About Autonomy.

Let me answer your post with a more general reply than I used on the trader principle. All of your confusions result from misunderstanding the purpose of CI. The CI has to do with one’s intention or what Aristotle might call “formal cause.” The final cause is not the CI. The final cause or goal of humans is happiness. Since the whole purpose of GMM is to determine the proper formal cause of moral action. But in fact he does not deny that happiness is the ultimate purpose of all humans. He writes, “There is one END [Aristotle’s final cause] that can be presupposed as actual for all rational beings …and this is happiness.” (GMM 415) So CI is the formal cause while happiness is he final cause.

So there are none of the problems you worry about. “An agent could be considered as moral if he divorced himself a) from reality. b) from any values) His values from reason.” All of these are non-problems.

Try this example. Howard Roark is an architect. He wants to build buildings. He would love build the bank, after all, that is what goal in life is—to build. But Roark has a formal cause that restricts how he can go after his goal—the formal cause is “my buildings have to be built my way.” Remember his reply to the statement, “after all, you’ve got to make a living.” And Roark answers, “Not that way.” [Peikoff had a hard time understanding this about Roark. On the one hand he seemed to be a realist, he wanted a career as an architect. This is the final cause. But on the other he seemed to be an idealist. He turns down the bank building by refusing the client’s request for a “few small changes.” This is the formal cause at work.]
Fred

“Kant rejects trader principle”

Let’s see. Since Kant was a pro-capitalist he was surely for the trader principle. Here are some indications from his writings.
“Every person may seek happiness in the way that seems best to him, [that would include trading] if only he does not violate the freedom of others." (THEORY AND PRACTICE 290 in the German)

Of course this could lead to great inequalities in possessions. And Kant agrees, a free society, “is completely consistent with the greatest inequality in the quantity and degree of possessions.” (Ibid 291)

And that means Kant should be anti-welfare state. And he is.
“A government that was established on the principle of regarding the welfare of the people in the same way that a father regards his children’s welfare, . . –such a government is the worst DESPOTISM we can think of. (Ibid. 291 emphasis in the original)

In a free society, Kant recognizes three enabling conditions for one to gain more than others, to wit: “talent, industry and luck.” (Ibid. 292) So if you have Rand’s writing talent, you can keep all the money you can make from writing; if you have Rand’s industry, you can keep all the money you make from from said industry; and it you hit the lottery, you can keep all the money for yourself. WHAT A GUY.

Fred

"It's the trader principle. I am a means/end and you are a means/end."
I understand your point.However, if you bring in trader principle, that's creates another problem. Trader principle presupposes exchange of values. "“Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept “value” is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible"(“The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, 15.) In other words the concept of "value" based on the concept of hypothetical imperative. CI effectively eliminates the need for value since one should act not in order to achieve A but simply out of duty and obedience to the law.Kant postulated "An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which it is determined" That, according to Kant's ethics, renders trader principle meaningless. Two (or more) people who act out of duty have no values to exchange. If they do act in order to achieve values, they are amoral. If they don't-then trader principle is not applicable. Indeed, as I pointed out before, Kant rejects trader principle and claims that moral imperative demands that one should serve others without to get any benefits (even moral satisfaction from altruist action) to himself. To continue with your example: if you enjoy to contribute to my Kantian education because you love teaching, then there is trader principle and you are means/ends, but within Kantian system you are amoral, since you act from inclination. However if you are totally indifferent to that process and do it from the duty only ,then you are moral, but I'm not, since I treat you as means to my ends. So one cannot win, that is- to achieve morality within Kantian ethics. No matter what one does, he's a sinner. Kantian idea is a substitution to the Biblical original sin. In order to find the way out of this tangle of contradictions one may put in good use Rand's advice-" By the very essence of Nature contradictions cannot exist. If you find contradiction-check your premises."(Atlas Shrugged)

"So how one could be NOT a means to others when he has CI to endeavour in order to forward the ends of others? Isn't this another Kantian antimony?"

Here you make a mistake that a lot of my students make, and the mistake comes from misunderstanding the formulation that I paraphrased earlier in this post. Let me quote it in full. "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means." (419 in the German)

Note what this does NOT say. It does not say that you cannot be a means to anothers end. I am a means to the end of your Kantian education. But what makes that ok and in agreement with the CI is that at the same time I treat myself as an end. It's the trader principle. I am a means/end and you are a means/end. That's the formula for a moral treatment of men by men. You violate the CI if you treat yourself or others as a mere means.
Notice how precise Kant is. In dealing with others, one has to "always at the same time" treat oneself and others as a means/end.
So that means the answer to your second question is, "No, it is not another antinomy."
But don't feel bad Leonid, I had to correct Pope John Paul II on this very point in an article I wrote on Centesimus Annus in 1992.

Hope that answers your questions.

Fred

Freedom, at least, means freedom from being influenced by outside forces, influences external to a person and their mind.

"Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)"(Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed., p44)

"If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy always results. (IBID P45)"

That means three things.
An agent could be considered as moral if he divorced himself a) from reality. b) from any values) His values from reason.
Consider hypothetical imperative as opposite to categorical imperative:

A. Hypothetical Imperative: a conditional maxim based on relative means/ends in the everyday world or every-day circumstances. The goal is not based on pure reason alone but usually upon desires. E.g., "If you want to be confident, then study hard."
B. Categorical Imperative: a rule stating what ought to be done based upon pure reason alone and not contingent upon sensible desires. "I am never to act otherwise than to will that my maxim should become universal law."

In other words, if agent acts on the premise “if he wants to achieve value A he ought to do X" this agent, according to Kant, is amoral and not rational. However if he doesn't have any goals, values, if he acts not in order to achieve his own happiness, but only to fulfill his duty, then he is moral and acts by reason. Kant thought that, "striving for happiness provides a ground for a
virtuous disposition is absolutely false." (Kant, op. cit., p. 119.)
But if one doesn't have any goals or things to gain or keep what does he need his reason for? Even Christian morality is less evil than this Kantian construction. At least good Christian acts according to God's imperatives in order to go to heaven. Kantian not supposes to have any ends at all. Mother Teresa's altruism, according to Kant, is amoral. Only John Galt could be "moral" altruist. But if no one has any goals, values or ends how one should treat others as ends? Kantian philosophy postulates selfishness without self which is contradiction in terms. The obvious question is: how such an agent could exercise any autonomy? Or, what makes "good" good? Kant explains "The Good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because its willing (i.e., it is good in itself" (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals in Kant Selections ed. L.W. Beck, p. 249.) By introducing the notion of intrinsing good Kant effectively separates morality from values. Kant formulated the condition of morality in three propositions : "... the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. The second proposition is: An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which it is determined. Its moral value depends on the principle of volition by which the action is done ... The third principle: ... Duty is the necessity of an action executed from the respect for law." To summarize: Kant formulated amoral ethics; its main element is obedience to the duty. Eichmann followed these principles to the letter.

 About altruism. Kant can’t be an altruist. Why not? The CI.

"The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does not also endeavour, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others"

So how one could be NOT a means to others when he has CI to endeavour in order to forward the ends of others? Isn't this another Kantian antimony?
"They can also be extremely bad and hurtful . . . power, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well-being and contentment with one’s state which goes by the name of ‘happiness.’" (p 61, emphasis his) The categorical imperative demands that we work for the universal good without any regard for our own happiness
[E]very rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use." By nature of being rational deserves what Kant calls an end, "a subjective ground of its self-determination.” (The Moral Law, p. 95. )In simple words, when we ignore ourselves and think of the good of another, we will treat them well.

“What, according to Kant, are these rational principles based on if one's rational values are replaced with adherence to the so-called "cartegorical imperative" and a sense of duty to it.”

If I understand Rescher correctly, that is the most fundamental of principles, even more fundamental than CI. So CI, although quite abstract is actually a step beneath the “always act rationally” principle.

“Secondly, how can one, according to Kant, act on rational principles if (a) objective reality is beyond man's access,”

Do you have a cite for this?

“pure reason, according to Kant, necessarily leads to paradox and antinomy.”
True, but remember, only when it is misused. Reason only works to give us knowledge when it is working on the material provided by our senses. Otherwise you get, what Rand might call, “floating abstractions.”

“Finally, Kant's notion of the "highest good" is a phenomenon of the noumenal world (the world in itself) which, according to Kant, is inaccessible to the individual, but is in some mystical fashion possibly accessible to the collective "humanity as a whole".”

Where oh where did you get this about “humanity as a whole” having mystical access to the noumena? I’m unaware of anything like this in Kant’s writings. If you have a cite for this, maybe you would be kind enough to share.

“Its no surprise that Eichmann was a Kantian. During his trial in Jerusalem, he expressed an incomprehension of why he was on trial, since, as he understood, the only thing he had done was to fulfill his duties or categorical imperatives towards German society.”

But there are no categorical imperatives toward German society. One who says this, like Eichmann, merely demonstrate their total misunderstanding of Kant.

Fred

The problem with quoting Windelband is that it will take attention away from Kant and we’ll wind up discussing if Windelband gets Kant right and if you get Windelband right. First let me mention that I couldn’t find your cite on pp.552-3. Maybe I have an older printing—I bought my Windelband in 1964 from NBI book service, so let me just take your quotation at face value. If Windelband says what you say he said, then either you or he is misleading. Consider the first clause, "The Will is heteronomous if it follows an empirically given impulse;” (my underline) But this is what Kant says, “All [heteronomous] principles . . . are either empirical or rational.” (442 in the German) You can read the Windelband to mean that an empirically given impulse is ONE WAY of being heteronomous. But as my quotation from Kant makes clear, that is not the only way to be heteronomous. In fact, there are two examples Kant given of rational heteronomy, the ontological principle of perfection and (far worse according to Kant) the theological conception of God.

You then quote WW, “it [the will] is autonomous only where it carries out a law given it by itself.” Correct. No fuhrer, no God, no empirical impulses [akin to whim in Objectivism]. So your quotations don’t further your case.
“Kant moral proof for freedom,immorality and God is,therefore,not a proof of knowledge, but faith." (ibid 556).”

This I did find (so I guess it’s me, oh well). But you open an unbelievable hornet’s nest. I have contributed to the literature on the concept of “faith” in Kant, see my KANT ON FAITH in Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol 7, #1. 2005. Suffice it to say here that Kant does not use the word with the meaning Rand gives it. It means rational belief and in the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON he gives a doctor’s diagnosis as an example. As for God, one must never forget that for Kant, God is not a constitutive concept but a regulative ideal, in other words, God does not exist but can be used as an heuristic device in much the same way that Rand used Aquinas’ angels.

About altruism. Kant can’t be an altruist. Why not? The CI. Consider the formulation that reads, “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, and never simply as a means.” To be an alturist is to treat oneself simply as a means to the end of others and is therefore against the CI. No altruism, no communism, no collectivism, no Nazism. QED.

Fred

Leonid
Nick Rescher's formulation when he writes that Kant's moral philsophy can be captured in the sentence, "Always act on rational principles."

Fred

What, according to Kant, are these rational principles based on if one's rational values are replaced with adherence to the so-called "cartegorical imperative" and a sense of duty to it. Secondly, how can one, according to Kant, act on rational principles if (a) objective reality is beyond man's access, and (b) pure reason, according to Kant, necessarily leads to paradox and antinomy. Kant may use the term "rational principles" in proliferation, but what he really is refering to is imperical practicality within a given experience, not objective principles based on man's knowledge of reality. Finally, Kant's notion of the "highest good" is a phenomenon of the noumenal world (the world in itself) which, according to Kant, is inaccessible to the individual, but is in some mystical fashion possibly accessible to the collective "humanity as a whole". Hence, Kant is both a collectivist and a mystic.

Moreover, Kant advocates the so-called "positive harmonising of society"-i.e., altruism. Kantian philosophy is the embodiment of the altruism-collectivism-mysticism axis on which today's society is based, including such politico-ideological movements as Nazism, whose fundamental premises are altruism, collectivism and mysticism (which ofcourse conclude logically with obedience). Its no surprise that Eichmann was a Kantian. During his trial in Jerusalem, he expressed an incomprehension of why he was on trial, since, as he understood, the only thing he had done was to fulfill his duties or categorical imperatives towards German society.

"Heteronomy is the principle of all spurious moralities. If you take orders from anyone but your own reason, your principle of action is heteronomous. If you take orders from God (to say nothing of a Fuhrer) you are not being moral. Got it? Try hard and you'll get it." Not quite.Windelband explains" The Will is heteronomous if it follows an empirically given impulse;it is autonomous only where it carries out a law given it by itself. The motive which stimulates man to obey this law must be nothing but reverence for the law itself. If now it is asked , what is the content of the categorical imperative,it is clear that it can contain no empirical element" (2001,pg552- 553). In other words autonomy a la Kant is complete divorce between the agent and reality.Moreover,Kant introduces dichotomy between happiness and virtue by using conception of highest good."The goal of of the sensuous will be happiness,the goal of ethical will is virtue; these two cannot sustain to each other the relation of means to end. And a propo human rights: " the ethical consciousness requers the reality of the highest good, faith must reach beyond the empirical life of man and beyond the order of Nature. Kant moral proof for freedom,immorality and God is,therefore,not a proof of knowledge, but faith." (ibid 556). Freedom which is based on faith,not on reason or reality of human nature cannot be solid basis for human rights. Besides, Kant never mentioned humans as individuals, only humanity as the whole-pretty much as contemporary collectivists (which apparently took this notion from him) "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty." "If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:* so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in e very case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out."(1785 - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS by Immanuel Kant - translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott." So man's nature is SUBJECTIVE principle of human action.But if it so why should every other rational being regard his existence similary. Moreover, why should I regard others as rational beings if rationality is subjective principle? Is humanity have some other qualities,than humans? Do you seriously suggest that this conglomerate of contradictions could be sound basis for morality of human rights? "The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does not also endeavour, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have its full effect with me." ibid)

Happiness, a la Kant doesn't exists, only virtue does (see above). This last statement IS foundation of altruism, and  ,as result, of communism and Nazism. Eichmann was Kantian, after all. To paraphrase Rearden from "Atlas Shrugged" " you have positively harmonized humanity for hundred,no, for thousand years and you achieved only misery, frustration, death."

Almost forgot your question, "where is in the formulations of CI any hint to individual rights?" If you didn't like my restating Kant's"end/means" formulation of CI you might appreciate a place where Kant is more explicitly defending rights. Before providing you with a Kantian text that you can read I'd like to relate David Boas intro to his section on Kant from the book THE LIBERTARIAN READER. He writes, Kant "contribution to liberalism has largely gone unrecognized. He did, however, in his political writings lay out a theory of inalienable rights." (142) The texts he cites are THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1791 and METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 1797. Fortunately they are both available in one book from Cambridge University Press entitled KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS. Kant is not quite as good as Locke but he's pretty damn good. Enjoy.

Fred

Let me try to explalin this from the other end, so to speak, since you seem to have a difficult time with the concept of autonomy. So Let's consider what Kant says about heteronomy. Heteronomy is the principle of all spurious moralities. If you take orders from anyone but your own reason, your principle of action is heteronomous. If you take orders from God (to say nothing of a Fuhrer) you are not being moral. Got it? Try hard and you'll get it.

Now to get specific. You write, "Then everybody becomes means and nobody has any end" and this should be clue enough that you're no longer talking about Kant. In one of its formulation, Kant says that one should treat humans always a s an end and NEVER merely as a means. So you must have gone off track in your little story. Try again. This time, stick to what the man actually says.

"What is good? Whatever could be universal law. What is universal law? Whatever is good. This is circular argument. Kant doesn't elaborate by which standards one may distinguish between good and evil-except one:personal inclinations."

Here you approach caricature. The morally good is that which is universalizable without contradiction. What is universalizable without contradiction? Whatever can be universalized without collapasing into a self defeating proposition. No circularity here. If one regards the law of contradiction as metaphysical ala Aristotle, then Kant is attempting to ground his ethics in metaphysics. Again no circularity. If one regards the law of contradiction as logical ala Aristotle, then Kant is attempting to ground his ethics in logic. Again no circularity.

"Suppose,one takes Kant's ideas about duties seriously and decides that his duty is to serve wellfare of others(becomes altruist)."

But then you have distorted Kant into teleogist instead of a deontologist. Stop distorting and start reading Kant. If you want to hang Kant, as least do it for the wrongs he committed, not for the errors you pretend he made.

Fred

" Eichmann woudn't qualify" -wouldn't he?
But he simply conformed his actions to "the maxims of a legislator of laws" And what if legislator exluded Jews and Gypsies from the rest of Humanity or decided that ends of Arians more important then that of Jews? And where is in the formulations of CI any hint to individual rights? I think that the major problem with Kantian moral system is the lack of objective standard of value. What is good? Whatever could be universal law. What is universal law? Whatever is good. This is circular argument. Kant doesn't elaborate by which standards one may distinguish between good and evil-except one:personal inclinations. If one acts according to his own choice (rational or otherwise), then he is amoral.Even the maxima not to treat others as ends is not result of understanding of human value but simply categorical imperative. If one does so because he thinks it is the right thing to do, out of his personal inclinations and not out of duty, he is amoral.And, besides, why that is bad to treat others as means and not as ends? Kant doesn't explain.("that those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself"-cannot qualify as explanation because its circularity). Explanation envolves proposition that man is rational creature and his mind cannot act under coersion. But Kant shrinked reason " to make place for faith". Suppose,one takes Kant's ideas about duties seriously and decides that his duty is to serve wellfare of others(becomes altruist).Than he wills this to become maxima-universal law.Then everybody becomes means and nobody has any ends.In such a society ends belong or to the God or to the collective. Since in twenty century "God is dead"-collective takes its place. As a result we had two most horrible societes in human history-Communist Russia and Nazi Germany. Kant's philosophy was major contribution to their foundation. Even today when you hear that you have duties toward society, Mother-Earth, poor, unborn children, and future generation and should act according to these duties and not from your own inclination for your own good -this is Kant's legacy. Many wonder how Germans from the nation of poets and philosophers became nation of butchers? Kant's moral philosophy gives the comprehensive answer.

This seems much better. Again, Eichmann woudn't qualify.

Fred

"Trying to keep Kant's context is difficult" That's right. "The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (4:439). It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions to the maxims of a legislator of laws (ii) equally possesses this status as legislator of uthat this lawgiver lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. " . Stanford encyclopedia elaborates:"Most philosophers who find Kant's views attractive find them so because of the Humanity formulation of the CI. This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our Humanity. Kant was clearly right that this and the other formulations bring the CI ‘closer to intuition’ than the Universal Law formula. Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings.It is not human beings per se but the ‘Humanity’ in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our ‘Humanity’ is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other capacities necessarily connected with these.

Kant offered several formulations of the CI and one of them states the one should never treat other humans as means only but also and end in themselves. This is his way of saying that we should always respect individual rights. If you think the Nazis were right respecters, then maybe Eichmann was a Kantian. But, of course, they weren't. Trying to keep Kant's context is difficult.

Fred

The Ominous Parallels by Leonard Peikoff (Paperback - Jun 1, 1983)
Buy new: $18.00 $12.24
43 Used & new from $5.98

You've got me. I'm dslexiyaic.

Fred

There's no book called Omnious Parallels. (dyslexia?)

Therefore no comment from me.

"Dare to use your own understanding." If one acts on the ground of CI, without goal or end, if one has to obey the law for the law's sake, if one has to abnegate his inclinations and choices,what he needs understanding for? Morality requires an unconditional statement of one's duty.There is no surprise to find another contradiction in Kant's writing-like autonomy without goal or choice.Essentially Eichmann followed CI-preservation of the purity of Arian race which became moral universal law in Germany and in many other places.Eichmann could have be Jews-hater or Jews-lover or totally indifferent to Jews,but his inclinations didn't matter,when he had to fullfil his duty, which he, as real Kantian ,dully performed.

"A person, who is acting on imperative, doesn't need reason, only obedience. That exactly what Eichmann did."

Wrong again. Here is Kant from two different works.

From the GROUNDING he tells us, in a section title no less, that, "Autonomy of the Will is the Supreme Principle of Morality." In order for you act to be moral you have to see that you can universalize it without contradiction, the law of contradiction being the touchstone for rationality.

And in his work WHAT IS ENLIGHTMENT, he writes in the opening paragrapgh, "SAPERE AUDE, Dare to use your own understanding." This is what Eichmann feared to do. He was only comfortable following orders.

Fred

"it is not sufficient to do that which should be morally good that it conform to the law; it must be done for the sake of the law." (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Akademie pagination 390)"
Kant distinguishes two kinds of law produced by reason. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason can provide a hypothetical imperative, or rule of action for achieving that end.But Kant has shown that the acceptable conception of the moral law cannot be merely hypothetical. Our actions cannot be moral on the ground of some conditional purpose or goal. Morality requires an unconditional statement of one's duty.( Categorical Imperative).By stipulating priority of duty over moral choice Kant effectively excluded morality from the realm of reason. A person, who is acting on imperative, doesn't need reason, only obedience. That exactly what Eichmann did.
"Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative. It is an imperative because it is a command (e.g., “Leave the gun. Take the cannoli.”) More precisely, it commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way, not to perform some action or other. It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves. Of course, other imperatives have a similar non-conditional form."(Stanford Encyclopedia).When Categorical Imperative (a command) has been established ( how, by whom ?) one can only follow it unquestionably ,blind. Therefore Kant's proposition that CI has rational basis is stark contradiction.It only can lead to self-abnegation -one souldn't have goal for oneself and therefore has no choice. In such a situation reason and autonomy are not applicable. How it could be autonomy without self?

Nope, you've got it wrong. Autonomy is the cornerstone of Kant's philosophy as he writes in the GROUNDING OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. Blind, I repeat, blind obedience is ruled out of court. Arendt captures this nicely when she writes, "Kant’s moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which rules out blind obedience.” I prefer Nick Rescher's formulation when he writes that Kant's moral philsophy can be captured in the sentence, "Always act on rational principles."

Fred

Fred,

I think one could have as much fun going through Peikoff's citations and sources as with Valliant's. For example, Peikoff sees something nefarious about Cassirer (a neo-Kantian) being appointed to a chair of philosophy in the Weimar Republic. Of course Peikoff forgot to tell his readers that Cassirer left Germany after the Nazis took over.

I believe Valliant called me one of the most unreliable writers on Rand.

-NEIL

____

"Act in such a way that the Fuhrer, if he knew your action, would approve it.”
The cornestone of Kantian moral philosophy is a false dichotomy between "good will" and duty. "What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that the motivational structure of the agent be arranged so as to give considerations of duty priority over all other interests."(Stanford encyclopedia)-and duty is simple respect for law of the land.Such a law could be for example Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany. "‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’ (4:402)."
Indeed, in Nazi Germany the will of Fuhrer and extermination of Jews became a universal law.