A Rejection of Egoism

Stephen Boydstun's picture
Submitted by Stephen Boydstun on Thu, 2008-02-14 16:57

Concerning animals and plants, we correctly think that “whatever stunts their growth or threatens their lives is bad for them. They are the sorts of things that can be healthy or diseased, and it is good for them to be healthy, bad to be diseased, to be stunted, to die before they mature. To determine what is good for some living S, we need to know what sort of thing S is—whether it is a human being, a horse, or a tree. If there are things that are good for all human beings, their goodness must be grounded not only in the properties of those things, but also in the properties of human beings” (WGW 88).

“Organic development, health, and proper physical functioning are . . . important components of human flourishing; but for us, faring well includes healthy psychological development and functioning as well” (WGW 5).

“Truths about what is good, when they are made about human beings, are truths about what is good for us . . . and must therefore be grounded in facts about our physical and psychological functioning. A theory about what is good that is applicable to human life must rest on ideas about the healthy development and exercise of the human mind” (WGW 90; further, 92–94, 131–66).

I have been quoting from Richard Kraut’s new book What Is Good and Why, subtitled The Ethics of Well-Being. It was issued by Harvard University Press in 2007. (Psssst—This is a very fine book.) The picture composed by those quotations will look familiar to readers who have studied Ayn Rand’s ethics.

One more from Prof. Kraut:

“When we do good, we do good for someone. And so, in addition to our deciding which things are good, we also must answer the question ‘Whose good should one promote?’ There are many simple formulas that propose an answer to that question. The two that are most prominent are egoism and utilitarianism.

“Egoism holds that there is only one person whose good should be the direct object of one’s actions: oneself. It allows one to take an indirect interest in others, and to promote their well-being, but only to the extent that doing so is a means towards the maximization of what is good for oneself” (WGW 39).

Before explaining Kraut’s reasons for rejecting egoism, I want to begin to review Rand’s arguments for her type of ethical egoism. Within the 1957 exposition of her ethics, Rand writes:

“Since life requires a specific course of action, any other course will destroy it. A being who does not hold his own life as the motive and goal of his actions, is acting on the motive and standard of death. Such a being is a metaphysical monstrosity, struggling to oppose, negate and contradict the fact of its own existence, running blindly amuck on a trail of destruction, capable of nothing but pain” (AS 1014 [hb]).

“The purpose of morality is to teach you, not to suffer and die, but to enjoy yourself and live” (AS 1014).

“To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values of his life: Reason—Purpose—Self-Esteem . . . . These three values imply and require all of man’s virtues . . . : rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride” (AS 1018).

“Pride is the recognition of the fact that you are your own highest value . . .—that of any achievements open to you, the one that makes all others possible is the creation of your own character . . . —that to live requires a sense of self-value, but man . . . has no automatic sense of self-esteem and must earn it by shaping his soul in the image of his moral ideal, in the image of Man, the rational man he is born able to create, but must create by choice—that the first precondition of self-esteem is that radiant selfishness of soul which desires the best in all things, in values of matter and spirit, a soul that seeks above all else to achieve its own moral perfection, valuing nothing higher than itself . . .” (AS 1020–21; see also 1056–58).

In the 1964 Introduction to The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand observes that “the choice of the beneficiary of moral values . . . . has to be derived and validated by the fundamental premises of a moral system. / The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action . . .” (x). I discern three intertwined strands in Rand’s defense of ethical egoism. I will be focusing on her arguments that move from agent egoism to beneficiary egoism. It is only when the latter is joined to the former that the theory should be called ethical egoism.

Strand One 

In Rand’s 1957 presentation, the first move to beneficiary egoism is in the first paragraph of her text that I quoted above. It is there asserted that if one does not hold one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s actions, one is acting in a self-destructive way. In The Fountainhead Rand wrote that “[man’s] moral law is never to place his prime goal within the persons of others” (740 [hb]). One illustration of the self-destructive path set upon by doing otherwise is Peter Keating’s being dissuaded by his mother from marrying the woman he loves. It will be argued, however, that there are some moral choices in which one’s immediate motive is the good of others, yet that choice is not self-destructive. In ordinary circumstances, I tell people the truth. My immediate motive is often their self-interest, not mine; I don’t want them to be taking up falsehoods.

Kraut articulates this apparent defect of egoism as follows:

“When everything goes well for a child and he has all the emotional resources he needs to interact with his community in ways that are best for himself, he will have some direct interest in some members of that community—namely, those who have manifestly expressed their love for him in ways that benefit him. So no one whose early education is as good for him as it can be will emerge from childhood as a person who is inclined to act as egoism says he should act. So fortunate a young adult will gladly help others for their sake . . . . Egoism tells him to extirpate this desire” (WGW 40–41; further, 48–65, 211–14, 231, 238–43).

I observe that when one chooses to tell the truth in ordinary circumstances or to render aid to others, one is engaged not only as an agent egoist. One is not only following one’s own judgment about what to do. One is also choosing in the particular occasion what is the good state of affairs for individuals in general.

Help another “if such is your own desire based on your own selfish pleasure in the value of his person and his struggle. . . . Man’s fight against suffering” is a value (AS 1059–60). In this passage, Rand is commending acting on one’s pleasure in a value-operation not one’s own. It seems to me that this is an occasion of egoistic action that is not directly for one’s own sake, only indirectly so. One has the pleasure directly, but the object of one’s intelligence yielding the pleasure is a value-operation not one’s own and a value-operation whose aim is success (e.g., truth or relief from suffering) for one not oneself. Then, strictly speaking, Rand’s is an egoism that falls outside Kraut’s definition of egoism.

Kraut’s definition is more narrow than the usual definition for ethical theory. It is surely correct to call Rand’s ethics an egoism, an integrated agent-beneficiary egoism. (Objectivist conceptions of egoism are usual. See N. Branden VOS 57; L. Peikoff Om. // 65, OPAR 230–31; T. Smith VV 154–55, ARNE 23–24.) Kraut opposes also this theory of ethics, which he takes to be less than full-fledged egoism. Rand holds that one should never sacrifice one’s own true interests to those of another. Kraut observes that “that thesis holds that one has a special normative relationship to oneself. It places the self ahead of others . . . .” (WGW 53). It gives priority always to striving for one’s own good, rather than striving for the good of others. Kraut rejects the ethics of uniform self-priority. “There is no reason always to place oneself first in situations of conflict, or always to refrain from making large sacrifices for the good of others” (WGW 54; further, 180–83, 191–96).

Rand writes concerning sacrifice:

“If you achieve the career you wanted, after years of struggle, it is not a sacrifice; if you renounce it for the sake of a rival, it is. If you own a bottle of milk and give it to your starving child, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to your neighbor’s child and let your own die, it is” (AS 1028).

“If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat” (AS 1029).

As an example of self-sacrifice, Kraut poses the following:

“Suppose a parent, to earn enough money to give his child an expensive education, gives up a job that makes full use of his talents and in its place accepts a post that is intellectually and emotionally deadening and physically dangerous, but provides a large and steady income” (WGW 181).

Kraut counts this as an example of self-sacrifice. To any ethical theory that would count it as not sacrificial, Kraut poses a challenge. Suppose the child who receives the education is an ungrateful child, who says he owes his parent nothing in return, that the parent was satisfying the parent’s own hierarchy of values, so there was no real self-sacrifice in the parent letting go of the career that would have been better for the parent.

It is possible that on Rand’s egoism, a parent who forfeited the better career for the purpose of a better education for the child would necessarily be making an inverted-value sacrifice, the forfeiture of what ought to be valued more in comparison to something that ought to be valued less, though highly. That is, the better career for the parent should necessarily be valued more highly by the parent than the better education for the child. Whether such a conclusion follows from Rand’s ethics, I will leave undetermined; thoughts from readers would be appreciated. What is clear is that a Randian should hold the child’s ungratefulness to be prima facie wrong for the child and a wrong against the parent because the value of what the parent forfeited for the child’s education was enormous, regardless of the possibility that the parent valued the latter over the former.

I concluded above that Rand’s conception of holding one’s own life “as the motive and goal” of one’s actions and never placing “[one’s] prime goal within the persons of others” does not entail always taking one’s own interests as the direct object of one’s actions. This further undermines the ungrateful child’s rationale. The direct motive for the parent’s momentous choice could be the child’s well-being, even if that choice also serves the parent’s well-being.

Strand Two 

The first strand in Rand’s move from agent egoism to beneficiary egoism was the thesis that if one does not hold one's own life as the  motive and goal of one’s actions (at least indirectly), one is acting in a self-destructive way. The second strand, wound together with the first, is that if one does not hold one’s life as the motive and goal of one’s actions, one is acting in a disintegrated way, and integrated life is better life.

All living organisms are engaged in continual integrated actions suited to their individual survival or the survival of their species. Deterioration of an organism’s ability to perform its integrated repertoire of actions is a loosening of the tight organization required for its continued life or the continuation of its species. Rand draws attention to the overarching value of the survival of the individual organism that is served by its integrated repertoire of actions suited to its kind. (She leaves out of the frame of attention the overarching value of the propagation of the species that is served by the repertoire of the individual organism.)

Consider the repertoire of the marine snail Pleurobranchea. The nervous systems of these animals are much simpler than the mammalian central nervous system, but they are sufficiently complex to coordinate the behavioral sequences known as fixed action patterns. Those are inherited stereotypical patterns of behavior (such as egg-laying) consisting of several distinct steps that either together form a coordinated sequence or do not take place at all. It has been determined that the fixed action patterns characteristic of Pleurobranchea are organized neurologically into a definite hierarchy: feeding is dominant over righting, gill and siphon withdrawal, or mating; episodic egg-laying is dominant over feeding; escape swimming is dominant over all other behaviors.

Humans have sensations of pleasure and pain. These are signs of the body’s welfare or injury. In addition to bodily pleasure-pain systems, we have emotional systems. Rand conceives joy and suffering as fundamental emotions that estimate whether something furthers one’s life or threatens it. Which particular things emotions will signal as good or as bad will be shaped by one’s unique past experience and value judgments. If one has taken up values opposing one’s self-interest—not only self-sacrifice as a value, but values contradictory, values impossible, or values sheltered from rational assessment—then suffering and destruction will be the results. On the other hand, if one chooses to value the full use of one’s rational mind, to value the possible, the productive, and the self-beneficial, then there is fair promise of life and happiness (AS 1020–22).

Just as the organs and systems of the human body must act in a properly coordinated way if they are to effect the end-in-itself that is the life of the individual organism, so one’s consciously directed actions must be properly organized if one is to achieve well the end-in-itself that is the conscious life of the individual human being. Rand identified seven coordinated patterns of volitional actions necessary for one’s realistically best life. Those are her seven cardinal virtues I listed above. (David Kelley has argued that an eighth cardinal virtue, sister to productivity, naturally issues from Rand’s ethics and conception of human existence. That virtue is benevolence. This addition is argued in his essay “Unrugged Individualism” [1996]). These virtues are defended as general principles, good guides for any individual. Ethical theory, on Rand’s account, tells one what are the main right values and virtues and their rationale. It tells one also who is rightly the primary beneficiary of one’s agency.

Kraut argues that philosophy can help answer “What is good?” but it cannot help answer “Whose good should I be serving?” (WGW 39–65, 208–13, 255–57). He argues that there are many proper answers to that second question, so an ethical theory that purports a uniquely correct answer to it must have gone wrong. The answer that one should always promote one’s own good is incorrect by overgeneralization. He recognizes that there are circumstances in which there is no one’s good besides one’s own that one should promote, but those circumstances are not typical. Contrary to Kraut, I think, as in Strand One, that promotion of the good of other persons can be directly for their sake, yet one can be holding in an integrated way to the overarching good for oneself, the overarching primary good of one’s own life and happiness.

One does stand in a special normative relation to oneself. Mature and healthy individuals are constituted—and Kraut also takes this for true—so as to love themselves, to take care of themselves, and to act for their own benefit. But Kraut allows for the possibility, when one has reached adulthood, of properly turning one’s life into a purely instrumental value serving the good of definite others (WGW 48–53). This extreme possibility is not cashed out in terms of a real-world circumstance in which it would be proper. I think, as Rand thought, that such an agent would not be self-harmonious, so, would not be flourishing.

Kraut does think philosophy can help answer “What is good?” and I want to give at least a peek at the fruits of his labor. Recall that Kraut maintains that the good is the flourishing of living things. The salient components he finds constituting human flourishing are: autonomy (WGW 196–201), cognitive skills (164–66), affects expressing rational assessments (153–58), affectionate relationships (161–63), honesty (192–93, 257–61), and justice (194–96, 225–34).

Strand Three 

Rand writes that “man’s life is the standard of morality, but your own life is its purpose. If existence on earth is your goal, you must choose your actions and values by the standard of that which is proper to man—for the purpose of preserving, fulfilling, and enjoying the irreplaceable value which is your life” (AS 1014).

If one aims to live and live well, then man’s life must be one’s standard of morality. Part of the nature of man’s life, in Rand’s conception, is that it is life of individuals in which each is organized to be an end in himself existing for his own sake. That is how human beings are outfitted by biological nature, and in the ways that are open to their choice, that is how they should organize themselves.

Morality can be put to various purposes. The proper one, in Rand’s view, is to provide “a code of values to guide man’s choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life” (VOS 13).

Kraut notes that the term moral is often used by way of contrast to terms like prudential, self-interested, and selfish. He allows that it is useful to have the term moral for distinguishing between behavior that benefits others in contrast to behavior that benefits  oneself, but he observes that “this way of talking has the unfortunate effect of making self-interested actions and concern for one’s own good dishonorable, or in any case of secondary importance” (WGW 256). He takes both the moral and the prudential to be genres of the good.

The good, in Kraut’s view, is the flourishing of the living. Rand stresses more than Kraut that organisms are organized so as to survive. She also stresses more than Kraut that individual human beings are by nature ends in themselves.

Kraut makes the good point that by citing facts of nature—of plants and animals and the powers nature has given humans—he is not maintaining that “what is good for us is whatever is natural for us, and whatever we are born with must be used” (WGW 146). We might correctly conclude that some of our natural powers are bad for us. But it is not plausible that many or all of them are bad for us.

“It would be foolish to begin with the assumption that whereas it is good for all other living things to flourish, it is not good for us to flourish. After all, flourishing consists in the growth and development of the capacities of a living thing: why should that be good for plants and animals, but not for us? . . . If a theory of goodness can fit its account of human well-being into a larger framework that applies to the entire natural [biological] world, that gives it an advantage over any theory that holds ‘G is good for S’ is one kind of relationship for human beings and a different kind for all other creatures” (WGW 147–48). That merit of Kraut’s theory holds for Rand’s as well.

The third strand in the cord by which Rand ties beneficiary egoism to agency egoism is the stress she lays on the self-sufficiency of organisms in general and individual humans in particular. There is much to be said for this and against this. Not today.


( categories: )

Author Meets Critics

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Richard Kraut’s book What Is Good and Why will be the topic of an Author-Meets-Critics session at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

The meeting will be held in Vancouver at the Westin Bayshore. This session will be on Saturday, April 11th, at 9:00 a.m.–Noon.

Chair: Corinne Gartner (Princeton)

Critics: Stephen Darwall (Yale); Thomas Hurka (Toronto); Gary Watson (UC – Riverside)

Author: Richard Kraut (Northwestern)

  

The session of the Ayn Rand Society will be on the preceding Thursday evening.

Stephen

Leonid's picture

If two definitions which describe same concept contradict each other, it means that one of them is wrong and shouldn't be in use. I think that standard definition is wrong since sacrifice means exactly what Ayn Rand means.

"Sacrifice (from a Middle English verb meaning "to make sacred", from Old French, from Latin sacrificium: sacer, sacred; sacred + facere, to make) is commonly known as the practice of offering food, or the lives of animals or people to the gods, as an act of propitiation or worship. The term is also used metaphorically to describe selfless good deeds for others, or a short term loss in return for a greater gain (such as in a game of chess).

The practice of sacrifice is found in the oldest human records. The archaeological record contains human and animal corpses with sacrificial marks long before any written records of the practice. Sacrifices are a common theme in most religions, though the frequency of animal, and especially human, sacrifices are rare today.(are they?-Leonid).Self-sacrifice, the act of deliberately following a course of action that has a high risk or certainty of suffering or death (which could otherwise be avoided), in order to achieve a perceived benefit for certain others, is a powerful theme with a well established place in many cultures, myths, and societies. Self-sacrifice may also be more broadly defined as selflessness, or the readiness to inflict pain upon yourself to save others; it is this definition which, for example, Leo Tolstoy embraced and espoused." Wikipedia
Therefore the use of word "sacrifice" to describe exchange of lesser value to greater one is wrong,except maybe for chess players who use the word as technical term.I know that many people would say something like " I've made great sacrifices to become plastic surgeon and now I have private jet." I think it is misnomer,remnants of altruist indoctrination of last 2000 years.

Special Definition

Stephen Boydstun's picture

That's right, Leonid. This standard, dictionary definition is flatly contrary to the special definition that Rand gives to the term sacrifice. It is fine to make a special definition for a term, as Rand did, so long as one makes clear in discussions that that is what one means by the term. A single term is being used to mark more than one concept. Both of the concepts delineated by these two definitions are useful.

As I explained in one of the links, Rand could have used the phrase inverted sacrifice to designate the concept she wanted to isolate. That would have been awkward. And she wanted to attack additional branches in the idea of sacrifice. She wanted to attack homage to supernatural deities that goes with the term sacrifice, and she wanted to attack the sacrifice of individuals to collectives. 

Stephen

Leonid's picture

(1)"One definition of sacrifice in my American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language is "the forfeiture of something highly valued . . . for the sake of someone or something considered to have a greater value."

(2)Rand's definition:" Sacrifice is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue."

These two definitions are mutually excluding. If (1) is right ,then (2) is wrong and vice versa.They are not interchangeable. According to (1) if I invested $10000 in stock exchange and became millioner I commited act of sacrifice (sounds a bit awkwardly-doesn't it?). According to (2) if I went on peace mission and selflessly died in the tribal conflict in Burundi I commited sacrifice (sounds O.K to any altruist). So how you propose to reconcile these two definitions?

Kraut Correct?

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Scott asked whether, in my understanding, Kraut refutes egoism through the necessity of self-sacrifice?

That the phenomenon of sacrifice is necessary in human life, under one of the standard meanings of the term sacrifice, is accepted by both Kraut and Rand. One definition of sacrifice in my American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language is "the forfeiture of something highly valued . . . for the sake of someone or something considered to have a greater value." In that ordinary sense of the term sacrifice, making a sacrifice may or may not entail contravening one's self-interest. In that usage, it is sensible to say that someone sacrificed greatly to raise the children or sacrificed greatly to establish themselves in a certain career.

Rand's definition and usage of the term sacrifice is not a standard one. (See also here.) Her special, non-standard definition is a useful one, as Christine Swanton observes in her paper to be delivered at the Ayn Rand Society later this month in Pasadena.

But neither Rand nor Kraut accept that sacrifice in Rand’s special sense of the term—the forfeiture of what is valued more for what is valued less—is necessary. I mentioned in the article that “Kraut argues that philosophy can help answer ‘What is good?’ but it cannot help answer ‘Whose good should I be serving?’ (WGW 39–65, 208–13, 255–57). He argues that there are many proper answers to that second question, so an ethical theory that purports a uniquely correct answer to it must have gone wrong. The answer that one should always promote one’s own good is incorrect by overgeneralization.”

Kraut would not say that self-sacrifice, in Rand’s sense of the term sacrifice, is necessary in the sense that one will necessarily sometimes deliberately and successfully choose it. But he does say, as Rand and I would say (contrary to Hobbes, La Rochefoucauld, and Nietzsche [as of Human, All-Too-Human]) that it is possible. So it is possible to reject beneficiary-egoism in deed and to reject it as uniformly ethically correct, this Kraut and Rand and I agree.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I was unsure by your question, Scott, whether you might be also asking what was my own assessment of ethical egoism. For my own history on this, see here, then here. As you see from my article above, I changed my mind, upon reading Kraut’s book, as to what should pass for egoism. His presentation inadvertently prompted me to realize that the directness requirement is overly restrictive. Kraut (and I myself previously) took egoism as holding “that there is only one person whose good should be the direct object of one’s actions: oneself. It allows one to take an indirect interest in others, and to promote their well-being, but only to the extent that doing so is a means towards the maximization of what is good for oneself” (WGW 39, emphasis added).

Scott

James S. Valliant's picture

While I would prefer ours to be the only one in the dictionary, I think the future of civilization requires only that ours be included.

Picking our fights properly is crucial.

I agree with Rand: this one is crucial.

And, as Rand says, for the very reason that you are afraid to fight it.

I went back and read the introduction a couple of weeks ago

personallydisinterested's picture

I understand where Rand, and you, are coming from, I just don't see it as relevant nor productive. 

"Selfish" should be a profound compliment, reflecting the demanding nature of true self-interest, true "egoism."

We must insist that a #2 (or whatever) definition be added in order to prevent the truth from being defined out of existence.

I disagree.  If we were successful in introducing a second definition, I'm sure the most common use of the word would also have to be added.  Therefore, we would have a word with three meanings, one neutral, one sinful, and one admirable.  The word would be useless. 

It is frustrating when people use the term selfish to describe brutish behavior.  Rand was obviously annoyed by this and decided it would be best to embrace the term and redefine it to mean the opposite.  Instead of arguing the issue, we end up arguing the meaning. 

It is much more important to get the dictionary out and point to the definition. 

When confronting someone that dislikes selfishness, show them that they are misusing the word.  "You don't dislike selfish people. You are selfish. I am selfish.  Do you dislike yourself?  Do you dislike me?"

Most people believe that selfish means inconsiderate of others.  It doesn't.  Instead of fighting over the meaning, win the argument. 

Scott

James S. Valliant's picture

I would urge you to read the "Introduction" to Ayn Rand's The Virtue of Selfishness where she discusses this very issue.

In short: to act in one's actual self-interest is being unfairly equated with what is -- in fact -- grossly self-destructive behavior. It's as if self-interest is necessarily harmful to others and short-sighted -- "by definition." It's as if self-esteem can only mean the insecurity of a boaster, and the self-absorption that can only signal a lack of self-esteem. When, of course, the opposite is true.

If dictionaries insist that self-immolation define the only meaning of "selfish" -- and simultaneously provide us no concept meaning "acting in a way that will in reality enhance one's life and happiness" -- the problem is not with our stars but with our language.

"Selfish" should be a profound compliment, reflecting the demanding nature of true self-interest, true "egoism."

We must insist that a #2 (or whatever) definition be added in order to prevent the truth from being defined out of existence.

personallydish

Leonid's picture

"What benefit do you seek from redefining the word selfish? "

Proper and functional description of the concept which would,for example,preclude contradictory conclusions you make.

Lost in translation

personallydisinterested's picture

Leonid and James,

What benefit do you seek from redefining the word selfish?

Stephen

personallydisinterested's picture

Can one choose an alternative in one’s self-interest, but not maximally so? Isn’t one possible motive for choosing an alternative less than maximally beneficial for oneself the benefit that alternative brings to a person not oneself?

Self-sacrificial, but not common.  One is not built to sacrifice.  One must be trained to sacrifice. 

IYO, does Kraut refute egoism through the necessity of self-sacrifice? 

Scott

James S. Valliant's picture

In FACT, a thief is not acting selfishly -- whatever his motive.

Stephen

Leonid's picture

"Can one choose an alternative in one’s self-interest, but not maximally so? Isn’t one possible motive for choosing an alternative less than maximally beneficial for oneself the benefit that alternative brings to a person not oneself? "

One could and as the matter of fact many would. The question is: Why? What benifit can be achieved by mutual sacrifice ? As far as we can learn from the history the end result of mutual sacrifice is mutual destruction. And on what rational ground one should be primary concerned with benifit of other person who is presumably totaly stranger as your alternative implicates ?

personallydish

Leonid's picture

"Your definition of selfishness is much too limited. Keating is not selfish? Give me a break." Consider this:
Ellsworth : Who designed Cortlandt?
Keating : Leave me alone
E: Who designed Cortlandt?
K: Let me go!
E: What did you do to Lucius Heyer?
K: I killed him...
E: Stop raving ... Why do you want to kill Howard?
K: I don't want to kill him. I want him in jail...He will take orders. He will take orders! "
Elsworth!" Keating screamed. "Ellworth!"
E: You make me sick!
"Fountainhead pg 633"
And this broken second hander is selfish?! Selfish without self? Give me a break! Second hander, like Keating or thief cannot be selfish. Their primary concern with others,not with themselves. They are parasites who cannot exist on their own.They are not self-sufficient. The source of their material and spiritual wealth (like self-esteem) is in others, and that why it cannot be sustainable-like in the case of Keating. And you call them egoists? "Selfish" = you've said-"concerned with oneself." This definition is too broad. By this definition any suicider is selfish-he concerned with himself. The full definition " concerned with one own good,concerned with promoting own welfare." And "good" is ethical concept which can be defined only in rational terms.( all other irrational attemts to define what is "good" failed) Therefore it is not such a thing as irrational selfishness.

Degrees of Self-Interest

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Scott,

When one chooses an alternative that is in one’s self-interest over other alternatives that also would be in one’s self-interest, is the alternative one selects always the one that was most in one’s self-interest? I gather you would say it is not.

If not, then can’t one try to discover by reflection which alternative would be most in one’s self-interest? Having reached a verdict as to which alternative is most in one’s self-interest, does one have to choose it?

Can one choose an alternative in one’s self-interest, but not maximally so? Isn’t one possible motive for choosing an alternative less than maximally beneficial for oneself the benefit that alternative brings to a person not oneself?

This would seem to be an occasion of self-sacrifice for the sake of another, although, since the alternative selected is in one’s self-interest, perhaps this should still count as a variety of egoism, rather than altruism. Prof. Kraut would evidently not count it as egoism, since he takes egoism to allow promoting the well-being of others “only to the extent that doing so is a means towards the maximization of what is good for oneself” (WGW 39).

 

Leonid

personallydisinterested's picture

Your definition of selfishness is much too limited.  Keating is not selfish?  Give me a break.  A thief is not selfish?  Selfish = concerned with oneself.  Selfish is not equal to rational self-interest based on Objectivist principles.  This is a silly semantic argument that distracts from the real issue.

The real issue is: human nature is to be concerned with oneself.  People who attempt to live as if they are not self-centered, are living a ridiculous lie.  This lie should be exposed, not redefined. 

Only rational egoist is selfish

Leonid's picture

"He should have titled his article "Isn't everyone an Objectivist?". I don't like to have semantic arguments, but you can't just redefine a word and then tell everybody else that they are using it the wrong way. Selfishness is a value of Objectivism, not a synonym for Objectivism."

It's depends how one defines selfishness. Consider Keating in "Fountainhead". He is cheating, manipulating, even indirectly killing in order to become great architect.By any standard he is selfish-he is acting to promote his own interest.But is he? If he were rational he would realize that manipulation of others will not make him great architect,he can only achieve recognition via secondhandness. Selfishness based on secondhandness is fried ice-contradiction in terms. So not every body is selfish, only rational egoists are.

Altruism is a sick joke

personallydisinterested's picture

So, an Indian prince, a Jewish carpenter, and a Chinese bureaucrat walk into a German bar...

When people promote altruism, the response should be derision, not 'lets talk about this interesting idea.'

When someone argues for altruism he tends to do it in terms of self-interest.  What a perfect opportunity to point out the fact that he is selfish.  

If on the other hand he, argues from the point of the common good, point out the fact that he is inescapably selfish and "evil" according to his own philosophy.  People don't like to be evil.  

Contradiction is uncomfortable and provides reason an excellent opportunity for philosophical change.   

Excellent questions, Stephen

personallydisinterested's picture


Do you think that everyone tries always to act in their self-interest? Is self-sacrifice not something that anyone tries for?

No.  I think that people who attempt to sacrifice themselves in an altruistic manner are fools.  They are motivated by something, and that motivation at its heart is a concern for one's self.  A person may wish to fly like a duck, but it can't be done, and any attempts would cause the viewer to rightfully question the sanity of such a person.  


Do you think that everyone who attains what they try for has acted in their self-interest?

Yes, but they could have acted in a self-destructive way in the attainment.  If I steal to gain wealth, I am acting in my own self-interest in a self-destructive way.  

 

Do you think that religious people who believe that the rewards to them
come in heaven after death cannot choose any actions here on earth that
are in fact, on this earth, self-sacrificial?

Yes, but it rarely happens.


Chapter 5 of The Virtue of Selfishness is titled “Isn’t Everyone Selfish?” Is there anything in the analysis given in that chapter with which you disagree?

The heart of the issue.  I went back and read Rand's introduction and chapter 5 again.  Chapter 5 took a few reads actually, as Branden is practically incoherent.  Not that I have a problem with selfishness as he and Rand describe it, I disagree with the purpose, reasoning, and his conclusion of the chapter.  The purpose is to argue against the idea that all people are inherently selfish.  The reasoning is that selfish people are Objectivists.  The conclusion is that selfishness is good (well, I don't disagree with the conclusion so much as the incomprehensible manner at which it is achieved).  Jelly + peanut butter + bread = elephant.

Branden confuses selfishness with Objectivism.  People who "sacrifice" of themselves in order to achieve rewards from god are acting in their own self-interest whether they (or Branden) want to acknowledge it or not.  An Objectivist has (a) a hierarchy of values set by the standard of one's self-interest, and (b) the refusal to sacrifice a higher value to a lower one or to a non-value.

To argue that a person is not self-centered is to argue that a person is not a person.  To argue that people choose to be selfish is to justify altruism as a choice.  Altruism is a ridiculous charade and should be called such.  Altruism is not virtuous.  It is not practicable.  It is not humane.  

Additionally, the irrational (and incoherent in his presentation) determination that people who understand the selfish nature of man provide an inherent argument against a rational code of ethics, is false.  In fact, I think it is an endorsement of a rational code of ethics. 

He should have titled his article "Isn't everyone an Objectivist?".  I don't like to have semantic arguments, but you can't just redefine a word and then tell everybody else that they are using it the wrong way. Selfishness is a value of Objectivism, not a synonym for Objectivism.  

Family relations and Objectivism

Leonid's picture

Leonid

http://www.objectivistcenter.o...

This article, in my opinion can greatly contribute to our discussion.

Olivia, child-rearing is NOT sacrifice.

Leonid's picture

Leonid
"how one spends one's time making the money."
Yes,that makes all the difference.Sometimes and quite often we do things for money which we would prefer not to do-like Howard Roark when he had to work in quarry instead to do architecture. So what? As long as one workes toward his own goals that is not sacrifice. Why to endure 10 years of " excruciated torture" to create new alloy ,as Rearden did in "Atlas Shrugged" ,is not sacrifice, but to spend 10 years doing well-paid but hated job in order to create new successful human being who also happened to be your own child is sacrifice? Child rearing is not sacrifice.

Possibility of Chosen Self-Sacrifice

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Scott, you wrote on 17 February:

“The truth is that self-interest is our only motivation and it has always been our only motivation.”

Do you think that everyone tries always to act in their self-interest? Is self-sacrifice not something that anyone tries for?

Do you think that everyone who attains what they try for has acted in their self-interest?

Do you think that religious people who believe that the rewards to them come in heaven after death cannot choose any actions here on earth that are in fact, on this earth, self-sacrificial?

Chapter 5 of The Virtue of Selfishness is titled “Isn’t Everyone Selfish?” Is there anything in the analysis given in that chapter with which you disagree? 

Stephen

The principal issue

personallydisinterested's picture

The reason why rational self-interest is rational and moral, is it is our inescapable nature.  Parents don't sacrifice themselves for their children.  It doesn't happen except maybe in a "Titanic movie" type situation. 

Crossed wires again...

Olivia's picture

You said "It would be the same thing as me saying “your career is more important than mine honey.” It would contradict Rational Egoism."-yes,only if one values his money more then child's career.

No way Leonid! You may of misunderstood what I was saying. It's about valuing the quality of one's own day to day existence - how one spends one's time making the money.

Olivia,there is no escape from the trader's principle

Leonid's picture

Certainly. trader's principle is applicable. The parent invests money but child has to perform.As I mentioned before,that depends on the context of the given situation. If a parent invests and doesn't recieve any return on investment-namely, child's progress- because child's unwillingness to make any efforts-then it would be parent's sacrifice and it would be immoral to carry on child's support.If child does his best ,then it is not sacrifice but trade-the parent buys his happiness in the form of child's achievement.If parent values his money more than child's future and support him out of duty he commits ugly sacrifice.

You said "It would be the same thing as me saying “your career is more important than mine honey.” It would contradict Rational Egoism."-yes,only if one values his money more then child's career. Obviously one has to strike right balance. If one in order to support his child has to perform such a job which is completely destructive to one's physical and mental well-being,then it would be futile exercise:one cannot enjoy his child's achievement in mental institution or in early grave.But such a situation is unrealistically extreme.

But Leonid...

Olivia's picture

that’s how Kraut did put it, hence my response.

A newborn baby stressing out its mother with sleepless nights is different in the sense that newborn babies do that, it is part of the nature of their identity. I don’t consider that a sacrifice (though I remember it feeling like one!) because it passes quickly as the child grows into a toddler – and mothers can sleep during the day when the baby naps, if they have to.

Regarding investments in the future like a beloved child’s education… sure, one can go without expensive homes and holidays if the value of the education is greater – that’s a choice. But if a parent has to live an existence everyday by way of a career that is soul destroying in order for the child to potentially achieve a career that is fulfilling, that is a sacrifice… and I know one that many people do in fact make. I personally wouldn’t do it for my children. It would be the same thing as me saying “your career is more important than mine honey.” It would contradict Rational Egoism.

You mentioned the trader principle. If I was to “sacrifice” my career for one of my children’s, I would only do it on that principle, but that would be a “deal” rather than a sacrifice.

A good friend of mine is working her butt off to put her two children through a very expensive school at the moment. She HATES her well paid job. This has been done by way of such a deal, ie: I pay and you better achieve! I’m not sure what the outcome will be, but I suspect (and hope) the children will do their very best.

Olivia, I'm not persuaded

Leonid's picture

"intellectually and emotionally deadening and physically dangerous, but provides a large and steady income for a child's expensive education."

If you put it like that, then you are right. Nobody under any circumstances can achieve happiness by total self-destruction. However it can be perfectly normal for the parent to choose his child's well-being and future as a value which is higher then value of many other things (comfort, income,career and so on). Have you heard about many sleepless nights of the newborn baby's mother? Do you know how that intellectually and emotionally deadening can be? Would you consider that to be a sacrifice as well? And why do you think that investment in the future ( in potential) is sacrifice ? What about all sorts of financial investments which may give you ( or may not) gratification in distant future ? Is that sacrifice ?

Persuaded - Thanks!

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Olivia,

I was unsure whether on Rand's ethical theory the choice of the parent posed by Kraut would necessarily be a self-sacrifice (in Rand's sense of the term) or something that could not be uniformly decided by ethics. You have persuaded me that Rand should say that it would necessarily be a self-sacrifice and should not be enacted.

This verdict is also in step with Rand's consistent stance taken in her literature of having career trump romantic relationship when that painful choice has to be made.

Thanks again.

I may be crossing my wires...

Olivia's picture

Mom was a second-grade school teacher in a small town. It was a big "sacrifice." She was not the type who would think I owed her something in return. It was a gift. The day I graduated from college was one of the happiest days of my life. I hugged her and told her that I could never have done it so soon without her. Believe me, I was grateful.

This I understand as being a worthy gift given to you by your mother's choice.

But the example of self-sacrifice given by Kraut in his rejection of Egoism was a choice between a career that uses the full talents of a parent versus one that is intellectually and emotionally deadening and physically dangerous, but provides a large and steady income for a child's expensive education.

My point is that according to my understanding of Objectivist ethics, the above example would be considered a self-destructive sacrifice.... and also not a particularly good choice for the child who gets to have an expensive education whilst his parent becomes increasingly spiritually numb, with the likely possibility that his parent's life may be cut short (education over!). A choice like that literally twists the parent/child relationship into one of host/parasite, even if originally made from the best of intent.

Rational egoism dictates that the parent should prioritise his own happiness first and thus set the best example to his child. An expensive education cannot erase the dark bleakness of a miserable parent, nor remove the burden of a growing guilt complex off an impressionable psyche.

Stephen, was your point that Rand would say the above example was not a sacrifice but a choice?

Vestiges of primitive thought

personallydisinterested's picture

The concept of sacrifice is being misused.  A principle idea of primitive morality of which we are still burdened, is this value of personal sacrifice.  Not only, are we to assume that it is a healthy value, but a necessary value.  Without this value, the world would turn into a nightmare of selfish mutual destruction.  In fact, we are threatened with this vision throughout history by religion and philosophy. If god doesn't strike you down, homosexuals will rape your house-guests, or evil factory owners will enslave their workers and use up the resources of the world.  But thank religion or altruism that we have avoided these nightmare situations!  Rational self-interest, evidently, deserves no credit, and thankfully has been controlled. 

It is understandable to still be under the influence of this primitive ideology, but it must be purged from your philosophy.  The truth is the opposite.  Rational self-interest is the only thing that has saved us from these evil philosophies and religions.  When taken to their logical extremes, they break down.  The defence to this is to say rational self-interest taken to its logical extreme doesn't work either.  It is time to call this defence a lie.  

The truth is that self-interest is our only motivation and it has always been our only motivation.  Many instances will be presented to demonstrate the invalidity of my contention, I can defend it against any.  Human altruism is impossible.  It has never existed and never will.  If you believe that a parent is sacrificing in order to pay for a child's education, you are mistaken.  The parent would never do it if the personal reward were not greater than that of the child.  If a child is disrespectful of a parent's "sacrifice" the response is appropriate (so long as the parent is following and preaching a religion or philosophy of self-sacrifice).  The argument of 'respect me for I have sacrificed' is hypocritical and evil.  The parent is attempting to get a reward from an "altruistic" act.  On the other hand, if a parent says "respect me for I love you" (or something equally as life affirming) the argument lacks hypocrisy and the parent should be respected.  Adult children despise nothing so much as hypocrisy in their parents (admittedly opinion, this would make an interesting thread), and when hypocrisy is so blatant, of course they react indignantly.

No one has ever given anything to another person without considering the primacy of their own benefit.  Rand railed against evil philosophies and religions because they so blatantly contradicted man's rational nature.  I'm sure you can point to instances where people act against their self-interest (monks burning themselves, etc).  But people who actually sacrifice themselves are doing it as a result of an evil philosophy or religion that convinces them that such a sacrifice is actually in their best interest (heaven, reincarnation, etc).  I know this seems ridiculous, that's why Rand was so direct in her refutation of such religions and philosophies.  They teach man to do what he can never do, sacrifice himself with the principal benefit of unknown others as his motivation. 

Do not get caught up with measuring benefit, it is inconsequential.  Perhaps I give all my money to a beggar.  You would say, I have his best interest in mind.  I would agree, but point out that I have my best interest in mind primarily.  There would be much evidences to support the idea that it was altruism, however, I do benefit.  When I give charitably, I do not feel indignant and self-sacrificing, I feel wonderful and powerful.  The 'charity' demanded by primitive religions and philosophies elicits the feelings of indignance and self-denial.

As long as we are confused into thinking that people owe us for our self-sacrifice, that that sacrifice is necessary, and that self-interest is personally and mutually destructive, we will continue to be disintegrated. 

We are rational.  We are self-interested.  Rational self-interest is good.  I recognize this and am better for it.

Can one really reject egoism ?

Leonid's picture

Hi, Stephen. Welcome back. I hope you’ve fully recovered from your illness and now well. Thank you for your thorough review of Richard Kraut’s book. I didn’t read the book, but as far I understood from your review; this book is a very instructive example of contradictive integration of incompatible ideas: egoism and altruism. And there are my comments

You said "I discern three intertwined strands in Rand’s defense of ethical egoism. I will be focusing on her arguments that move from agent egoism to beneficiary egoism. It is only when the latter is joined to the former that the theory should be called ethical egoism. “ “'

''Ethical egoism''' is belief that one ''ought'' to do what is in one's own self-interest, although a distinction should be made between what is really in one's self-interest and what is only apparently so (see [[psychological egoism]]). What is in one's [[self-interest]] may ''incidentally'' be detrimental to others, beneficial to others, or neutral in its effect. Ethical egoism is not to be confused with [[rational egoism]], which holds that it is rational to act in one's self-interest, but not that it is ethically imperative. Ethical egoism must also not be confused with [[individualism]], because individualism does not force that one ought to do what is in one's own self-interest.” (Wikipedia)

First, I’d like to point out that Objectivists ethics based not on beneficiary or ethical egoism but on rational egoism which is not the same. Rational egoism as you yourself demonstrated in your previous post is “a system of hypothetical imperatives that hinge on our wanting to secure certain aims: ‘If you want to secure social cooperation, then you ought to . . . Rand placed herself in the hypothetical-imperative territory in her “Causality versus Duty.” Remember too that for Rand, the moral individual achieves the value that is self-esteem “by shaping his soul in the image of his moral ideal, in the image of Man . . . .” (AS 1021) Rational egoism rejects categorical normative commandments like “Respect your father and mother” and examines each and any situation within its context. The only imperative which rational egoism recognizes is “Thou shall think.”

 Strand One 1.

It will be argued, however, that there are some moral choices in which one’s immediate motive is the good of others, yet that choice is not self-destructive. In ordinary circumstances, I tell people the truth.(1) My immediate motive is often their self-interest, not mine;(2) I don’t want them to be taking up falsehoods.” In this statements part (2) contradicts part (1) when part (1) is also self-refuting. For if it is agent’s motive then it is agent’s self-interest, not their, otherwise it would be their motive. This is the agent, who doesn’t want them to be taking up falsehoods, not them. Apparently agent doesn’t want them to fake reality since it wouldn’t be in his self-interest to live in faked reality. Hence agent’s motive is his own good. 2. “Kraut articulates this apparent defect of egoism as follows: “When everything goes well for a child and he has all the emotional resources he needs to interact with his community in ways that are best for himself, he will have some direct interest in some members of that community—namely, those who have manifestly expressed their love for him in ways that benefit him. So no one whose early education is as good for him as it can be will emerge from childhood as a person who is inclined to act as egoism says he should act. So fortunate a young adult will gladly help others for their sake . . . . Egoism tells him to extirpate this desire” (WGW 40–41; further, 48–65, 211–14, 231, 238–43). “ There is no defect if one applies “Trader’s principle” “The principle of trade is the only rational ethical principle for all human relationships, personal and social, private and public, spiritual and material. It is the principle of justice. A trader is a man who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved. He does not treat men as masters or slaves, but as independent equals. He deals with men by means of a free, voluntary, unforced, uncoerced exchange—an exchange which benefits both parties by their own independent judgment. A trader does not expect to be paid for his defaults, only for his achievements. He does not switch to others the burden of his failures, and he does not mortgage his life into bondage to the failures of others. In spiritual issues—(by "spiritual" I mean: "pertaining to man's consciousness")—the currency or medium of exchange is different, but the principle is the same. Love, friendship, respect, admiration are the emotional response of one man to the virtues of another, the spiritual payment given in exchange for the personal, selfish pleasure which one man derives from the virtues of another man's character. Only a brute or an altruist would claim that the appreciation of another person's virtues is an act of selflessness, that as far as one's own selfish interest and pleasure are concerned, it makes no difference whether one deals with a genius or a fool, whether one meets a hero or a thug, whether one marries an ideal woman or a slut. In spiritual issues, a trader is a man who does not seek to be loved for his weaknesses or flaws, only for his virtues, and who does not grant his love to the weaknesses or the flaws of others, only to their virtues. "The Objectivist Ethics,”The Virtue of Selfishness 31.

 

3.” Kraut rejects the ethics of uniform self-priority. “There is no reason always to place oneself first in situations of conflict, or always to refrain from making large sacrifices for the good of others” (WGW 54; further, 180–83, 191–96). “ Contradictions don’t exist. From the “Trader’s principle “ one can also learn that is no conflicts of interests among rational men.

 4. “I concluded above that Rand’s conception of holding one’s own life “as the motive and goal” of one’s actions and never placing “[one’s] prime goal within the persons of others” does not entail always taking one’s own interests as the direct object of one’s actions. This further undermines the ungrateful child’s rationale. The direct motive for the parent’s momentous choice could be the child’s well-being, even if that choice also serves the parent’s well-being.” Ask yourself : what are child’s parents motives? If they value child well-being more then their career then they are perfectly moral from the objectivist point of view. They do it for sake of their own happiness. They enjoy to watch child’s progress. However if they don’t mind the child and do it out of duty they commit ugly sacrifice. Gratitude of the child is irrelevant to this case (it can indicate bad child’s moral condition, since he violates “Trader’s principle” but not his parents.)

 Strand 2

1. “David Kelley has argued that an eighth cardinal virtue, sister to productivity, naturally issues from Rand’s ethics and conception of human existence. That virtue is benevolence. This addition is argued in his essay “Unrugged Individualism” [1996]” First, I think that the title “Unrugged Individualism” is inappropriate. It implicates that Rand advocated “Rugged Individualism” I don’t think that Kelley has enough evidence to support such an implication. Second, I don’t think that indiscriminate, out of context benevolence is warranted. That would be violation of the “ Trader’s principle”, granting of unearned. According to Kelley every body can count on my benevolence and no matter what. Virtues are means to obtain values and no value cannot be obtained by sacrifice which is indiscriminate extention of benevolence.

 Strand 3

It would be foolish to begin with the assumption that whereas it is good for all other living things to flourish, it is not good for us to flourish. After all, flourishing consists in the growth and development of the capacities of a living thing: why should that be good for plants and animals, but not for us? . . . If a theory of goodness can fit its account of human well-being into a larger framework that applies to the entire natural [biological] world, that gives it an advantage over any theory that holds ‘G is good for S’ is one kind of relationship for human beings and a different kind for all other creatures” (GWG 147–48).That merit of Kraut’s theory holds for Rand’s as well. “ Yes,it does. However Kraut failed to elaborate by what means humans are live and flourish. He didn’t mention that humans do it by using their mind and unlike all other living things they don’t do it by instict or reflex but by choice and exactly because that they need morality of rational egoism

Caring for Parents

Stephen Boydstun's picture

Thanks for the thoughts Olivia.

When my stepmother was a child, her grandmother lived with her familiy at their farmhouse. They were taking care of her as she lost her abilities. The grandchildren went to a one-room schoolhouse, where they learned English. But at home, they all continued to speak German until Grandma Buhr died, as she did not speak English. She was buried right there on the farm.

Those were different times. They were still working the farm with mules. They raised nearly all the food they would need for the year. To go into town for church, they had a buggy and horses. Back then it was commonplace for the younger generation to take care of the elderly members of their own family. It might be said that that was a way of repaying the gift that they had been given by being raised to maturity. I don't know how much they thought of it that way. I think more it was just that they had the personal, family history with the elderly member. They loved her and took care of her.

Also, it may have come under the commandment: Honor your father and mother that it may be well with you and that they may live long on the earth.

My parents were more educated than their parents, and even though they were middle-class people, the amount of money my folks had was undreamable to their parents. From the time I was off to college in 1966 to the present, I have never been able to figure out whether parents nowdays have a moral obligation to pay for the college education of their children. My father did not think so. Anyway, in Kraut's example a parent chose to do so. My natural mother, whom I knew only slightly, chose to do so for me. I could earn some by part-time work, but it was not nearly enough. Mom was a second-grade school teacher in a small town. It was a big "sacrifice." She was not the type who would think I owed her something in return. It was a gift. The day I graduated from college was one of the happiest days of my life. I hugged her and told her that I could never have done it so soon without her. Believe me, I was grateful.

When she became elderly, I certainly was prepared to provide for her care. As it worked out, her retirement pension and her rancher husband's savings were enough for them. Through the years, there were other things I was able to do---to call, to visit, to send gifts---that were echoes of gratitude for something long ago, also love and joy.

Stephen...

Olivia's picture

“Suppose a parent, to earn enough money to give his child an expensive education, gives up a job that makes full use of his talents and in its place accepts a post that is intellectually and emotionally deadening and physically dangerous, but provides a large and steady income” (WGW 181).

I think according to Objectivism this is definitely a sacrifice. The child’s education is being held as a higher value than the adult’s career. In other words, the child's potential for happiness is worth more than the adult's actual happiness.

Kraut counts this as an example of self-sacrifice. To any ethical theory that would count it as not sacrificial, Kant poses a challenge. Suppose the child who receives the education is an ungrateful child, who says he owes his parent nothing in return, that the parent was satisfying the parent’s own hierarchy of values, so there was no real self-sacrifice in the parent letting go of the career that would have been better for the parent.

This is precisely the kind of sacrifice that would give a child license toward such an “ungrateful” response. (After all, he has been sent a concretized message that his own happiness is more important than that of his parents).

I’m reminded of the old film “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner” with Sidney Poitier acting as the black man whose choice of white partner shocked and grieved his black parents. They kept reminding him how much he “owed” them because they had worked so hard in order for him to have the kind of life they had only ever dreamed of.

The film concludes with Sidney’s character getting very angry at his parents' pleas that he oblige them. He shouts at them...[I paraphrase from memory] “You did what you had to do… and when I become a father, I will do what I have to do for my own son or daughter.”

An Interpretation

Stephen Boydstun's picture

In the Strand One section, I interpreted Rand as holding to an egoism in which some right actions are not directly for the actor’s sake, only indirectly so. Directly, they could be for the sake of one not oneself, nonetheless count as egoistic. By this interpretation, Rand’s type of ethical egoism would fall outside Kraut’s exceptionally restrictive definition. “Egoism holds that there is only one person whose good should be the direct object of one’s actions: oneself” (WGW 39).

My interpretation of Rand on this point is in some tension with her text that I quoted (AS 1059–60). Further tension is added by other text of Rand’s:

The rational man . . . . recognizes the fact that his own life is the source, not only of all his values, but of his capacity to value. Therefore, the value he grants to others is only a consequence, an extension, a secondary projection of the primary value which is himself. (VoS 46–47)

She goes on, in that 1963 essay, to quote Nathaniel Branden:

“The respect and good will that men of self-esteem feel towards other human beings is profoundly egoistic; they feel, in effect: ‘Other men are of value because they are of the same species as myself.’ In revering living entities, they are revering their own life. This is the psychological base of any emotion of sympathy and any feeling of ‘species solidarity’.” (VoS 47)

Rand’s contrast of secondary to primary might suggest the contrast of indirect to direct. I think, considering the layout of the psychology to which Rand points, that suggestion should be rejected.

What if my interpretation of Rand is incorrect on the point of directness-indirectness? It remains that an egoism just like Rand’s except for that one point is a serious possibility that needs to be considered against Kraut’s theory, as I have done.

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