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Online usersPollWhat should the government do about ailing financial institutions? Nothing, except to back off and get out—as any Objectivist knows, intervention is treating the disease with the disease 85% Intervene judiciously—enough to avert a catastrophe that is otherwise imminent 4% Intervene massively—as it's doing 2% Nationalize the whole economy and be done with it. Bring on the USSA! 2% Something else (specify) 7% Total votes: 55
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ARE EMOTIONS TOOLS OF COGNITION?Submitted by seddon on Thu, 2008-05-08 16:41.
I came across this paragraph in the essay “SORGE and KARDIA” by John D. Caputo. It’s from a collection of essays on the early Heidegger entitled, READING HEIDEGGER FROM THE START: ESSAYS IN HIS EARLIEST THOUGHT, the best collection I’ve come across. Especially interesting are two essays on Aristotle’s influence, one bearing the title, BEING AND TIME: A ‘TRANSLATION’ OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS? Anyway, I thought some SOLOISTs would find this interesting, despite the technical terminology from both Husserl and Heidegger. “Pleasures and pains establish a new register of events, with a table of categories of their own, . . . The significance of pleasures and pains . . .lies in the way they close factical life in upon itself and deprive it of a world. The ‘subjectivity’ of ‘feelings’ is an objection to them only if one is enforcing a transcendental-ontological reduction. In fact, feelings explain how the ‘subject’ in one important sense is constituted. Postmodernist critics have done considerable damage to the modernist notion of subjective agency, individual autonomy, reflective transparence, and prelinguistic interiority. They have in effect finished the job of demolishing the Cartesian subject first launched in [Heidegger’s] BEING AND TIME. But the result of this critique is to bring to the fore another subject, the subject as patient, as subject to grief and misfortune, power and oppression. What I mean by ‘my’ life, by ‘I’ myself, in the most elemental sense is the incommunicability of ‘my’ pleasures, the pleasures and pains., the feelings, which define my factical life. What I mean by the subjectivity of the ‘other’ is the one in pleasure or pain, the one whose fact is twisted with torment [think of Linz listening to Slayer--tee-hee] or streaked with a smile [think of thinking of Linz listening to Slayer—tee-hee].” (“SORGE and KARDIA,” p. 338) Since the author blames postmodernists for denying that “emotions are tools of cognition” does this make Rand a postmodernist. Ahhhhhhhh. Maybe only a postmodernist light. Less calories than regular postmodernists. And she certainly didn’t care for Descartes.
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Lindsay
I'll try to get something out soon. Look for my defense of poor old David Hume. Who else?
Fred
Fred ...
Of course Rand was a pomowanker. After all, as you never tire of pointing out, she was a Platonist and a Kantian and a Cartesian and a Hegelian and a secret Rosicrucian too ...
I'm appalled to think you've been reading the Slayer thread all this time and said nothing.
Too much Scourge and Chlamydia if you ask me ...