"BTW I wasn't saying your referring me to OPAR was an indication of faith based reasoning."

I'm so glad.

Fred

Fred -
Well, it sounds like you're happy.

Thank you. That's quite a compliment considering how objectivists define happiness. You seem happy too.

Cheers,

Reed.

[Edit] BTW I wasn't saying your referring me to OPAR was an indication of faith based reasoning.

Well, it sounds like you're happy.

Fred

I'm pretty sure I understand the intrinsic-subjective-objective trichotomy...

Epistemetaphysology(C) encompasses our understanding of reality.
Metaphysics is an intrinsic perspective of epistemetaphysology.
Epistemology is a subjective perspective of epistemetaphysology.

To consider the whole is the objective perspective or epistemetaphysology.

Or put another way...

"To be aware is to be aware of something."
To focus on the awareness aspect is epistemology and a subjective approach.
To focus on the something aspect is metaphysics and an intrinsic approach.
To consider "awareness of something" as a whole is an objective approach which I have labeled epistemetaphysology.

Or put another way...

I don't consider perception separately from what I perceive nor do I consider what I perceive separately from perception.

Cheers,

Reed.

"... For a good introduction to this trichotomy. see Peikoff's OPAR, pp. 142ff, 241ff, and 438ff.
This suggestion is to me what the faith card is to you."

I'm confused. I provided those references to Peikoff on the trichotomy, not to suggest that it is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but rather to provide a more complete exposition of said trichotomy. The site you had provided made it seem as if the trichotomy only obtained in ethics. Sorry for the confusion.

"'Do you think that "the nature of the universe as a whole" is identical with "the nature and means of human knowledge"?...'
No..."

If so, then one must differentiate epistemology from metaphysics.

" do you agree with the following 2 statements?
1) The Epistemological is a subset of the Metaphysical.
2) Our understanding of Metaphysics is a subset of Epistemology."

I do, but I don't think it does the job you intended, i.e., to establish the identity of the two disciplines. Notice you did not write,

"The Epistemological is a subset of the Metaphysical, and The metaphysical is a subset of the Epistemological."

With that I disagree. They are two different disciplines.

Happy Valentines Day

Fred

Fred -
Just because people perceive an existent as being designed doesn't mean the existent is designed. Many people perceive existents as being created by a triune God, but they may in fact be wrong.
Yes, I agree. Usually people acknowledge the possibility that they may be wrong by admitting faith/belief and not professing "knowledge". Focusing on perception doesn't address the nature of the existents.

Many people "perceive 'red' as being in the object, but science tells us that "red" is actually a multi-valued relation involving the object, the subject, a light source and an intervening medium.

Depending on an individuals perspective "Red" could be...
1) A reflective/emmitive property of an object.
2) Light of a specific frequency range.
3) The perception of a colour range.
4) Some combination of the above.

When there's no light or observer is my car still red? The answer is yes and no, depending on how we define the word "red". Here we have four perspectives but the different perspectives do not change reality - it only affects how we discuss it.

... For a good introduction to this trichotomy. see Peikoff's OPAR, pp. 142ff, 241ff, and 438ff.
This suggestion is to me what the faith card is to you.

Do you think that "the nature of the universe as a whole" is identical with "the nature and means of human knowledge"?...
No...
[snip]... Is this a part/whole confusion?
... maybe... do you agree with the following 2 statements?
1) The Epistemological is a subset of the Metaphysical.
2) Our understanding of Metaphysics is a subset of Epistemology.

Cheers,

Reed.

"If I understand his conclusion correctly he is ignoring existents that people perceive as having been designed."

Just because people perceive an existent as being designed doesn't mean the existent is designed. Many people percieve existents as being created by a triune God, but they may in fact be wrong. Many people "perceive 'red' as being in the object, but science tells us that "red" is actually a multi-valued relation involving the object, the subject, a light source and an intervening medium. (Cf. Kelley's THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES on this.)

"I found this explanation. The Intrinsic/Objective/Subjective Trichotomy explained here is simply defining/redefining the word "value". Three perspectives, one reality."

This is not your error, but rather due to the incomplete explanation of the trichotomy given at "this explanation."

The trichotomy actually originates in epistemology, and then is applied to ethics, politics and esthetics. For a good introduction to this trichotomy. see Peikoff's OPAR, pp. 142ff, 241ff, and 438ff.

"I don't think of metaphysics and epistemology as two subjects; ie. what we learn about reality is knowledge and knowledge is what we learn about reality. - Two perspectives, one reality."

Let say we look at Peikoff definitions of metaphysics and episemology. (OPAR, p.3) The former is the "branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the universe as a whole," the latter "studies the nature and means of human knowledge." So, question. Do you think that "the nature of the universe as a whole" is identical with "the nature and means of human knowledge.? They certainly differ as to subject matter. One studies all of reality, the other a part of reality. Is this a part/whole confusion?

Fred

Fred -
If "order" or "design" is epistemological, doesn't that damage the so called argument from design?
Correct me if I'm wrong... Binswanger is claiming that "design" is a matter of perception only, rather than a matter of reality, and to assume he is right is the same as assuming that evidence of design does not exist.

Reed: I think Binswanger's approach is oevasion.
Fred: How can you say this without hearing the argument?
If I understand his conclusion correctly he is ignoring existents that people perceive as having been designed. Existents are not a product of perception and the design argument is an explanation of its nature... I think his ignoring and denial approach fits within the objectivist definition of evasion.

My hunch is that the religious types do think "design" is intrinsic...

While I am still unsure of your meaning I'm pretty sure if you consider the "order" found in your phone book to be intrinsic then it should be safe to assume religious types think "order" in nature is intrinsic in the same way.

Are you familiar with the intrinsic-objective-subjective trichotomy. My fault. I just assumed all posters to this site would know that and hence would understand my question about "order is intrinsic." But now I have a hesitation. My hunch is that the religious types do think "design" is intrinsic but since the trichotomy is epistemological and not metaphysical, we're back where we started and the argument seems to fail.

I found this explanation. The Intrinsic/Objective/Subjective Trichotomy explained here is simply defining/redefining the word "value". Three perspectives, one reality.

Note: I don't think of metaphysics and epistemology as two subjects; ie. what we learn about reality is knowledge and knowledge is what we learn about reality. - Two perspectives, one reality.

Cheers,

Reed.

"I think Binswanger's approach is oevasion (sic).

How can you say this without hearing the argument? That's why I put it in the hpothetical form. If "order" or "design" is epistemological, doesn't that damage the so called argument from design?

As to my second query. Are you familiar with the intrinsic-objective- subjective trichotomy. My fault. I just assumed all posters to this site would know that and hence would understand my question about "order is intrinsic." But now I have a hesitation. My hunch is that the religious types do think "design" is intrinsic, but since the trichotomy is epistemological and not metaphysical, we're back where we started and the argument seems to fail.

Fred

Fred -
I think Binswanger thinks there is a difference.
I think Binswanger's approach is oevasion.

Do you think my neighbors are in alphabetical order, or is that something I impose to deal with an otherwise unmanageable diversity?
I'm not sure I get your meaning so I'll answer this a few ways...
1) If you have 20 or more neighbours and they reside in alphabetical order I would expect it to be an arrangement by design - a military base perhaps.
2) If your neighbours are arranged in your phone book alphabetically then that would also be evidence of intelligent ordering.
3) If you simply imagine your neighbours in alphabetical order they may or may not be arranged physically in alphabetical order.
4) If you simply imagine your neighbours unordered they may or may not be arranged physically in alphabetical order.

Do you think the argument from design crowd thinks that order is intrinsic?
I'm not sure of your meaning here either. If you can say whether you consider the order of names in your phone book to be intrinsic or not and explain why then I may be able to answer.

How/why did we shift from discussing "design" to discussing "order"?

Cheers,

Reed.

I think Binswanger thinks there is a difference. Again, I wish someone would post the tape that his argument appears in so you could check out the primary source.
Or maybe I could simply ask about a particular kind of order. Do you think my neighbors are in alphabetical order, or is that something I impose to deal with an otherwise unmanageable diversity?

Another question. Do you think the argument from design crowd thinks that order is intrinsic? I think they would have too since both objective and subjective order presuupose conscousness--hence order would be, if objective, a relation between reality and consciousness, and not a property of reality.

Fred

Fred -
If "order" or "design" are epistemological rather than metaphysical, then the argument from design is simply misplaced. There is no "order" out there to account for, hence no need for a god to account for it.

Is there a difference between this approach and simply ignoring then denying apparent design?

Cheers,

Reed.

I posted this about a week ago but I don't see it. Maybe it got lost in cyberspace. Anyway here it is from memory.

"It's not obvious to me, how does Binswanger's (re)classification of opposing arguments defeat them?"

If "order" or "design" are epistemological rather than metaphysical, then the argument from design is simply misplaced. There is no "order" out there to account for, hence no need for a god to account for it.

Fred

Chris -
Re: Evolution needing intelligent intervention.

Evolution assumes a pre existing life with a pre existing mechanism for evolution.

So... the theory of evolution starts with a hypothetical first organism that contains the programming required to produce all life and all the design that will ever exist on earth.

IMO evolution's foundation is a proposal of a much more sophisticated design than anything that currently exists in nature.

Cheers,

Reed.

Chris -
how does the designer not also require a designer?
Who designed the ultimate designer?
What existed before anything existed?
What happened before the beginning?
What is the cause of the causeless cause?

The above questions are all the same form and are errors, the questions themselves are contradictions.

If you accept that things in nature have a cause and that there is (eventually) a cause that is without cause then you accept that there is a causeless cause of things in nature.

Examining nature should lead to conclusions about the cause of nature. If parts of nature are designed its cause is a designer.

Cheers,

Reed.

Gregster -
Nothing exists outside the sole accordion, or you're getting into dodgy theories like multiverses.
The term "multiverses" sounds like a proposal for parallel dimensions which is unnecessary for considering multiple accordions.

If it is possible for an accordion to exist here then it is possible for an accordion to exist somewhere else.

It looks to me like you are suggesting that the existence of our own accordion is impossible or that you are applying an extreme skepticism where you assume nothing exists beyond what can be detected or that there is something special about this corner of space.

Cheers,

Reed.

Fred -
I'm not sure if "unintended consequences" was a problem or not but I have abandoned that deduction - explained here.

... Binswanger's position that "design" is an epistemological, not a metaphsical concept. If true, it obviously kills any argument from design.

It's not obvious to me, how does Binswanger's (re)classification of opposing arguments defeat them?

Cheers,

Reed.

"The doctrine of the Holy Trinity? A man of reason isn't going to have the faintest fucking idea how the morons who debated the doctrine of the Holy Trinity came up with their answer, because the way they did it is outside the bounds of anything like proof, of stating criteria, of defining terms, of reducing concepts, of . . . well, of anything familiar to a man of reason."

Since both Aquinas and Augustine discussed the Trinity, I assume you mean to call them morons. Charles Murray in his book HUMAN ACCOMPLISHMENT lists these two thinkers as the sixth and the ninth greatest Western philosophers EVER. And since Rand was, if we believe Peikoff, an expert on Aquinas' angels, she presumable read some Aquinas and perhaps his thoughts on the trinity, making her a junior moron!
As for proof, Aquinas is famous for his use of Aristotle's syllogism and anyone with even a passing acquaintance with him knows he defined his terms, stated his criteria etc. This "moron" was Rand's second favorite philosopher. Maybe that makes her a semi-quasi moron.

Fred

I checked out the Metcalf site and after quoting the following from Plantinga
"First, is God complex? According to much classical theology (Thomas Aquinas, for example) God is simple, and simple in a very strong sense, so that in him there is no distinction of thing and property, actuality and potentiality, essence and existence, and the like...God is a spirit, not a material object at all, and hence has no parts...."
he writes,

"I have no idea what this means. Presumably the author don't either,"

But if he has no idea what Plantinga means shouldn't he withdraw. Since these concepts are from Aquinas who got them from Aristotle, perhaps that is the place to start Metcalf's education. As for the second clause, isn't that just psychologizing. Why presume Platinga doesn't know classical theology just because Metcalf doesn't. After all, Peikoff claimed Rand knew more about Aquinas' angels that anyone he ever met. If so, she knew (at least some) classical theology.

Another point. Plantinga writes, "But why does Dawkins think God is complex? And why does he think that the more complex something is, the less probable it is? Here I think Plantinga is guilty of an equivocation. Dawkins uses the pair simple/complex to refer to the "materially simple" and the "materially complex." Plantinga uses simple to means "having no material parts" and complex to mean "having material parts." So he is doomed to miss the Dawkins' point.

Fred

So, "Magic Man done it!" gets the job done? And without the regression problem no less? And without the apparent circularity ("X assigns greater probability to the reliability of the mind, ergo it is more rational to assume X") no less?

Of two possibilities, A has a 90% chance of being true and B has a 10% of being true, which one do you bet on.
In Vegas, since black is more likely to come up than 17, the house deals with this fact by giving odds. isn't that rational. Bet on the most likely.
But then again, I not very lucky.

Fred

"I don't think the burden is on Objectivists to do anything here. Someone needs to go back to the drawing board and prove a positive, not have Objectivists essentially prove a negative."

This depends on where we are at in the conversation. If we say the burden is on the theist and the theist presents an argument, then the ball is back in our court and we have to answer. Then the ball goes bact to the theist etc. I have a feeling this tennis match is not going to end in my lifetime.

Fred

"Part of the problem with even being able to understand Plantinga is that he deals in all this modal-logic stuff which is hard for ordinary folks"

I think you point out an interesting problem. What are the cognitive obligations of an atheist in face of arguments he is not equipped to understand. Maybe we either beome experts ourselves, or we leave it to professional epistemologists who are also atheists. Richard Gale, to whom I have referred to in previous posts, is just such as guy Also Ted Drange. BTW I will be speaking before the West Virginia Philosophical Society on Plantinga's essay "Is Naturalism Irrational" and I think I can answer Plantinga. I let you know what transpires at the meeting (Mar 28-29).

Fred

Chris Cathcart: The doctrine of the Holy Trinity? A man of reason isn't going to have the faintest fucking idea how the morons who debated the doctrine of the Holy Trinity came up with their answer, because the way they did it is outside the bounds of anything like proof, of stating criteria, of defining terms, of reducing concepts, of . . . well, of anything familiar to a man of reason.

Well, yeah.

I was surprised to see Fred Seddon swallow the idea that Plantinga did Dawkins (as Debbie does Dallas). This position isn't borne out when Plantinga's argument is dissected.

I stumbled over the rank sophistry of these passages:

"But why does Dawkins think God is complex? And why does
he think that the more complex something is, the less
probable it is?

[ . . . ]

Now suppose we return to Dawkins' argument for the
claim that theism is monumentally improbable. As you
recall, the reason Dawkins gives is that God would have
to be enormously complex, and hence enormously
improbable ("God, or any intelligent, decision-making
calculating agent, is complex, which is another way of
saying improbable"). What can be said for this
argument?

Not much. First, is God complex? According to much
classical theology (Thomas Aquinas, for example) God is
simple, and simple in a very strong sense, so that in
him there is no distinction of thing and property,
actuality and potentiality, essence and existence, and
the like. Some of the discussions of divine simplicity
get pretty complicated, not to say arcane. (It isn't
only Catholic theology that declares God simple;
according to the Belgic Confession, a splendid
expression of Reformed Christianity, God is "a single
and simple spiritual being.") So first, according to
classical theology, God is simple, not complex. More
remarkable, perhaps, is that according to Dawkins' own
definition of complexity, God is not complex. According
to his definition (set out in The Blind Watchmaker),
something is complex if it has parts that are "arranged
in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance
alone." But of course God is a spirit, not a material
object at all, and hence has no parts. A fortiori (as
philosophers like to say) God doesn't have parts
arranged in ways unlikely to have arisen by chance.
Therefore, given the definition of complexity Dawkins
himself proposes, God is not complex.
"

Yow. Because of classical theology, the Belgic Confession, because spirits have no parts . . . God is simple. Thus God is not complex. Thus Dawkins is a dope.

Gah.

Plantinga's remarks are weak and tendentious; if you want to see him taken to pieces, check the commentaries following his essay at Dawkins' site: The Dawkins Confusion: Naturalism ad absurdum.

Here is a particularly succinct dissection, by Conrad Metcalf:

WSS

reed wrote:

AFAIK the only attempted explanation for what appears to be design is evolution and even if that is assumed to be true it still appears, to me, that intelligent intervention and intent is required.

If you already "assume" evolution is true, you're already "assuming" that changes occur by means of causes that are in principle investigatable by some process, method, stated standards, etc. The paradigm in which evolution is theorized about is the scientific one -- the one where the causes investigated are naturalistic, and where unprovable interventions from some outside source don't play any kind of explanatory role. So are you saying -- what? That even if all these processes can be explained by completely natural explanations, that the process would require a "designer?" Well, if so, that's just your own add-on.

The rest of us, not expanding things beyond epistemological necessity, treat it as inadmissible just as any good judge in a court of law would throw out "God did it" as inadmissible.

Linz wrote:

"And that Fred is the difference between those of faith and scientists. Those with faith are happy with the assumption they made to explain of how we got here and can't see any point in improving on that. Scientists, like the explorers of old, won't be satisfied until they've understood a thing completely and will continue testing their explanations until they ring true."

And Fred critiqued on the ground of self-reference fallacy:

Scientists, like men of faith, "are happy with the assumption" that the scientific method is the only method we have for gaining truth. This certainly applies to the logical positivist type of scientist to say nothing of the Kuhnian "normal scientist" who never questions the paradigm he is working with.

Yeah, I know about the fallacies of scientism well, but this is just bad criticism regaradless. The scientists are working within a certain kind of paradigm that is absolutely different than the paradigm of the faithist. That paradigm is one of actually using proof and reason based on grounds commonly accessible to all humans, vs. using some hidden and unexplained grounds with hidden criteria for adjudging something true.

The doctrine of the Holy Trinity? A man of reason isn't going to have the faintest fucking idea how the morons who debated the doctrine of the Holy Trinity came up with their answer, because the way they did it is outside the bounds of anything like proof, of stating criteria, of defining terms, of reducing concepts, of . . . well, of anything familiar to a man of reason.

The scientific paradigm is one of reason -- more specifically, of epistemology as applied to investigation of the natural world. The scientists themselves may be all pragmatic about it; it "works well enough," but at least they're following known criteria, testing their claims, etc. And some of the time, the conclusions they reach constitute knowledge.

The alternative paradigm is, long story short, in essence, to throw epistemology out altogether. When you have faith, how do you know that your belief is true? If you started having to answer that question, you'd be doing epistemology and basically you'd end up with one of two things: either it remains an article of faith, therefore outside the realm of epistemology, or it becomes open to epistemological inquiry, therefore no longer making it a matter of faith. To equivalence the faith thing with what scientists are doing is just plainly corrupt.

C'mon, I'd expect this amateurish "scientists have faith in the scientific method" stuff on an idiot Creationist board, but not around here.

Citing Darwin's doubt, Plantinga apparently then sophizes:

"If naturalism (+ evolution) assigns a very low probability to the reliability of the human mind whereas theism (+ evolution) assigns a higher probability to said reliability, then it is more rational (but not compelling--a crucial distinction) to assume the latter than the former. In a word, it is more acceptable to posit a designer than not simply because it gets the job done."

So, "Magic Man done it!" gets the job done? And without the regression problem no less? And without the apparent circularity ("X assigns greater probability to the reliability of the mind, ergo it is more rational to assume X") no less?

You're saying this is a serious philosophical answer?

As far as infinite regression is concerned... how can it be denied that whatever caused our existence is ultimately without cause?

It's a great question with an obvious answer. Whatever ultimately is, is without being caused. And either whatever that is exhibits design or it does not, and whether it exhibits design or not is not determinative of whether it must be caused. So . . . in terms of burdens of proof, this looks to privilege naturalism rather than supernaturalism, now does it not.

IMO if objectivists want to do better than Dawkins then they would need a superior explaination for what appears to be design (which implies intent and intelligence).

I don't think the burden is on Objectivists to do anything here. Someone needs to go back to the drawing board and prove a positive, not have Objectivists essentially prove a negative. Does design imply intent and intelligence, or not? Well, what's the argument that it does? Moreover, have we done a good job tracing back our concepts here ("design," "intent," etc.) to their roots, or are we just taking some meaning for granted like good little rationalists?

This is completely unlike how Rand approaches these kinds of questions. The fundamental epistemological burden of either side is to trace their concepts to their roots by a painstaking process, and try and place any discussion of design, intent, and so on in their proper context and known hierarchical relation to all our other understanding. Rand was a fanatic about this. Much too few other people are, most distressingly so the intellectuals whose very job it is to care fanatically about these things. It's in this environment that I'm sure a Plantinga can thrive best.

I was hearing in some bar discussion with phil. students some weeks back some very mention of Plantinga, who, they said, used some kind of "incompleteness theorem" from Godel or somesuch to show that he (Plantinga) was no less justified in assuming the reasonableness of his system than some non-theist was assuming his.

That, my friends, if true, is utter corruption.

So . . .

how does the designer not also require a designer?

I love these first-cause type arguments because they need a self-exemption and the self-exemption just isn't open to debate. We've got "design" in nature (think on that one, i.e., whether this concept was formed properly or not as applied to these discussions), and . . . by a process of reasoning . . . there must be something undesigned. A proof of the unknown by reference to the known. Wasn't the idea of proving that there must be another reality by referencing the one we know something that came right out of Galt's address? Whatever it is, it's something we do not know, but it's gotta exist in virtue of what we do know. Rationalism in a beautiful, concise nutshell.

My general impression is that Plantinga is getting the attention that he is by feeding off the corrupt notions indulged in by all too many mainstream philosophers. Part of the problem with even being able to understand Plantinga is that he deals in all this modal-logic stuff which is hard for ordinary folks to get their heads around and grapple with and debate whatever issue there is on whatever level he's debating, and then on top of that, we already know how tenuous a grasp so many mainstream phils, rationalists that they are, have of the relation between logic and actual reality.

Nothing exists outside the sole accordion, or you're getting into dodgy theories like multiverses.

Sorry, I thought most SOLOists were familiar with the doctrine of unintended consences. You might check http://skepticwiki.org/index.php/Doctrine_of_Unintended_Consequences

There are a lot of examples of this in Atlas. Government laws always have unintended consequences.

The relevence to our topic is that design may be an unintended consequence of non-designed factors.

BTW. I also might mention Binswanger's position that "design" is an epistemological, not a metaphsical concept. If true, it obviously kills any argument from design. Unfortunately, I think his argument is on a tape and not in book form, so its not easy to verify.

Fred

Fred -
I don't know what you mean by "doctrine of unintended consequences".

Reed.

Do you think that the doctrine of unintended consequences casts any shade over the first premise, i.e., "Design requires a designer." Or the Law of Identity?

Fred

Definition: Design is "the purposeful arrangement of parts or details".

Design requires a designer.
Nature contains purposeful arrangements of parts or details.
Therefore nature requires a designer.

Note: Purposeful in this context is referring to a function within the designed thing and not a purpose of the designer (that would be begging the question).

[Edit: not much traffic here, so I have re posted this in my blog here]

Gregster -
Yes, like the biggest-ever accordion. I've always preferred this one. Big Bang my arse.

Yes, scientists saying that a large quantity of nothing is explosive is not very convincing.

However, why would you assume that there is a limit of one "accordian" (or any limit), is there something special about this corner of space?

Cheers,

Reed.

"as far as I am aware the currently favoured proposal is of an expansion/contraction cycle without beginning."

Yes, like the biggest-ever accordion. I've always preferred this one. Big Bang my arse.

So when the most outer objects are teetering at the edge of gravitational attraction expansion would stop and eventually they'd start coming back inwards. In more than one place at once too.

'Biblical God' is countered by the Gervaisian Thereom (1). Accordingly, if we are to posit a Designer, then such cannot be the Biblical God, for to design a Universe a single mind would need to be highly logical, ordered, and organised, and yet in Genesis we find that God created the Earth, the plants, animals etc all before the sixth day when he created day(light). Ergo, he created everything fumbling around in the dark, and then he turned on the lights. This would be more consistent with DA (2) Mysticism Theology, thus Biblical God is knocked from contention as Grand Ompah (3).

(1) Ricky Gervais - Old Vic, Tuesday 5th January, 2007 in front of mainly drunks, some junkies.

(2) Dumb Arse

(3) Sorry Fred. Back to your good thread. I would be interested in answers to Reed’s queries also.

Robert -
I am still curious to know your answers to my questions, you don't have to answer them if you don't want to but I expect you have just forgotten them.

Cheers,

Reed.

"I've neither read nor heard anything about Objectivism having anything to say about the origin of life & the Universe"

I don't know if you have a copy of the old Objectivist Newsletter, but if you do you might have a look at May 1962, p. 19 where N. Branden tries to answer the following question that seems to deal with the so-called cosmological argument, to wit: "Since everything in the universe requires a cause, must not the universe itself have a cause, which is God?" It's there that Branden brings up the "infinite regress" argument which Linz and others have alluded to--although I don't know if they have that particular article in mind.

Also you might check Lecture #4 of the old Basic Principles of Objectivism lecture series ion which all of the traditional arguments for the existence of God are discussed, including the cosmological argument which deals with the origin of the universe.

Finally, Peikoff in his HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY course deals with the cosmological argument when certain philosophers bring it up.

Cheers,

Fred

Robert -
Reed: "where objectivists only assert that a creator is not required without any explanation"
Robert: Huh? As far as I know, Objectivist say only that "if you assert that there is a god, you should prove it."

I may have overstated the case but you can prove me wrong by answering this question...

From an objectivist perspective, excluding what is man made, is a creator/designer required for anything that exists?

OK. Let's just call the 'causeless cause' the 'Big-Bang' because the English is getting confusing.

Big-Bang is not an equivalent term, "nature" is close but it contains an atheistic assumption that is not obvious. The term "causeless cause" may be confusing but was chosen because it is neutral and unambiguous.

Suppose that by some means (time machine - whatever), the Big-Bang is proven empirically to be correct and the infinite regress problem solved.

The big bang theory does not solve the infinite regression problem (ie. what caused the big bang?) and as far as I am aware the currently favoured proposal is of an expansion/contraction cycle without beginning. The big bang theory also assumes there is something special about this particular corner of space without any attempt of an explanation.

And suppose that there was no sentient being anywhere to be found in the mix. Would you still believe in god?

If I assume that there is no God then I would not be able to reach any other conclusion without denying the original assumption.

What evidence of design would you need to see to concede there might be a designer?

From your statements Reed, can I assume that you don't believe that God is as he is described in the Bible?
If not would you say that to be god he has to be all powerful?
For the sake of argument you can assume my understanding of a designer/creator/God is incomplete and possibly flawed. I'm not sure how that affects the argument that "if design exists then a designer exists" (unless you can prove that no designer is possible).
If you want to start a thread on "Why the biblical God is not." then I will participate but I expect if it is discussed here it will lead this discussion off on a tangent.

Cheers,

Reed

"where objectivists only assert that a creator is not required without any explanation"

Huh? As far as I know, Objectivist say only that "if you assert that there is a god, you should prove it." Likewise, the Big-Bang theorist.

All objectivism says is that we are here, we are real. And then it goes on to say how we can prosper in this life. I've neither read nor heard anything about Objectivism having anything to say about the origin of life & the Universe - other than to observe that any claim on how we came to be here physical proof to back it up.

"If the "causeless cause" is determined to have intent and intelligence then it is God otherwise it is not God"

OK. Let's just call the 'causeless cause' the 'Big-Bang' because the English is getting confusing.

Suppose that by some means (time machine - whatever), the Big-Bang is proven empirically to be correct and the infinite regress problem solved. And suppose that there was no sentient being anywhere to be found in the mix. Would you still believe in god?

From your statements Reed, can I assume that you don't believe that God is as he is described in the Bible? If not would you say that to be god he has to be all powerful?

Dawkins considers that our existence requires an explanation where objectivists only assert that a creator is not required without any explanation, so in this regard Dawkins does better than objectivism.

As far as infinite regression is concerned... how can it be denied that whatever caused our existence is ultimately without cause?

From my perspective the discussion regarding God or no God is the discussion about the nature of the "causeless cause". If the "causeless cause" is determined to have intent and intelligence then it is God otherwise it is not God.

IMO if objectivists want to do better than Dawkins then they would need a superior explaination for what appears to be design (which implies intent and intelligence).

AFAIK the only attempted explanation for what appears to be design is evolution and even if that is assumed to be true it still appears, to me, that intelligent intervention and intent is required.

Also, IMO objectivists should not aim to do better than Dawkins in explaining why there is no God, they should consider the nature of what exists to determine the nature of the causeless cause. Once objectivists have defined the nature of the causeless cause then objectivists would have an explanation regarding the existence of God.

Actually I was willing to accept what you wrote. To wit: "Scientists, like the explorers of old, won't be satisfied until they've understood a thing completely and will continue testing their explanations until they ring true". That way I was assured you couldn't complain about "scientific method," since the description is yours. If that is acceptable, then my argument goes through as stated.

Personally I don't think there is one scientific method, but rather numerous scientific methods, depending on the discipline and the problem to be solved. But I didn't want to inflict my view on you. You are of course free to change or alter what you wrote.

Fred

I've heard a lot of bollocks talked about the Scientific method - mainly coming from people who've never explored the unknown with less than perfect instruments.

So perhaps you'll do me the honor of explicitly stating what ~you~ mean when you talk about the 'scientific' method. Then we'll see if you are correct to allude to 'other' methods of seeking the truth.

See my post to Linz as it covers some of what you have written. Let me say two things.
(1) You are perfectly rational to hold the position that you do. And this is Plantinga's claim. Most of his arguments are probability arguments and can be weighed differently by different thinkers.

(2) I think you are guilty of a self-reference fallacy when you write,

"And that Fred is the difference between those of faith and scientists. Those with faith are happy with the assumption they made to explain of how we got here and can't see any point in improving on that. Scientists, like the explorers of old, won't be satisfied until they've understood a thing completely and will continue testing their explanations until they ring true."

Scientists, like men of faith, "are happy with the assumption" that the scientific method is the only method we have for gaining truth. This certainly applies to the logical positivist type of scientist to say nothing of the Kuhnian "normal scientist" who never questions the paradigm he is working with.

But I must say I'm content. You at least read the Plantinga and have come to your own conclusions.

Fred

"It's the old problem of infinite regress. As far as I can see Plantinga doesn't address this at all."

Perhaps because he was addressing Dawkins and sticking to his context. I do agree with you that he eventually has to explain that.

"Why is it not acceptable to posit a universe without a designer but acceptable to posit a designer without a designer?"

He doesn't answer this question in the Dawkins essay but he does in an essay entitled, "Is naturalism irrational?" He starts by citing Darwin's doubt which goes like this,

the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has (sic) been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? (Letter to William Graham Down)

If naturalism (+ evolution) assigns a very low probability to the reliability of the human mind whereas theism (+ evolution) assigns a higher probability to said reliability, then it is more rational (but not compelling--a crucial distinction) to assume the latter than the former. In a word, it is more acceptable to posit a designer than not simply because it gets the job done.

Fred

you were referring to Fred?

"First, suppose we land on an alien planet orbiting a distant star and discover machine-like objects that look and work just like tractors; our leader says "there must be intelligent beings on this planet who built those tractors."

May I suggest that the leader is a moron. The first thing any explorer (scientist, astronaut etc.) would say is "Where the F*** did they come from?" And then they'd proceed to look. Anyone that comes across something as weird as a tractor on an Alien planet and assumes to explain it without further exploration is a twit - much like the person who came up with this hypothetical (IMHO).

And that Fred is the difference between those of faith and scientists. Those with faith are happy with the assumption they made to explain of how we got here and can't see any point in improving on that. Scientists, like the explorers of old, won't be satisfied until they've understood a thing completely and will continue testing their explanations until they ring true.

If Dawkins has a fault, it's that he makes too much stew out of the available experimental onions. He's as much a poet and a dreamer as he is a scientist. There isn't anything wrong with that - provided that you are aware of that and don't take his extrapolations as the truth before they are proven correct.

As to the rest of Plantinga's gobbledegook:

"Similarly, in invoking God as the original creator of life, we aren't trying to explain organized complexity in general."

Arse.

The bastard is attempting to move the goal posts of the argument. His is a positive defense. He's admitted that Genesis 1:1 is crap and is proceeding to mitigate the damage done by that admission. In effect he's saying that "In the beginning god created the Universe..." doesn't, in fact, mean that an all-powerful being created everything . No, no! How silly can you be! You're obviously interpreting that passage literally. What the words actually mean is that God created everything other than the complex or some other twaddle I haven't the energy to decipher.

And after a blizzard of waffling the author is hoping that you've missed the fact that the fundamentals remain unanswered: where the f*** did this thing called God come from? It's the infinite regress riddle that bedevils the Big Bang theory (e.g. where the hell did the flammable materials come from and can you prove it?)

However even though scientist's and the theist's pet theories on the origin of everything share the same fundamental flaw; only the scientists address that question by going out and trying to check their ideas against reality. The theologists (and philosophers like you) avoid that sort of thing like the plague. They amuse themselves with addressing the actual meaning of the word 'god' (as if the bible isn't clear enough about his all powerfulness) or what Genesis 1:1 means by 'creates' or 'universe.' (as if the Oxford English Dictionary isn't clear enough). And while this new tactic is an improvement over the inquisition, it still doesn't give their argument any more credence.

Why? Because if you invoke a creator, you've got to (a) prove that he exists and (b) bloody well explain where he or it came from. And neither you, nor the Bible, nor Alvin Plantinga do any of that. All the Plantinga's can do is poke holes in Dawkins' writings or evolution or plate-techtonics or archeology and shout "Ha ha! We've refuted atheism."

Bollocks they have! Why hasn't god shown up since the 'beginning?' Why did all the 'miracles' stop right about the time science started to explain them as natural phenomona?

And in any event, if people truly believed as Plantinga did, then religion would dissolve like sugar in hot water. The guy basically admits that the religion that everyone from President Bush to the anti-evolution morons in Kansas believe is crap when he starts off with "According to classical theism..."

Eh? There's another version of the Bible I'm not familiar with? Has the Pope been informed?

Bush and the anti-evolution Kansans ~do not~ believe as Plantinga does.

Where he says "we" he means "me and the legions of other hair-splitting professional intellectual conjurers." He certainly doesn't mean the bulk of those Religious people who believe that Genesis is exactly how it happened.

And it's the moderate people who read the St James edition of the bible that Dawkins and Hitchens are trying to reach. There isn't any point in trying to reach a modern philosopher. Maybe when they've finally agreed that they actually exist and can't therefore disappear up their own arseholes on a whim (if only they would!), but certainly not before.

All modern philosophers do is start untethering themselves from the reality by declaring that Genesis 1:1 is "classical theism" and therefore obsolete. They then proceed to make up shit as they go along! And nobody points out that "classical theism" is what every god-fearing man bar them (if they are being honest - a dangerous assumption in and of itself), believes.

Did you mean to write "did" instead of "didn't"?

Nope. "Plantinga still doesn't explain how, if the universe had to be designed, God did NOT have to be designed."

Let me put it another way. Why is it not acceptable to posit a universe without a designer but acceptable to posit a designer without a designer?

It's the old problem of infinite regress. As far as I can see Plantinga doesn't address this at all.

Didn't Plantinga cover your very question with the 'tractor example'?

Fred

"Plantinga still doesn't explain how the hell, if the universe had to be designed, God didn't."

Did you mean to write "did" instead of "didn't"?

Fred

Better arguments for not believing in God are contained in the Bible!

Case in point:

Genesis 1:1, 2:4-6
"In the beginning, God created the heavens and earth."

Um, stop right there. This isn't the beginning, because you haven't explained how God came to be. That is, who is HIS daddy?

And the story gets worse from that sentance forth.

I always thought the improbability agument in The Blind Watchmaker was one of the best aguments for believing there is no god.

Do you mean this?

What is it exactly than which "we" have to do better? Objectivists don't use Dawkins' improbability argument. And Plantinga still doesn't explain how the hell, if the universe had to be designed, God didn't.