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PollWhat should the government do about ailing financial institutions? Nothing, except to back off and get out—as any Objectivist knows, intervention is treating the disease with the disease 84% Intervene judiciously—enough to avert a catastrophe that is otherwise imminent 3% Intervene massively—as it's doing 3% Nationalize the whole economy and be done with it. Bring on the USSA! 1% Something else (specify) 9% Total votes: 76
 Basic Economics by Thomas Sowell
 Economics In One Lesson by Henry Hazlitt
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Reprise: The Fatal Deceit ... or, Hume's Homecoming Submitted by Lindsay Perigo on Tue, 2008-01-22 22:48.
"The rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason." – David Hume, quoted approvingly by F.A. Hayek in The Fatal Conceit. "One should never suppose ... that only those moral rules are valid that reason endorses." – F.A. Hayek. "The idea that reason, itself created in the course of evolution, should now be in a position to determine its own future evolution, is inherently contradictory." – F.A. Hayek. "The idea that human nature is reasonable is a disastrous mistake." – John Maynard Keynes. "We are now at the end of the Age of Reason. The intellect has grown autocratic, and has become a disease of life." – Adolf Hitler. In a sense, these quotations say it all. Hayek, a leading contemporary advocate of capitalism, turns out on closer inspection to endorse the fundamental premises of capitalism's enemies. He is an apostle of unreason, of tradition-worship for its own sake, of a mechanistic evolution which man's mind is powerless to grasp or control; and of the deadly ethical poison that continues to infect the bloodstream of freedom and civilisation: altruism, the belief that one's life belongs to others, that the good of others should be the primary purpose of one's life and actions. Thus, while conceding that in a free market, individuals act for their own good, Hayek argues that they are exempt from moral blame for this, and remain morally virtuous, because they unintentionally benefit others in the process! He is an eloquent example of why capitalism has been languishing for want of a viable, i.e. rationally justifiable, moral defence — by his own admission, he doesn't believe such a defence is possible. It is tempting to ask, before moving further: in that case, why does Hayek bother making any sort of case at all? If reason is irrelevant to the existence and validation of the "extended order" (the outcome of his inexorable evolutionary process), why bother proffering any reasons whatsoever — even flawed ones — for the desirability of this order? To argue a case for anything is to invoke the faculty of reason ... but if this faculty is irrelevant, or indeed inimical, tto that which one is arguing for, one is subverting one's own position. Better, surely, that Hayek simply leave us to immerse ourselves in the ineffable tradition that he says has spontaneously and inexplicably become the repository of all wisdom, and passively await enlightenment?! Hayek's problem in my view is that he has failed to observe the crucial role of ideas in human history. He assumes that when cultural evolution took over from biological evolution, it was equally blind, spontaneous, unaware of itself; it occurred independently of any ideas held by the entities whose culture was evolving. He accepts Marx's view that ideas do not shape man's "social being," but rather, the other way round. What then doesdetermine man's social being? According to Marx, inexorable laws that are independent of man's will; according to Hayek, "moral traditions" that are "spontaneously generated" and are also independent of man's will. Where's the real difference? Both are positing forms of historical determinism. But it is not just any old life form we are talking about here. What distinguishes man from all other conscious organisms is his conceptual faculty, the ability to form concepts from the percepts that his sensory apparatus automatically absorbs, to integrate concretes into abstractions, to reach conclusions about the world, man's place in it, and what he should do if he wants to remain in it and flourish. This faculty is what we refer to as reason; the conclusions it draws, the ideas it forms, however primitive, are its currency. They determine not merely whether, but how, men will live. In short, they determine culture, and they move history. Hayek unintentionally concedes this from time to time — for example, in linking the advance of civilisation to the development of private property and the concept of liberty. He notes that in ancient Crete, private property was prevalent and makes a connection between this fact and the enshrining of personal liberty as the state's highest good in that state's constitution. Well, where does he think that notion came from? That it was emblazoned in the sky? That the constitution spontaneously wrote itself? That men woke up one morning and found themselves suddenly occupying private property, free from the shackles of other men? For liberty and private property to be prevalent, they must be institutionalised; to be institutionalised they must first be grasped as concepts. Someone has to think of them. This is not to suggest that such ideas could be conceived in a vacuum. Men would have to make significant advances from the stage of cave and club and hunting tribe before advanced abstractions such as individual liberty became conceivable or applicable; but these advances too are dependent upon the application of man's reasoning mind to his external circumstances. He has no innate knowledge of how to make a fire. Someone has to think of it — or, if he discovers it by accident, to think of uses for it. Reason, even at that primitive level, is man's distinctive mode of functioning and means of survival. How it became so is for science to discover; that it is so is the only appropriate starting point for a tenable ethics. To put this point another way: in upholding the primacy of tradition, Hayek is side-stepping the question of how that tradition developed. His own answer would be that the question is unanswerable, the process unknowable. The true answer, empirically derived, is that tradition — any tradition — is the upshot of whichever antecedent ideas have achieved dominance in human affairs. The issue then becomes one of evaluating those ideas — and this is where Hayek disassembles. For him, there can be no such thing as an objective ethics, no code of morality that can hold its own against all comers, no standard of evaluation, no possibility of objectivity in forming conclusions as to how human beings ought to behave. Observe his equivocation here, for he obviously understands full well that on this basis he has no business dispensing moral prescriptions of his own — yet he does precisely this; and in the process, of course cannot avoid assuming a standard of morality even though he would dismiss it as subjective. Thus: "although this morality [i.e. his, the one derived from tradition] is not ' justified' by the fact that it enables us to survive, it does enable us to survive, and there is something perhaps to be said for that." Perhaps??!! Is there or isn't there?! Is there "perhaps" something to be said equally for a morality that doesn't enable us to survive, or one that explicitly encourages self-destruction?! To be consistent, of course, Hayek would have to answer in the affirmative, since if no objective ethics is possible, any ethics is as "good" as any other. Hayek's error lies in a mistaken view of objectivity, in his unstated assumption that objectivity must consist in floating abstractions, divorced from man and this earth; that the instant a man makes a value judgement it becomes subjective because it is a man who makes it; that any value judgement whatsoever is thereby subjective; that there is no objective means of evaluating the respective merits, for example, of Thomas Jefferson's view of the status of the individual in society — and Adolf Hitler's. In holding this view he is simply a child of his times, a footnote to Immanuel Kant, the father of our times, who taught us, with far more sophistication than David Hume or Plato, that we can't know anything. [How does he know that we can't know anything if we can't know anything? Blank-out!] "Objectivity" is conformity to reality; to be "objective" is to identify reality; one's tool of objectivity is one's reason. To assert that there is no such thing as reality and that objectivity is impossible is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, since one is purporting to make an objectively true statement while denying the possibility of objectivity. One does not negate a concept by invoking it! It is interesting to note, in passing, Hayek's disdain for, and misrepresentation of, Aristotle, the father of biology and of logic, of observation and reasoning, of induction and deduction, the arch-purveyor of the efficacy of the human mind, of a reality-based ethics, of the virtues of self-fulfilment, personal happiness and pride. Aristotle most assuredly made errors and did not proceed consistently in all matters, but this is said with some arrogance with the benefit of hindsight. To attribute to him the stagnation and rigidity of the mediaeval period [while ignoring Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and other altruism-mongering mystics] as Hayek appears to do, is absurd. Moreover, observe the gaping contradiction here: he who downplays the potence of ideas attributes to one man's ideas the stagnation of a millennium! Contradictions, alas, seem to abound in The Fatal Conceit. Observe that Hayek regards altruism as a genetically transmitted instinct that developed during the biological evolution leading to homo sapiens, but that became inconsistent with the requirements of the "extended order" as it came into being. Since he approves of the extended order, one would expect him to argue in favour of an alternative to altruism as the moral base of that order; but lo, what do we find? First, an acceptance of altruism as being axiomatic; second, the most tortuous verbal gymnastics being practised in an effort to prove that the free market is altruistic and immune from the charge of selfishness. Thus: "All systems of morality of course commend altruistic action." "The morals of the market do lead us to benefit others not by our intending to do so, but by making us act in a manner which nonetheless will have just that effect." "...the institution of private property is not selfish, since it serves the needs of distant, unknown individuals." "We can still call his [the entrepreneur's] motives altruistic in that they eventually redound to the benefit of others." Observe the confusion here: to act for the sake of others, Hayek accepts, is noble. In the free market, one acts for oneself...this, by implication, must be ignoble. But wait ... it just so happens, by a fortunate coincidence, that self-interested actions benefit others also. Phew!! That's all right then! Even though a man intends that he himself should be the beneficiary of his own actions, we can pretend his motives don't exist and exempt him from the severe moral censure that he would otherwise deserve for his despicable selfishness, because he unintentionally benefits others. What a relief! For a moment it looked as though we might have to contemplate finding a justification for self-interest! This ethical ambiguity, incidentally, is paralleled by the epistemological ambiguity Hayek displays in asserting that belief in a personal god, though false, has been efficacious. Aside from the treason of applauding anything that is false, the countless millions who were tortured, murdered, or had their lives made unendurable in the name of a personal god, might take a different view. Let us now extricate ourselves from this Hayekian mess and see if we can't posit something better. Let's say we were observing from afar the actions of one man stranded alone on an island, and saw that he opted not to lie down and die, but to take actions conducive to his survival. Suppose we said, "Well good for him. He is doing consciously what all other forms of life do naturally — he is acting to live. He is applying his mind to the material around him so as to adapt it to the needs of his survival." As time went by, and we found him surviving on an increasingly sophisticated level — not merely in the manner of the plants and animals around him, but savouring his existence, the fruits of his actions — we would, consistent with our initial approval, applaud him even more loudly. Without stating the issue in philosophical terms, we would have accepted life as the standard of evaluation appropriate for the living organism capable of the act of evaluating, and it would strike us as very eccentric to posit any other standard (and to try to act on it!). Now suppose several other people were subsequently stranded on the same island. What, ethically, would alter? Nothing — except that our solitary individual now would have the opportunity to further enhance his existence considerably. The self-interest of all parties would consist in their collaborating on terms mutually agreed to, effecting a division of labour, and attaining an ever-improving quality of life. In pursuit of that self-interest, they would also have to agree not to kill or otherwise visit physical harm upon each other. Observing this, consistent with our standard of evaluation being life, we would have to conclude that all of these people, acting in their own self-interest, were acting morally. To pretend that they were not acting in their self-interest, or to acknowledge that they were and then allege that this was immoral, would be an inversion of morality, a slap in the face of life itself. Why then, do we feel obliged to practise this inversion or maintain this pretence when dealing with modern market economies? Why do we not shout it from the rooftops that self-interest, and the individual freedom its exercise presupposes, are good, and capitalism is good because it is based thereon? And so what if tradition has it that self-interest is evil; more fool tradition! Look at the devastation, the destruction of life, that traditional altruism has wrought! The peddlers of self-sacrifice know that it cannot be justified by reason, and so they must resort to a tradition steeped in the suspension or outright defiance of reason: faith. To claim that this tradition is not only compatible with a system dependent on reason (capitalism), but also caused that system to come into being, as Hayek does, is dishonest. To credit that system's enemies with seeking rationality in man's social existence is gullibly to swallow the rhetoric of some of its enemies while ignoring the accurate rhetoric of most. Rationality is an attribute of the individual, exercised volitionally; capitalism's enemies, be they Keynesian, communist or fascist, deny volition and claim that true individuality lies in surrender to the common good, i.e. the suspension of one's own rational judgement. The enemies of capitalism are the enemies of reason ... and many are honest enough to say so. Conversely, the enemies of reason are the enemies of capitalism ... and it ill-behoves capitalism's friends to attack reason. Observe that every time Hayek, in spite of himself, posits something as being good, it is something collectivist in character: custom, tradition, survival of the largest number, the greatest good of the greatest number, etc. Individual sovereignty in his view does not exist by right, i.e. by dint of each individual possessing the capacity to think and choose for himself, but as a means to "maximum economy in the use of resources" and the unintended welfare of unseen others. Of course, capitalism does achieve these results, but these are secondary consequences, not its primary justification. After all, these are precisely the objectives Keynes, Marx et al purport to be striving after! One cannot defend individualism, the prerequisite of capitalism, on collectivist premises. Individualism rests on reason, both for its practice and its defence; to abandon reason is to embrace collectivism. By paraphrasing the David Hume quotation of which Hayek is so fond, one can make it fruitful: "The rules of morality hitherto have not been the conclusions of our reason." All the more reason to make them so now! Lindsay Perigo, 1993
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Fred
Thanks for the reminder of that. I do recall this now. It's such a shame that he's known so much more for things other than his actual contributions to human knowledge.
James
"But I do agree that Hume is worthwhile qua economist and historian, Fred."
But how about Hume's contribution to logic, specifically induction. H.W.B. Joesph considers him the father induction, not Mill.
Consult most logic texts and in the chapter devoted to Induction you will usually find a section dealing with Mill's methods. But J. S. Mill did not discover these methods. H. W. B. Joseph lists three men prior to Mill who did spade work on induction, and Mill credited two of these as his predecessors, viz., Herschell and Whewell. But who was the first? Mill doesn't mention him, but Joseph does. He is none other than David Hume. (Joseph 395)
Book I, Part III, Section XV of Hume's Treatise is entitled "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." (Surely a strange section for a man who supposedly rejected causality.) The first sentence reads "According to the precedent [i.e., Hume's] doctrine, there are no objects, which by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the cause of any other; and no objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes." (Emphasis mine.) By "mere survey" we cannot say anything about cause and effect. From a "mere survey" and restricted to a "mere survey" we are stuck with the not very helpful doctrine that "Any thing may produce any thing." (173) Hume, as do we, found this situation intolerable. We need to know what objects cause what effects if we are going to re-make the world in our own image and likeness. Had Hume been the kind of skeptic some think him, he may have said "Tough luck" at this point in the argument. But he does not. He writes, "Since therefore 'tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so." [This reading assume that the first clause refers to the "mere survey" mode and the second to be the results of the "consulting experience" mode.] Hume then proceeds to give eight rules for inductive generalizations.
To see how congenial Hume, in his logic, is to Objectivism, let's do a side-by-side comparison of him and an Objectivist logician. For this purpose, let us examine a logic text written by an Objectivist scholar, David Kelley. Kelley's treatment of the methods of induction is fairly standard and any other could have been chosen.
KELLEY
AGREEMENT: a method of identifying a cause of an effect by isolating a factor common to a variety of cases in which the effect occurs. (517)
DIFFERENCE: a method of identifying a cause of an effect by isolating a factor in whose presence the effect occurs and in whose absence the effect does not occur, all other factors remaining constant. (517)
CONCOMITANT VARIATIONS: a method of identifying a cause of an effect by isolating a factor whose variations are correlated with variations in the effect, all other factors remaining constant. (517)
HUME
AGREEMENT: where several objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. (174)
DIFFERENCE: The difference in effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ. (174)
CONCOMITANT VARIATIONS:
When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded effect, driv'd from the union of several different effects, which arise from the several different parts of the cause. (174)
If Hume is an Attila, then perhaps we should rename him, Attila the logician.
Fred
Linz
"Some "defences" are so bad they constitute an attack."
Well, then, in that case I'm "agin" it.
Fred
Yep
Absolutely. If someone "defended" the free market by somehow arguing that it would result in "the extermination of undesirable races," or some such nonsense, for example, it would do far more harm than any possible good. That is the fellow who should be fought EVEN HARDER than we fight the "pure" socialist.
But I do agree that Hume is worthwhile qua economist and historian, Fred.
Fred
Some "defences" are so bad they constitute an attack. Hayek's moral "defence" in "Fatal Conceit" is certainly in that category, as I discuss. Interestingly, when I wrote that review I did not know Rand's view of Hayek, though I figured I knew what it might have been. It came as no surprise subsequently to find her reference to him in Letters as "poison" to be avoided like the plague, or to read her notes about him in Marginalia.
If you and I and Hayek all went to the front, I'd say to him: "Shouldn't you be at the back?" I might have to wonder about you too. Tee-hee.
Linz
Linz
I think that any defence is capitalism is better than any attack. Imagine we're in a large stadium and someone says, "All pro-capitalist go to the front and all anti-capitalists go to the back--I guess you and I and Hayek would move to the front. Now all of this is against the background that Rand has provided the best defence yet of the free market. BTW, Hume's defence of capitalism in Book III of the TREATISE is much better than Hayek's. See the Hume chapter in my book on Objectivism.
Fred
Fred
I think it begs the following question: What is better? To have a collectivist/altruist defence of capitalism or a bashing of capitalism as evil.
And what is *your* answer to the question thus raised, but not begged? Inquiring minds would like to know!
Linz
Richard
Still more empty bluster, Richard?
The example we've just gone through shows how this guy hasn't a clue what Rand actually said -- and indeed it exemplifies his simple-minded, out-of-context approach throughout. If you had actually followed the argument on the Hume thread, you would have known precisely what Rand meant from the start, and would have seen the deep and fatal flaws in this fellow's warped take on what Rand said yourself.
The metaphor was mine, not Rand's, btw, and giving page numbers for quotations doesn't come close to ensuring an accurate reprise of an argument.
A demand from you to look reality in the face -- after what is now months of solid evasion on your part -- even the evasion of discussing this very critic you cite with such grandiose pretension -- only gives the final demonstration of what I have seen from the start of your presence here: chosen authorities seem to do most your thinking for you.
Among fatal flaws, this is one of the worst.
If this is really the very best you can muster, expect no more replies from me.
Live and dead
Richard
"It is true that the matter of which non-living things are composed can't be destroyed; but this is equally true of living things."
That is true.Dead animal or man is composed from exactly the same matter as the living one,however it is one, but significant difference between them: living entity able to produce self-initiated goal orientated response to its environment in order to live-that is to preserve its internal structure and to prevent destruction when the dead one can be only acted upon it.
"A cabbage is no more capable of "acting" or of having "goals" than a house."
That simply not true. A cabbage, in order to remain cabbage has to perform very complicated actions like photosyntesis, growth,it has to obtain water and minerals from the ground using its root system,and so on.Its goal to live,to maintain its structure.House doesn't do anything like that.If you damage house,it cannot repair itself,if fingi attack it,house will not employ its immune system to protect itself,if arsonist threaten to burn it,house will not run away. Living entities do all this things, they able to initiate goal orientated actions and this is the fact of reality.
The facts of reality
I've never seen anything so silly as this:
Houses face the alternative of existing or not existing
Of course, the use of the term 'face' here is metaphorical. But there is something to be gained from such metaphors as they highlight certain features of non-living things in ways that bear fruit. Besides, to say that living things face the alternative of existing or not existing is also to speak metaphorically. You cannot literally face this alternative. If you could, in which direction would you turn? Towards Mecca?
A house can face a street. A house can face north. Why can't a house also face the alternative of existing or not existing?
Can house die? You can do better then that!You know well that unanimate matter can only change form but matter cannot cease to exist.I'm sure that you know difference between living and dead dog.
Of course, a house cannot die. I never suggested that it could. It is true that the matter of which non-living things are composed can't be destroyed; but this is equally true of living things.
James implies that the argument in which Huemer contends he finds 8 fatal flaws is a "straw man". But Huemer says,
Rand's argument seems to be as follows. I enclose in parentheses required implicit premises that I have introduced. The right-most column gives page and paragraph citations for where Rand says these things
The argument is Rand's! (Albeit lovingly reconstructed by Huemer.)
When Rand speaks of "an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative," she means to include the lowly cabbage. And, if cabbages, why not houses? A cabbage is no more capable of "acting" or of having "goals" than a house. And, after all, a bird's nest (a bird's "house") is, just as much as a bird, a gene's way of making new genes.
It occurs to me that you haven't actually taken the time to read Michael Huemer's Critique of "The Objectivist Ethics". If you were to do so, you would quickly come to appreciate that Objectivist ethics is fatally flawed. Even one fatal flaw is fatal.
Why don't you take the bull by the tail and look the facts of reality in the face?
In All Seriousness
Confronted by a simple fact -- that only a living being can act in the face of an alternative, and that the alternative faced is its existence or non-existence -- Richard will not look at reality, but to arbitrary form. He simply must find "bullshit" and ambiguity in order to "catch" Rand in error. This will justify his previous assertions about Rand and her ideas, although it is now quite clear that he knows precious little about either.
It is an unfortunate fact of human nature that after one has announced a strong position he will often tend to dig in, even after his position is shown to be wrong. (This has even been codified in a standard American Jury Instruction which must be given in most cases.) It's false pride. It takes a big man -- at least, one with self-esteem -- to admit error.
This is not meant as an ad hominem (what you've said has been rebutted already), Richard, but as a simple inductive inference at this point, given your consistent refusal to engage the substance of what's being said.
Come on Richard
Leonid
"Houses face the alternative of existing or not existing. When a house is destroyed by flames, it ceases to exist."
Come on,Richard.Can house die? You can do better then that!You know well that unanimate matter can only change form but matter cannot cease to exist.I'm sure that you know difference between living and dead dog.
Hayek's (limited) value
I think I’ve read and remembered enough Hayek in my day to see exactly where his valuable insights are, and where he’s definitely limited. (Maybe the best short distillation of his whole system of ideas is an essay, “Socialism and Science,” reprinted in one of his Essays on… collections.) His greatest value is as an institutional and economic theorist, from which arise his very important criticisms of scientism, the idea that the methods of the hard sciences can be applied to human societies, which informs his critique of the notions of centralized planning. His main criticism of socialists is, his view the adoption of “constructivist rationalism,” this notion that some new kind of order based in the dictates of rationalistic “reason” can be revolutionarily imposed upon a society that had evolved to the way it is because the institutions of civilization – crucially, private property – generated order via the dispersed actions of individuals. The socialists’ rationalism is akin to rationalism in Rand’s sense: they have these ideas deduced in a nice theoretical world of “reason” that they think can be imposed onto the actual real-world workings of society – with disastrous results.
Where Hayek is not so valuable is as a moral theorist, particularly his non-answer to an “is-ought” problem. In fact, Hayek defines “morals” more along the lines of “accepted rules and customs of conduct.” His ideas do not actually amount to a defense of laissez-faire capitalism as a matter of principle as with Rand, but to a defense of what I can only call a conservatism, despite Hayek’s protestations not to be a conservative. If societal evolution over time leads to a mixed economy, that could be prima facie evidence of their usefulness and not readily subject to critique “from the outside” according to ideals. That would amount to a “meta-critique” of Hayek if what Hayek wants is laissez-faire. But that’s actually not what Hayek wants; he’s much too, well, conservative for that. So, yes, I think he’d consider Rand’s ideas open to criticism on the grounds that she aims to radically remake society from the way it is presently. Of course, I think such criticism would be short-sighted because Rand recognized that a change would necessarily take time as new ideas become spread throughout the intellectual culture.
Not Paying Attention?
Rand said exactly what she meant. You quoted her out of context, Richard. The lack of clarity was all yours. If you had just kept reading the very source you quoted, all would have been made perfectly clear. (But, houses "face" alternatives!?)
I would stack Rand's clarity up against any other philosopher's, my friend.
And, no, Richard, I shouldn't hijack this thread with those links. I quoted you verbatim the third time and on the appropriate thread.
Well, okay, then, for those who weren't following:
Way back on 11-21-07, in one of our very first exchanges, in a post titled "Facts, Facts, Facts," I said: "It is by induction that we first gleaned life itself to be the objective standard of value."
I was then posting in direct response to -- and explicit agreement with -- Mr. Cresswell pointing out to you that deduction won't get us there. He wrote: "You're looking for a deduction, Richard. What James was offering was an induction. It's by induction that we derive knowledge from concrete facts -- and it's also how we identify which facts do have value, and which facts don't."
His post was even titled, "Induction, Not Deduction."
And although you falsely accused me of various other things, you did seem to understand what I was saying at that point, as you replied: "Ah, so it's induction, not deduction! ... Unfortunately, induction is altogether irrational." You even implied that I had then "given up" trying to "deduce" this -- as if I had ever tried (!) (And, of course, this would make human knowledge "altogether irrational," and render your own assertions meaningless. But we'll ignore this for now.)
On January 16, and repeated on January 19 (just scroll up), I wrote: "I have said explicitly that deduction alone will never get us to the facts we need here. For that, we must look."
From now on, however, you do your own homework.
Larry Sechrest...
Now there's a blast from the past. Haven't heard from of of him in a while? Anyone know how he's doing?
Linz
Did you enjoy the parts about Hayek, Fred?"
I think it begs the following question: What is better? To have a collectivist/altruist defence of capitalism or a bashing of capitalism as evil.
Fred
It's not about choices
Plants don't make choices and neither do most animals, which generally rely on instincts. The issue is actions, right actions (that lead to survival) and wrong actions (which lead to death and nonexistence). Matter is just rearranged -- when we die the atoms that make up our bodies are not destroyed, but life is destroyed. An abstract shape might be changed, but that is not the same thing as the very real loss of consciousness or biological functioning that results from the death of a living organism. Humans have choices, and they need to be correct as much as an animal's instincts have to be correct or a plant's characteristics have to be properly based on its objective requirements in order to survive.
The whole reason human choice evolved, or an animal's instincts, or a plant's characteristics, in the first place is to connect ought to is -- i.e. to correlate actions and biological characteristics to reality. Those creatures that did not and do not base their choices, instincts or characteristics on reality, die and do not pass down their choices, instincts or characteristics to the next generation.
All of evolution is about connecting ought to is to avoid death. Solving this problem is the primary qualification for the survival of all living organisms. It's the very mechanism that guides all of biological development. It's why life, unlike all inanimate existents, changes over time, always specializing. Indeed, specialization itself in biological evolution is the same process writ across thousands of generations as plants and animals adapt to their enviornment -- as the "ought" of their identity is based more and more on the "is" of their surroundings.
Can't derive an ought from an is? Hume didn't know that Darwin was right around the corner. The ought itself IS. That which life requires is an objective fact of reality, "the facts of life." They are a given and must be adapted to in order for life to exist whether at the individual level, the species level, or the whole sweep of an organism's evolutionary history. Rand points out that life is an end in itself, unlike all inanimate entities. It has its own end that is subject to life or death, existence or non-existence, based on its success adapting to reality.
To really wrap your head around Rand you have to realize exactly what she meant by A is A. Identity is not separate from reality. The ought is not separate from the is. Existence IS identity. The OUGHT of what a living organism must be to survive IS. Just because we unpack the concept of ought from the living entity that is, does not make them separable IN REALITY. Just because we identify existence does not mean identity is separate from existence. This rejection of both rationalism and empiricism (as she defines them) is the key to really understanding Rand and why what she is proposing is utterly new and revolutionary. It should not be whisked aside as shallow mumbo-jumbo simply because one did not take it seriously enough to get right what she is saying.
Clarity
As she explains, "to face an alternative" implies the ability to take action in the face of an alternative. The living act in order to survive — the house cannot.
Then Rand should say what she means. She should say, instead, that no non-living things face any choices.
Clarity, and the avoidance of ambiguity, are philosophical virtues. Speaking of which, James, please would you provide a link to your original comment in which you clearly and unambiguously declare that one cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is" (thereby avoiding having to repeat yourself a FIFTH time).
I've never seen anything so
I've never seen anything so silly as this:
Houses face the alternative of existing or not existing
Richard
No, the only bullshit here is reading Rand out of context. As she explains, "to face an alternative" implies the ability to take action in the face of an alternative. The living act in order to survive -- the house cannot.
I certainly believe that an ought can be derived from an is, and have shown how.
Not willing to take the offer, then?
No surprise there, at any rate.
Terrific Article, Linz
Linz,
That was a terrific skewering of Hayek and the collectivist premises in his Fatal Conceit. Larry Sechrest did a similarly thorough demolition job on Hayek at the 1994 Summer Seminar.
One thing I would recommend from Hayek is his brilliant 1945 American Economic Review article: The Use of Knowledge in Society. It can be found here:
The Use of Knowledge in Society
Jim
Linz
Great essay! Have a gold star.
James
Hume has been blasted to bits down on the Hume thread
You agree, though, don't you, that you cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is"?
No Mr Davis
Rand (quoting from Galt's speech) says,
"There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms."
In other words, Rand says that non-living things do not face the "one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence."
Now, to show that Rand's generalisation - that no non-living things face any alternatives - is false, one has only to provide a single counter-example. And that is what Huemer does.
Houses face the alternative of existing or not existing. When a house is destroyed by flames, it ceases to exist.
So the only bullshit here is Rand's. (No, you ought not be surprised!)
Mr No Goode
I looked at that page of rebuttals and gave up because of the weaknesses in the first three! For example, "Premise 3 (No non-living things face any alternatives.) seems to be false. Rand claimed that living things face an alternative of existing or not existing but that non-living things do not. I can think of five interpretations of this, but all of them make it false:
First, it is not true that non-living things can't be destroyed. I once saw a house destroyed by flames, for example.
Bullshit that I'm surprised you brought up! Oh, no, I ought not be surprised.
Fatal, Indeed
If you believe that any of these "rebuttals" is an adequate response to Objectivism, rather than his own "straw man," then you have as little idea of what Rand actually said as that fellow does, Richard.
Why don't you take each of these, one at a time, and post them here separately, for discussions?
But -- and I want to stress this one -- only if you promise to actually engage the case.
Hume has been blasted to bits down on the Hume thread -- and you have had no rebuttal (even less than that chap you recommended) to Rand's positive case. While his stuff had long been anticipated by Rand to his seeming ignorance, yours is nonexistent.
As a species?
That statement reveals that you have already accepted a whole (collectivist) philosophy, without even being aware of it. Philosophy is inescapable.
The fatal deceit
Objectivism has yet to encounter a real rebuttal of any kind
The fatal self-deceit.
In his Critique of "The Objectivist Ethics", Michael Huemer identifies 8 fatal flaws in Rand's case for Reason.
So, there you go. Eight real rebuttals in one handy location.
You
Wait as long as you like, a "species" will never "decide" anything.
Only individuals can do that.
And, despite "our strong feelings about issues," humans can and often do reach "that level of sophistication." In addition, the Average Joe absorbs the philosophical ideas developed by others, just as he uses other discoveries which he may never have been able to come up with himself and soon begins to take for granted. Finally, philosophical beliefs, in some form, exist in, and profoundly influence, each and every one of us, and the very course of history -- whether we know this to be the case or not.
Even the consciousness of the personally disinterested is shaped by such ideas -- it's just that for him these ideas will remain forces outside of his knowledge and control, that is, until and unless he becomes interested enough to understand them.
While I agree that Objectivism has yet to encounter a real rebuttal of any kind, we have hardly "won" the philosophical argument. The world is still in the clutches of various forms of mysticism, altruism and collectivism (like the idea that government needs to do a bunch of stuff.)
You know, the title of one of Rand's books is Philosophy: Who Needs It.
It's worth checking out.
Who needs philosophy?
As a species we have still not decided that we need philosophy. Our strong feelings about issues never reach that level of sophistication. The fundamental idea that is supported not by philosophy but by common sense is that important things must be done by the government. We have won the philosophical arguement but that hasn't translated into a reasonable society. How do we create a need for philosophy?
Philosophy is Fundamental
And Hume was a pioneering historian and economist, too.
What a fellow says about the fundamental issues in philosophy can be far more important than any of his assertions on other topics. The more fundamental the man's ideas, the more of an impact they can have for good or ill.
Fred ...
... but such "knowledge" is not the real thing, and you ... er ... know it.
Did you enjoy the parts about Hayek, Fred?
Linz
"Immanuel Kant, the father of our times, who taught us, with far more sophistication than David Hume or Plato, that we can't know anything. [How does he know that we can't know anything if we can't know anything? Blank-out!]"
This is intellectual malpractice, and you know better.
This is said of Kant, who in the 2nd preface to the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, cites three different disciplines that have achieve the status of a science, to wit: Aristotle's Logic, Euclid's Geometry and Newton Physics.
This is said of Kant, the last great Enlightment thinker who challenges us, in "What is Enlightment" to Dare to Know.
This is said of Kant who with his nebular hypothesis and theory of tides made actual contributions to science.
When we bash the great thinkers of the past, we do our enemies work for them.
Fred