form the bases for objectivity. The axiomatic concept of identity has to be known before or at least at the same time someone identifies identity. This seems incoherent.’

Well, we should note that that is a different argument.

No it is an extension of the one I made at the beginning, that axiomatic knowledge is different than the knowledge included under “All knowledge”. It is not derived in the same way. If it were, it would need itself to derive itself. It is a precondition for integrating or conceptualizing non-axiomatic knowledge.

And one I even pointed out the essential flaw in earlier: this is simply confusing the *concept* with the *referents*.
The axiomatic FACT is “implicit in every state of awareness”, not the axiomatic CONCEPT. Here is