"If theoretical construct means every knowledge which cannot be obtainable by direct observation then most of our knowledge is theoretical construct."

Correct. The locus classicus for all of this topic is chapter 5 of Northrop's THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES. I discuss this in my book on Northrop dedicated to this text.

"when your doctor suggests to you to take X-ray, is he talking in terms of "hypothetical" construct?"

Precisely. You normally talk to you doctor in abstractive concepts and he then translates that into his specialized theoretical constructed knowledge.

Fred

"we do not perceive electrons like we perceive tables and chairs."
But we do perceive effects of interactions of different types of electrons with other entities-for example the light of electrical bulb. The effect of such an interaction depends on the different features of different electrons ( say their energy)-more energy gives stronger light. This quantitative effect could be omitted and we can speak about concept of electrical current. This concept could be reduced to the concept of single electron. If theoretical construct means every knowledge which cannot be obtainable by direct observation then most of our knowledge is theoretical construct.We cannot directly observe brain waves, X-rays, and many other things. But when your doctor suggests to you to take X-ray, is he talking in terms of "hypothetical" construct?

Well, I hate to speak for Peikoff but he might point out that we do not perceive electrons like we perceive tables and chairs. Therefore, we can't look and see what they have in common and what are their differences etc. When we posit the existence of elelctrons, we posit their measurements as well. Omitting the measurements after we have posited them see a bit strange. Anyway this is Peikoff. He uses the word "hypothetical" rather than "theoretical construct" but I could not discern any difference between the two. In fairness, I believe this was during a Q & A and so came off the top of his head.

"In any case electron is not theoretical construct but very real thing."

Just because a thing is known by means of a theoretical construct, doesn't mean that its referent is imaginary. Theorectical constructs refer to the manner in which the construct is arrived at, not whether its referent is real or not. So if Peikoff is correct, we can arrive at concepts two different ways: (1) by abstraction (and this is the content of ITOE) or by (2) hypothesis.

Fred

I don't understand. Electron is an entity. We know that different electrons have different measurable features like energy level, spin and so on. If we omitt these measurements we'll get the concept of electron. The same thing is applicable to other elementary particles. Maybe the definition of concept should be modified as " A concept is a mental integration of two or more units OR TWO OR MORE IDENTICAL GROUPS OF UNITS possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(, with their particular measurements omitted." In any case electron is not theoretical construct but very real thing.

Your questions will no doubt be much more probing than I'm likely to get from my undergrads.

I mean, she really is incomprehensible.

I also have had my hesitations about "implicit" concepts, but I do not think they are theoretical constructs, at least as that concept is used in, say, Russell or Northrop. To see this and prevent misundertanding, perhaps she should have said "implicit abstractive concepts." The source of meaning for abstractive concepts is perceptual; the source of meanings for theoretical constructs is the hypothetical deductive system in which it occurs. In order to know what "electron" means you have to know what system it is embedded in.
I happen to be lecturing on this very topic in my Philosophy of Science class at Penn State, so feel free to keep the questions coming, if you're interested. Your questions will no doubt be much more probing than I'm likely to get from my undergrads.

Fred

"So what's wrong about that?"

I hadn't intended to say what was wrong about it; just merely laying out her position. But since you asked, there are definite problems with many scientific concepts, e.g., electron. Somewhere in the History of Philosophy lectures by he admits that you cannot get to the concept of electron by abstraction since we never encounter two or more electrons from which we may abstract CCDs. He suggests that we need what he calls "hypothetical concepts" to deal with these kinds of concepts. No one in the movement, as far as I know, has elaborated on this tantalizing suggestion. If Peikoff is right, an abstractive epistemology is not wrong (he agrees with Rand, after all) but incomplete.

Fred

..."undergoes three stages of development in man's mind." (ITOE, pbk, pg. 6) This isn't exactly a construct, but it is similarly a resident of some netherland of perceptual/conceptual meaning.  A couple of paragraphs later, we have, "This requires the transformation of the (implicit) concept "entity" into the (implicit) concept 'unit.'" This dynamic role given to an "implicit concept" has always presented a difficulty for me. "It is this implicit knowledge that permits his consciousness to develop further." (pg. 6)

This doesn't have anything to do with mind-body interaction. It comes to mind in response to your comment about theoretical constructs. Are Rand's "implicit concepts" theoretical constructs? Seems not far off the mark. The more interesting question is what ontological status they have, such that they can play any dynamic role in the development of knowledge.

= Mindy

"All knowledge is abstractive for her; there are no theoretical constructs."
Yes, Rand doesn't allow theoretical constructs which don't pertain to reality. "The cognitive function of concepts was undercut by a series of grotesque devices—such, for instance, as the “analytic-synthetic” dichotomy which, by a route of tortuous circumlocutions and equivocations, leads to the dogma that a “necessarily” true proposition cannot be factual, and a factual proposition cannot be "necessarily” true.(Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 102.)
Again and again she emphasized that all human knowledge, no matter how abstract, is derived from percepts and could be reduced to percepts, that is irreducible primaries.

“Knowledge” is . . . a mental grasp of a fact( of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." ( Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 45.)
"Without sensory evidence, there can be no concepts" (“Kant Versus Sullivan,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, 90)
"the base of all of man’s knowledge is the perceptual stage." ( Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 5.)
So what's wrong about that?

In so far as we are concerned with man, I do not think man is made of two substances, so in that sense I disagree with substance dualism of the kind Descartes is famous for.
I am currently rethinking the whole notion of property dualism, although I do think it is Rand's position vis-a-vis man.
I am an epistemological dualist, but in Northrop sense, which probably is not your sense. Maybe you could expand on your notion. I think Rand is, in some sense, an epistemological monist. All knowledge begins with the senses an is reducible to the sense perceptual level. All knowledge is abstractive for her; there are no theoretical constructs.

Fred

Do you agree that there are three dualisms, substance, property, and epistemological?

An epistemological dualism supposes an highly abstract point of commonality.

"I'm not representing Rand's position, but my own."

Clears that up. Thanks.

Fred

I was defending Rand's position. I was defending your position.
Notice Mindy disagrees with your position. See why I had to ask my question. Sheesh, non-academics are SUPER-dumb!!

Fred

She wrote, “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes" Notice the word "two."

And the words "integrated unit."

Sheesh, academics are SUPER-dumb!!

I'm not representing Rand's position, but my own.

But this is not Rand's position. She states that we are made of two attributes, matter and consciousness and never does she refer to them as appearances of the same thing. She wrote, “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes" Notice the word "two."

Fred

There is no interaction because there are not two attributes, but two appearances of the same thing. This is in epistemological dualism as distinct from property dualism.

I know that's your answer. I wanted to make sure it was Mindy's also.

"And the "interaction" is not between separate entities"

No kidding. I have been saying that since day one. So let me repeat it for the sloooow among you--Rand is NOT a substance dualist.

Sheesh, non-academics are DUMB!!

Fred

Clear up an ambiguity for me. Do you mean there is no interaction and hence no problem of interaction (ala Spinoza and Leibniz) or are you saying there is interaction between the two attributes but it presents no philosophical problem?

You asked that of Mindy, who's as flaky as you. So I'm not speaking for her. But it's the latter!! How can you have missed that from everything that's been posted already?! And the "interaction" is not between separate entities but aspects of the *same* entity!!

Sheesh, academics are DUMB!!

"The point being that Rand's statement to the effect that man has distinct physical and mental attributes, does not imply a division into metaphysically isolated categories."

Well yeah, That's been granted since my original post. Rand is not a substance dualist and claiming that man is made of two ATTRIBUTES makes that point quite well.

If epistemological dualism. . . is recognized, distinguishing man's mental and physical aspects does not raise a problem of interaction."

Clear up an ambiguity for me. Do you mean there is no interaction and hence no problem of interaction (ala Spinoza and Leibniz) or are you saying there is interaction between the two attributes but it presents no philosophical problem?
Thanks for the clarification.

Fred

I came across the following, and it seemed to capture my uneasiness with Fred's original (baiting us into a discussion?) point about Rand's take on mind-body interaction:

    The office of philosophical disquisition consists in just distinction; while it is the privilege of the philosopher to preserve himself constantly aware, that distinction is not division. In order to obtain adequate notions of any truth, we must intellectually separate its distinguishable parts; and this is the technical process of philosophy. But having so done, we must then restore them in our conceptions to the unity, in which they actually co-exist; and this i[s] the result of philosophy.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Chapter 14, published in 1817... (Bold is my emphasis.)

The point being that Rand's statement to the effect that man has distinct physical and mental attributes, does not imply a division into metaphysically isolated categories. Analysis means abstraction, which, a la Aristotle, is separating in mind what can't be separated in reality.

If epistemological dualism, as distinct from attribute/property dualism, and from substance dualism, is recognized, distinguishing man's mental and physical aspects does not raise a problem of interaction.

=Mindy 

You make me glad I started this post.

Fred

An odd thing happened on Xmas day...

Christmas Eve, Larry and I had dinner and then stayed overnight at a sumptuous establishment -- the Simsbury Inn -- the place where he and I and two friends who have spent Thanksgiving with us for maybe the last 20 years have partaken of the Thanksgiving Day buffet for at least the last eight years.

Scheduled in advance as the central topic of conversation was the history of theories of mechanics -- a subject of immediate relevance to an honor's thesis Larry is currently advising, and to my concerns in general. Among the related issues we discussed was the significance of Lagrange and his mathematization.

Next afternoon, Christmas afternoon, while I was half-napping in the dark downstairs bedroom at home (NE exposure, plus heavy window quilts, the room to which I retreat for refuge from the --literal -- light which sets off my neurologic problems), visions of mathematical formalisims began to dance before my inner sight.

I think that MAYBE...maybe, maybe, maybe...I've found something I've been seeking for about the last six years, a mathematical means which would "make sense" to the physics community in which I could express my view on the evolution of volitional molding of animalian motion.

Net result in terms of my posting on e-venues: I've decided that I'd best drop out from participating on those.

I hadn't meant to post anything else on SOLO when I blipped in with a remark on Marcus' thread re Durkin; I'd just meant to explain what Durkin meant by "romanticism" in the context.

I was lured into further posting by the subject of this thread. And I'm grateful that I was. The Robert Rosen book Leonid recommended, Life Itself, has already been a major influence on my thoughts -- Rosen's discussion of formalisms in the opening chapters was backdrop to my mathematical images on Xmas day.

I'm grateful.

I'm also "fired up" to get about developing yesterday's insight, if it is that. Meanwhile, there are the problems which result from my worsening neurologic difficulties -- and there's the strong prospect of my going partly blind (at least in the left eye) within a few years.

Thus...I hope to entirely stop posting on internet discussion groups.

I'll continue to look at this site for topics of special interest. I keep tabs, for instance, with what Marcus is posting on the long global-warming thread. But I'm going to try to refrain from any further active participating. (Also, in case anyone's curious on this point, I don't expect to start a small website of my own. I have too much to do with follow-up on what I think I've glimmered.)

So... Holiday Cheers; Happy New Year; and, Leonid, again my thanks especially for the Rosen recommendation.

(Just skimming through the posts which have accumulted since last I looked, I will say this, Leonid, re your response to my last post: I think you're well mixed up between Spinoza, who was a monist, and any form of "dualism." But...ok, be that as it may.....)

Ellen

Right back at you, especially for all the work that goes into this site every day of the year. I posted something nice (I really mean nice) from Hegel for all Soloists.
And it is relevant to this post as well. A lot of posters are quick to move from the attribute of 'matter' in the quotation from Rand to talk about the 'brain.' But Hegel also gives honorable mention to (in addition to the brain) to the hand (see my Xmas post about Hegel) the palm, the skull, the central nervous system, the forehead, the nose, the liver, the back, the head, the heart, the penis, etc. as expressions of the human Spirit. What a wild "Bacchanalian revel" with this old Krauthead!

Fred

For free will.
Against substance dualism.
Against determinism.
That is easy. To "chew" that philosophically is tough.

OK. It's just that sometimes I can't be sure if you're chewing or pooing.

In any event, to you and everyone on this thread, whatever our differences, Merry Xmas and thanks for engaging.

I'm glad you at least describe her speaking of two attributes as "unfortunate wording." However, where do you get your statement that this wording "gave to Fred an idea that Rand was attribute dualist a la Spinoza?"

Fred's position is that Rand is attribute dualist-see quotations below. Dual-attribute theory belongs to Spinoza.

Submitted by seddon on Fri, 2008-12-05 00:44.
“I'm still not clear what either Ellen or Fred is claiming. Is it that Rand was unwittingly a dualist?”
Yes and no. No, if by dualist you mean “substance dualist.” That is Descartes position. Yes, if you mean “attribute dualist,” at least on one reading of her claim that “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two [dualist] attributes: matter and consciousness.”

Submitted by seddon on Fri, 2008-11-21 22:00.
"I doubt that Rand would accept the depiction of this position as "dualism." You and Fred have yet to show how it is."
Let me requote Rand: “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of TWO attributes: of matter and consciousness, . . .” (Emphasis mine.) Dual means two. Had she said "Man is made of THREE attributes, the physical, the formal and the psychological" (this is actually someone postition but I'll keep that a secret) then she could be described as a Threeist. But she is a twoist or dualist
Submitted by seddon on Sun, 2008-11-23 03:50.
"two different ways of looking at the thing."
But this would make Rand into Spinoza. And what havoc it makes of her claim that consciousness is an axiom, along with existence.”

And this is actual response to your question
Submitted by seddon on Fri, 2008-12-12 03:26.
What makes her an attribute dualist is her words that I have quoted. “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of TWO ATTRIBUTES: of matter and consciousness, . . .” (Emphasis mine). I take two attributes to mean TWO attributes. Two = dual.

My response:
Submitted by Leonid on Fri, 2008-12-19 22:23.
But not if one is referring to attribute dualism"
I did. On Sat, 2008-12-13 in my post to you I wrote
"Apparently you relate to view forwarded by Spinoza (also called the dual-attribute theory)" in which the unitary substance God is expressed in the distinct modes of the mental and the physical." (Dictionary of Philosophy).

Mindy, your criticisms of the Fitch and the Dennett approaches to mind and its intentionality, as well your positive outline, here are dead on the money. More cautions concerning Dennett are in the last part of this earlier post.

Philosophic explanation or scientific explanation?

Ellen, you said, “The question Fred is raising is how an interaction might occur.”

One sensible philosophical form of explanation is to ask “How is such-and-such possible, given that this-and-that are the case?” To pose that sort of question is a way pose a philosophic problem of interest. A famous example is Kant’s question “How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible, given that this-and-that are the case?” To successfully state a philosophic problem, one has to specify both the such-and-such and the this-and-that. A superb example of successful statement of a philosophic problem (which he then tries to solve) is A. D. Smith’s statement of the title problem in The Problem of Perception.

The problem of universals, the problem of induction, the problem of free will, all need to be not simply named, but successfully stated. Naturally, that goes for the mind-body problem too.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Examples and discussions of philosophic explanations and scientific explanations in Objectivity are listed here within the SUBJECT INDEX.

Explanation

Philosophic Explanation V1N1 26, V1N2 4, 8–13, 15–17, 23–24, 33–35, V1N3 2–3, 5, 8–9, 12, 17, 23–26, 30–31, 35–39, 40–43, 43–51, 61–65, 68–69, V1N4 1–17, 18–24, 25–28, 31–38, 43–54, V1N5 4–6, 23–24, 69–90, 109–28, 129–33, 134–47, 151–53, V1N6 14–21, 55–70, 73–103, 147–48, 177–87; V2N1 12–28, 47–51, 93–106, 124–35, V2N2 1–13, 17, 33–38, 46–52, 59–82, V2N3 4–9, 11–12, 17–19, 30–31, 40–42, 63–69, 77–112, V2N4 1–2, 6–14, 22–32, 37–42, 78–90, 101–12, 183–88, 190–202, V2N5 97–104, 114–15, 123–30, V2N6 41–72, 200–203, 208

Scientific Explanation V1N1 14–16, 20–24, 30–37, V1N2 38–40, 51–52, 57–59, 76–85, V1N3 13–15, 28–31, 39–40, V1N4 33, 52–53, 69–71, 74–76, V1N5 14–17, 20–22, 36–42, 52–64, 73, 96–104, V1N6 77–79, 121–27, V2N1 31–45, 97–98, 101, 121–23, V2N2 23–24, 26–28, 33–34, 85–92, 117–18, 120–21, 123–25, V2N3 54–56, 92, 98, 120–24, V2N4 21, 26–28, 109, 113–19, 123–27, 145–46, 149–57, 188–90, 192–93, V2N6 18–24, 83–85, 94–95, 137, 143–48, 150–54, 158, 164–70

"My challenge to them right now is: state your own positions unabashedly, and stop this tee-hee, behind-the-hands pomowankery. What do *you* believe re free will, dualism, determinism, etc?"

For free will.
Against substance dualism.
Against determinism.

That is easy. To "chew" that philosophically is tough.

Fred

I find it engaging and fruitful to consider "system" as a metaphysical kind, and--and more pertinently--as a way to analyze the constituency and integrated functions of conscious organisms: to think about the mind-body problem.

What pretentious nonsense! What mind-body problem?? The Dennetian/Brandroid/Sciabarrian poseurs here have not been able to state their non-case with anything remotely resembling coherence. Fred is all over the place. He and Ellen both evade the issue of their acquiescence to stake-burning behaviour by the "open-system" pseudo-Objectivists. As does Mr. Scherk. "By their fruits shall ye know them." My challenge to them right now is: state your own positions unabashedly, and stop this tee-hee, behind-the-hands pomowankery. What do *you* believe re free will, dualism, determinism, etc?

Regarding Fitch's and Dennet's macromolecule, nanotechnology theories of mind: 

Is there anything more to this approach than self-delusion? All I find is a programme to use mentality-implying language with permissive abandon. If you choose to look at everything as if it were designed to be and do what it is and does, you will find that it is "well-designed." If you imagine there's a monster under your bed, you might not be able to get to sleep. The mind-set is the same.

The "self-replication" of macromolecules is not an action taken by a molecule. Crystals "grow," but they aren't therefore somehow alive. The attractive and repulsive forces of magnets are as likely a couple of candidates for intentionality as are DNA and RNA.

It is fascinating to search for the "key" to life, and similarly the key or origination of mentality. Dennet surveys man's evolution from this point of view, and is in that sense a good read. As theory-builders, though, Fitch and Dennet declare the bankruptcy of their own approach in apologizing for relying on inaccuracte characterizations (Fitch, Ellen's link here) saying that "there is no other way," and (Dennet) that stretching the meaning of these terms is irresistible... (this from Dennet's Kinds of Minds, pg. 22, pbk.) They are both selling hope and faith, saying quite clearly, Folks, what else have we got? Intellectually, it's a spectacle, but theoretically, it's a disaster.

Things vary from the simple to the complex. Generally speaking, complexity introduces powers and products that simpler things didn't have and couldn't do. The Dennet/Fitch approach flies in the face of this. We can't find where it got started, so it must have been there all along.

An alternative, I propose, is to work with the concept, "system." A system is a complex, dynamic whole. It is "...a complex unity..." OED and "In various scientific or technical uses: A group, set, or aggregate of things, natural or artificial, forming a connected or complex whole."   

Solar systems and weather systems are literally systems, as are computer systems, and social/political systems; while, of course, biological systems are a familiar classification. The concept "system" gives a way to talk about inanimate, animate, conscious, and/or artificial things, and to compare them, apples-to-apples, in terms aplied literally and unambiguously. Systems come into and go out of existence; systems have structure and functions; systems can have sub-systems; they are sometimes adaptive; they sometimes produce other systems, etc.

I find it engaging and fruitful to consider "system" as a metaphysical kind, and--and more pertinently--as a way to analyze the constituency and integrated functions of conscious organisms: to think about the mind-body problem.

- Mindy   

We have a webmaster to whom everyone is encouraged to suggest improvements. His address is at the bottom of every page. It's not that difficult.

Ellen has discovered the annoying linking problem others have encountered in popular threads. There is at least one kludge available.

If the comment was, say, 61939, the usual syntax for the link would be http://www.solopassion.com/nod...

But clicking on http://www.solopassion.com/node/5602#comment-61939 leads you to . . . well, it depends on your preferences. Generally it will lead you nowhere near the post you want.

The kludge is inserting ?page=2 between the node and the comment . . . like this:

http://www.solopassion.com/node/5602?page=2#comment-61939

And so this link will take you to the intended post (in this case, an interesting set of thoughts from A Short):

http://www.solopassion.com/node/5602?page=2#comment-61939

WSS

Re, your comment, two posts below:

"I cannot agree with the notion that this is a job for biologists to define life. Their job is to describe life; biological definition would be only descriptive at best. To define life as metaphysical phenomenon is philosophical task."

I'm curious. For one thing, I don't understand just how you're divvying up the biologist's and the philosopher's roles. For another, would you say the same thing in regard to physics, that it's the philosopher's task to define "as metaphysical phenomen[a]" the basic concepts of physics?

Ellen

PS: Jingle bells. I won't be posting again till after Christmas. Enjoy the festivities, folks, if you indulge in some form of Holiday celebration.

In the passage from Galt's Speech which you cite two posts below Rand is doing some of her mighty railing. Jonathan Edwards declaiming on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" couldn't rail more mightily than Rand. But notice what she is railing against: the ethical dichotomizing of the Plato/Christian (including Augustine's Manichaean input) heritage which considers the realm of body at minimum inferior ranging to outright evil. She isn't talking about what she thinks the actual mind/body relationship is.

I'm glad you at least describe her speaking of two attributes as "unfortunate wording." However, where do you get your statement that this wording "gave to Fred an idea that Rand was attribute dualist a la Spinoza"?

Spinoza's theory was pantheistic monist. He thought there was "no dualism between God and the world" (see) -- and no "free will" either. His view of mind/body, though it's sometimes described as "dual-attribute" and sometimes considered a variant of "property dualism" (incorrectly, I think) is more typically described as "dual-aspect."

(See: "Physical and mental are in dual-aspect theory different aspects of a single brain process, viewed from different cognitive perspectives and thus causally describable from those perspectives.")

(And: "dual-aspect theory - A view forwarded by Spinoza (also called the dual-attribute theory) in which the unitary substance God is expressed in the distinct modes of the mental and the physical.")

I doubt that Fred made the mistake of describing Rand as being a Spinozan.

Could you please link the post where you think Fred said that, and give the post number? (If the post is no longer on the first page, the link won't go directly to the post, just to the page -- among the bad features of this site's software. The post number can be found in the URL which appears when you click on the subject line of a post.)

Ellen

Rand on Life and Organism

More Rand on Life  

Life with Growth & Reproduction – Rand & Branden

1." I agree with you: "that notion of mind-brain relation is loaded with dichotomy, as like as they are two entities which able to interact", but I don't agree that Rand didn't fall into that dichotomy, at least some of the time."
I don't think that Rand ever approved on dichotomy, in fact she fiercely denied it. In Galt's speech she wrote "They have cut man in two, setting one half against the other. They have taught him that his body and his consciousness are two enemies engaged in deadly conflict, two antagonists of opposite natures, contradictory claims, incompatible needs, that to benefit one is to injure the other, that his soul belongs to a supernatural realm, but his body is an evil prison holding it in bondage to this earth…They have taught man that he is a hopeless misfit made of two elements, both symbols of death. A body without a soul is a corpse; a soul without a body is a ghost".
The problem is that our very language is loaded with this dichotomy-which is a legacy of 2000 years of religious thinking and Cartesian philosophy. Even Rand herself couldn't avoid this trap, when she talked, for example, about two attributes-mind and body. This unfortunate wording gave to Fred an idea that Rand was attribute dualist a la Spinoza.

2.A different point, re her supposed "definition" of life: You write, "[...] Rand defined life as 'a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action' [...]."

As a definition that description isn't good, since it wouldn't, for instance, distinguish life from a fusion reaction, or even from the processes in an internal-combustion engine

Not that this description isn't good, it’s incomplete. The full definition should read “life is a process of self-sustained, self-generated self initiated and goal-orientated process driven by final causation when the final end is life itself." This is not my creative rewriting of Rand but a summary of Rand's own ideas. "Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed action. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action “ (The Virtue of Selfishness, 16, 17). Fusion reaction, motorcars, torpedoes and computers don't have any ends of their own and this is the crucial difference which Dennet and other functionalists fell to grasp. However I cannot agree with the notion that this is a job for biologists to define life. Their job is to describe life; biological definition would be only descriptive at best. To define life as metaphysical phenomenon is philosophical task.

Frankly, I think that you engage in some creative rewriting of Rand to suit your beliefs as to what's true.

I don't think that Roger does that; I think that he's aware of the discrepancies in Rand. But I'll wait for any further discussion of REB/Rand until Roger's new paper is published.

I agree with you: "that notion of mind-brain relation is loaded with dichotomy, as like as they are two entities which able to interact", but I don't agree that Rand didn't fall into that dichotomy, at least some of the time.

A different point, re her supposed "definition" of life: You write, "[...] Rand defined life as 'a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action' [...]."

As a definition that description isn't good, since it wouldn't, for instance, distinguish life from a fusion reaction, or even from the processes in an internal-combustion engine.

I have anecdotal evidence that Rand herself didn't think of this description of life as a definition but instead as a characterization.

The person who told me this, J. Roger Lee, is no longer alive to verify the story. J. Roger told Larry and me that he, J. Roger, was present at an occasion when Leonard Peikoff described "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" as a definition of "life" and AR chewed Leonard out, saying that, no, it wasn't a definition, it wouldn't be a good definition, it was meant as a characterization, it was the business of biologists to define "life."

I put weight on the truth of the story, for two reasons: One, I always found J. Roger to have an excellent memory for details of conversations; two, I credit AR with the perspicacity to realize that the description wouldn't be a good definition.

Unfortunately, there's no hint I'm aware of in written material that she wasn't thinking of "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" as a definition of "life."

Ellen

"Well, then REB's view is in disagreement with Rand's."
We should examine Rand's view in the full context of her position on the question of life causality and “Mind-Brain" relation. Prof B claimed that "the relation of conscious activity to brain activity is scientific, not philosophical question and AR agreed. First, I'd like to mention, that notion of mind-brain relation is loaded with dichotomy, as like as they are two entities which able to interact. Rand herself mentioned more that once, that mind is not an entity but faculty of certain living organism-man. REB position on that matter is in full agreement with that of Rand. He said "The mind is not an intrinsic phenomenon, like the brain and nervous system, but
an objective, intentional phenomenon. It is the form in which we are aware of our brain's conscious functioning, and the form in which we are aware of our brain's capacity to engage in such activity. And "we" is not a reference to anything ethereal or mysterious, but simply to ourselves, the conscious living organisms that we are.
Mind is another name for the brain (or perhaps a part of the brain) viewed introspectively." (pg 18). However one can formulate this question in more general terms-what is relation between entity and its faculty? The answer, I think, is that faculty is an expression of the particular mode in which one entity interacts with another. Only entities have relations. So, in my opinion, the whole issue is misplaced, non sequitur But if intention of prof. B was to ask " what is particular mechanism by which man is able to have " first person experience", to be aware of his own brain activity, than this is scientific question. REB's hypothesis may provide the answer. In relation to the question of causal efficacy of consciousness REB said" The mind is not an intrinsic phenomenon (like a material entity), but (like a color patch) is an objective phenomenon: the form in which we are directly, introspectively aware of the brain and its functioning. It is a view of the mind that is completely
consistent with Rand's trichotomy, and it completely obviates the necessity for debates over such conundrums as the "causal efficacy of mind." The entity involved is the brain. Consciousness is not some other entity cohabiting in Cartesian mystery with the brain. Instead, it is the brain as we are aware of it introspectively, just as a round, red color patch is an apple as we are aware of it perceptually."-only in this case we don't percieve an entity but brain activity, its faculty.
REB completely eliminated remnants of Cartesian dichotomy and demonstrated that only man which is indivisible entity can act. His actions are self-initiated and on the level of conceptual consciousness that presupposes ability of choice and free will. Since Rand defined life as "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" and consciousness is essentially biological process it also should be driven by self-causation. On this count I think REB is also in agreement with Rand. But mechanism of this self-causation is better elaborated in the Fitch's paper.

First -- and this is much more important to me than our disagreements -- I again have to thank you for a reference. That Fitch paper from which you quoted looks very interesting. (Here is a direct link to an HTML version of the complete paper.)

Second, WSS says in a post below that he's contacted Roger and told him of the discussion on this thread, and that Roger reports having a forthcoming JARS article which he expects to be an improvement and extension over the 2003 paper we're referencing, and that he doesn't want to get into his views piecemeal here. I'd thus prefer not to vex Roger by continuing to discuss details of "Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena."

So I'll conclude with just a couple general remarks about Roger's views by contrast to Objectivism's.

It could be that Roger would consider his views closer to Fitch's than to Dennett's. Nonetheless, I think there would still be 2 key points on which Roger and Objectivism significantly part company.

To explain the first, I'll quote my own favorite definition of "determinism." It's the definition which to me best expresses the common feature of all the variants of determinist theories. It's posed by Peter Van Inwagen in An Essay on Free Will (1983, Clarendon Press) and quoted by Dennett on pg. 25 of Freedom Evolves (2003, Penguin paperback edition 2004):

"Determinism is the thesis that 'there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future' (Van Inwagen 1983, pg. 3)."

Now, Objectivism does not agree with that thesis, but Roger, I think, does.

Second, in response to my saying, "Mind has no causal efficacy in [REB's] view," you reply "Obviously not."

Well, then REB's view is in disagreement with Rand's. I remind you that (e.g., for a quick reference) on pg. 290 of the Expanded ITOE, she makes no demur to the statement of "Prof. B" (Gotthelf) that in exploring the scientific relationship of "conscious activity to brain activity," science would have to accept "certain provisos from philosophy, such as that consciousness is causally efficacious and that free will is possible."

(AR replies: "Philosophy would have to define the terms of that question. In asking what's the relationship between 'mind' and 'brain,' scientists have to know what they mean by the two concepts. It's philosophy that would have to tell them the [general] definitions of those concepts. But then actually to find the specific relationship, that's a scientific question." The bracketed "general" is Harry B.'s insertion.)

Encapsulating, she's saying that finding the specific relationship is a scientific question, but with the provisos "that consciousness is causally efficacious and that free will is possible."

Clearly, consciousness isn't causally efficacious is in disagreement with, yes, it is.

Ellen

PS on terminology: Both REB and Rand use "mind" specifically to refer to human conceptual consciousness. I've adopted that meaning in my posts. In my own usage, however, I don't think of "mind" as a subcategory of "consciousness" but instead as refering to a type of operations which might not, often don't, occur consciously. Thus "mind" as I use the term might be causally efficacious whereas consciousness per se isn't. (I agree with Roger contra Rand that consciousness per se isn't causally efficacious.)

"I suspect Descarte's proposed dualism was an attempt to reconcile determinism and free will"

I suspect your suspicions are beyond suspicion. Descartes, Leibniz and Kant all thought they had to do something drastic to permit free will in a deterministic, scientific world.

Fred

"Re your statement "it cannot be material or non-material". That's interesting. What other category do you propose?"

I think that proper category in this case would be "functional".

"Mind has no causal efficacy in his view."-Obviously not. According to REB there is no distinction between brain, body and mind. He's speaking about man, integrated, undivisible entity. Such an entity has only final or self-causation. I didn't much read Dennet and cannot fully comment on his views. But from what I did read I understood that Dennet is essentially functionalist who doesn't make much difference between animated and non-animated processes, doesn't see difference between organism and clock, between human mind and computer. So I don't think that his position is anywhere close to that of REB. If you are looking for analogy, than I think that views of Tecumseh Fitch as presented in "Nano-intentionality: a defense of intrinsic intentionality" (© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007 10.1007/s10539-007-9079-5) are much closer to that of REB and Objectivism. "In this paper I will argue against Dennett’s conclusion by focusing on a causal power related to “intrinsic intentionality” that seems to have been overlooked in previous discussions. The key to my argument is the recognition of a specific capacity characterizing eukaryotic cells (the type of highly-organized cells with DNA sequestered in a nucleus, organelles, a cytoskeleton, etc, that make up a huge variety of life forms including amoebae, mushrooms, redwoods, and humans). I provisionally dub this causal power “nano-intentionality”—a microscopic form of aboutness, inherent in individual eukaryotic cells, that includes a goal-directed capacity to respond adaptively to novel circumstances. The core causal power underlying nano-intentionality is the cell’s ability to arrange and rearrange its own molecules in a locally-functional manner, thus preserving and extending its individual existence, depending on local and perhaps somewhat novel circumstances. Crucially, this capacity is as characteristic of a neuron in the brain as it is of a free-living amoeba. Both deal, as semi-autonomous individual cells, with their local circumstances, and when novelty is coped with successfully, the cell can “remember” a solution by changing its own physical structure. This specific capacity is an important characteristic of virtually any eukaryotic cell and is related to, but much more specific than, Aristotelian “telos” or Schopenhauerian “will”. I will argue here that humans possess intrinsic intentionality, and that it necessarily builds upon the nano-intentionality of the cells of our brains. They are not the same thing, however: the relationship between nano- and intrinsic intentionality is quite complex and indirect. By unpacking the linkage between nano-intentionality and mental activity I suggest that we can avoid both horns of Dennett’s dilemma for the low, low price of taking seriously some uncontroversial biological facts about eukaryotic cells and the vertebrate brain...A cell has specific, causal powers, possessed by no currently available machine, and it is these powers I wish to bring into focus with the term “nano-intentionality”. Eukaryotic cells respond adaptively and independently to their environment, rearranging their molecules to suit their local conditions, based on past (individual and species) history. A transistor or a thermostat does not—nor do the most complex machines currently available. This is a practical difference between cells and machines "-I'd add that clocks and laptops cannot have goals and their actions are not self-induced.

I suspect Descarte's proposed dualism was an attempt to reconcile determinism and free will (where experience suggests "free will" and reason suggests a non deterministic machine can not be built from deterministic components) and Rand's solution is the original problem.

webhost101.net - Websites made easy.

I still have the hope, as exemplified in 'Sunny Days Ahead For SOLO,' that Lindsay Perigo understands the failures of the sister lists and of online O in general, and lets SOLO's crops burgeon without obsessive and unnecessary gardening.

As you know, I pay no attention to "sister lists." As you also know, I have never cut a discussion off, never declared any topic taboo, and never banished anyone for dissenting in good faith. I barely garden at all, let alone obsessively or unnecessarily. But I most emphatically reserve the right to express my own views uninhibitedly on my own site. That, unfortunately, is what some folk can't come to grips with, and it's their problem, not mine.

You know I see you as a pomowanker, and you have furnished ample empirical evidence for my view. Currently, it seems, you are having an outbreak of sincerity. I hope it lasts, but based on previous such apparent outbreaks, I'm sceptical. As I've said to you privately, I wish I could harness your considerable talents to good ends, rather than snide nihilism. I'm prepared to consider your Facebook offer, but I'm wary that you'll revert to form faster than I can say the word "pomowanker" itself.

Ellen Stuttle: The paper by Roger Bissell which Leonid linked is the one titled "Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena: The Ontological Status of Introspective Data.".

Thanks for the correction, Ellen. Thanks too for rooting the 'soft' determinism in concrete essays and bodies of work that we can consult and ponder.

I polled Roger Bissell on his SOLO status, while letting him know of the wonder of Lindsay Perigo hosting Seddon/Stuttle/Boydstun in relatively untrammeled discussion.**

Roger writes of a forthcoming publication of "Mind, Introspection, and the Objective" for the next issue of the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, saying it's a significant improvement and extension of his earlier work as presented in 2003 at TOC -- and featured at RoR/SOLOHQ.

He does have a SOLOPassion account, but is unlikely to post here, as presenting his views (of the free will/determinism//mind-body issue) piecemeal would be "extremely frustrating to me and hardly helpful to anyone sincerely wanting to explore the issue."

Me, I am finding these deep or at least dark waters, so will sit on the shore, eat Xmas treats, and watch to see if Moeller's circuits will fuse from vexation with Seddon.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

I tend to agree with Lindsay that "free will" -- such as it is -- is yet another determinant, or agent of action in the world; I'm not an especially diligent student of philosophy, nor deeply-read, so when the inevitable scrums form over 'determinism' VS 'free will,' I figure that that all the world is determined by the nets of law that hold it together, and by the actions, reaction, compulsions, attractions and repulsions of the entities held within the nets.

In which case, human 'will' certainly appears to determine some human acts. And it is these apparent acts of human will that are interesting to me.

They simply aren't, the human acts, supremely predictible -- as 'will,' however we explicate it and illustrate it, cannot be tracked in advance.

Yes, some or much of humanity's trudge, grudge, wed, squabble, shit, starve and farm is predictable to our hindsight -- and what we surmise of human 'will' can often predict human actions in the aggregate with some success.

But the particular storms of individual genius and invention are what are interesting, to me at least. If these storms were predictable, determined (in the sense of pre-determined), then I would take up quantum mechanics or cosmology to slake my thirst for wonder. Humans would be quite as interesting as baboons, and no more.

Some argue against this simple-minded take on things, and for that I am glad. Until MSK drops in here to tell us what the Actual Truth is (invoking Holons, Victor Pross, Marketing 101, and the departed OL-ists' perfidy and cliquishness), such argument is what makes SOLO -- and Objectivishism in general -- interesting to me.

Lindsay might argue that I care not for the issues, that instead I slaver over the schisms, lynchings, banishments and bloodletting.

He is wrong, but a cartoon version of me, this thread, and serried ranks of evul personal enemies seems to give him the pleasure of certainty . . .

WSS

_________________________

** My bitch with MSK (and with Lindsay here at times -- and with Joe Rowlands in sum, and with the hydra-headed lords of OO, as well as with the Empress Speicher) is his intractable need to dominate and repress and be Lord Arbiter.

Not content to have an opinion, and to express it, he transmutes it to Policy. Not content to spout his notions, some addled, some wise, some murky, some sensible . . . he patrols his forum threads, not as a participant, but as Emperor.

Not content to be one among many, and to encourage debate, nor to let discussions run their course, he invokes the power of the Emperor -- cloture, prorogation, jail, salt mines, exile. Sadly for him and his ambitions, no one Objectivist can impose upon another, no Objectivist can have his citations and traffic tickets and sweeping conclusions become Diktat.

MSK is too dilatory, stupid, vain and baboon-baffled by mirrors to understand this, and so his forum dwindles and calcifies.

Strong thinkers like Bissell are insulted, deleted and dismissed, strong discussants like Stuttle are insulted and dismissed, strong and knowledgeable (within their fields of expertise) discussants like Robert Kolker, Dragonfly and others are belittled, insulted, dismissed and patronized. This leads nowhere for Objectivism and nowhere for MSK.

I still have the hope, as exemplified in 'Sunny Days Ahead For SOLO,' that Lindsay Perigo understands the failures of the sister lists and of online O in general, and lets SOLO's crops burgeon without obsessive and unnecessary gardening.

I still look forward to the essay promised to the 2008 Summer Conference in Portland: "Objectivism's Worst Enemy: Objectivists."

"consciousness is a faculty, as Rand observed, not an entity. Faculty is an inherent power or ability. - (American Heritage Dictionary)."An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing."(Leonard Peikoff, “The Philosophy of Objectivism” lecture series (1976), Lecture 3).Consciousness is ability or power of the certain entity-man-to be aware of existence that is-all other entities and as such it cannot be material or non-material.
For example man has faculty of locomotion. Is it material or non-material? The whole problem is misplaced and misrepresented."

Rand definitely referred to consciousness -- also to reason -- as a "faculty."

However, I think your description loses the flavor of what she meant by "faculty." She didn't just mean "an inherent power or ability." She used the term in the sense of...well, what today in evolutionary psychology would be called a "module" -- i.e., a fairly self-contained sub-set of abilities which operate as a sort of unit.

I've always thought that Rand's usage of "faculty" had echoes of the school of thought which was called "Faculty Psychology." Here is a brief overview of "Faculty Psychology."

Re your statement "it cannot be material or non-material". That's interesting. What other category do you propose?

Ellen

I'll reply in two parts to your post -- first the part about Roger's "Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena":

In response to my saying that I'd consider the whole thesis REB presents determinist, even if I didn't know of his "soft determinist" -- or, using the term more often used today, "compatibilist" -- views, you write:

"I disagree. Apparently you think that non-determinist approach presupposes causelessness. There is no such a thing. However it is such a thing as causality without antecedent cause, as Binswanger and Peikoff elaborate elsewhere."

Well, Roger doesn't agree with Binswanger and Peikoff. (Btw, no, I don't think that a non-determinist approach presupposes causelessness, but we're discussing Roger's views.)

You quote Wikipedia:

"Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. soft determinism says that we are determined and are nonetheless still free[.]"

Right, more or less. Soft determinists, a/k/a compatibilists, don't necessarily say that we're "nonetheless still free," but they think that we nonetheless still have volition (although some of them think that the volition we nonetheless still have amounts to an illusion).

"Bissell describes a process which allow us to be aware of the activity of our own brain and for that he deserves huge credit. How it makes him soft determinist?"

REB says that mind is the form in which one is aware of what one's BRAIN is doing. Leonid, I think you should read carefully the fine print -- of which there's a lot -- in what Roger wrote. It is the brain which is doing all the doing of cognizing, evaluating, choosing. Mind he describes as a form of awareness just like seeing red is a form of awareness. Mind has no causal efficacy in his view.

Stripped of the Objectivist setting, there's no difference which makes a difference which I see between Roger's description of brain/mind and Daniel Dennett's of brain/consciousness in the latter's book Consciousness Explained (and elsewhere, but most fully elaborated in that book).

Ellen

"Thanks for the ITOE reference. I found it a bit confusing. For example, 'I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms.'

Do you know why she was against neologisms? As for how to refer to the concept 'concept,' since consciousness is an attribute, wouldn't that make a concept an attribute (or 'aspect' to use Linz's word with a slightly different referent) of the attribute consciousness. I've got no problem with attributes of attributes."

My eyebrows raise at her statement that she was against neologisms. It's the only place where I recall ever reading or hearing her make such a statement; nor do I recall any of the people I knew who knew her well saying anything about her being against neologisms. There are a number of neologisms in Objectivist terminology, also specifically Objectivist re-definitions which almost amount to neologisms (including the Objectivist meaning of "objective," which Roger talks about at length in the opening part of his "Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena" paper).

I think what's clear from the passage is that she was thinking of a "concept" as a sort of some thing, though she was discontent with using "entity" for the sort of some thing. I think it's also clear from her very definition of "concept" as a "mental integration" of "two or more units" that she was thinking of a concept as a sort of some thing. She wasn't thinking of a concept as an activity, a process. She even describes a concept by analogizing it to a "file-folder." Of course she doesn't mean a literal file-folder, but the description is that of a kind of some thing.

(EDIT: I originally wrote "something," but then changed to "some thing," which I hope less potentially ambiguously conveys the meaning.)

Re consciousness, she characteristically refers to consciousness as "a faculty." She also refers to reason as "a faculty." I don't know if she ever used the wording "attribute" to describe consciousness anyplace except in the particular passage you cited.

I'll comment on her meaning of "faculty" in a reply to Leonid.

Ellen

"Fred, a thing is what it is."

You've got me there you silver tongued devil.

"If the point of the exercise (does it have a point?) is to show further down the line that free will is illusory,"

It isn't. The point was to chew the quoted sentence.

"'We can call this “attribute dualism” to distinguish it from the “substance dualism” of Descartes.'
Whoa!! Who says we can?!"

I say I can. I name what Rand named as "two attributes." Now, was she right. Is man made of two attributes. Is man "an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness?" I'm not denying his metaphysical substantial oneness, but I'm not ignoring his metaphysical attributional twoness.

"'But does it solve the problem, or simply relocate it."
What problem?! Fred's just smuggled in the assumption that Descartes' "problem" was authentic and then tried to show that Rand had it also and merely disguised it."

Whoa. Surely Rand thought it was a problem, a problem for Descartes and for any substance dualist, that is why she was so strong in her rejection of any for of substance dualism. That means the problem of substance intereaction is not a problem for Rand since she does not see man as composed of two substances. But then I thought, although this "solves" the problem of interaction as derived from Descartes, what is the relationship between matter and c-ness. Do they interact? Peikoff thought so, but didn't know how. Given that negative reply, some might say they don't interact. Are they right?

"What its [the entity] attributes are, what they do to each other, how they affect each other, whether they affect each other, are part of that thing's identity. Remember identity? It's one of the corollary axioms, the other being (gasp!) consciousness. Philosophically speaking, end of story."

Not hardly the end. Not even close. It is legitimate to ask "how they affect each other" etc. in an attempt to identify its identity. That it has an identity is not the question: what's is its identity is fair game. At least for philosophers.

"Doesn't mean they are not integrated wholes qua entities, or that so reducing them means one is a "dualist," "triadist," "centurist" or any such nonsense."

There is a confusion here. I'm not denying they're integrated wholes. So I'm quite content to call them ONES via-a-vis their wholeness. But I was asking about the whole qua possessing attributes and in that case we can ask, how many essential attributes the whole (say, an animal) has; one ala Descartes, two ala Rand (for those animals possesing c-ness) or three ala Northrop. Now this may not interest you, but then shouldn't you move on to a topic that does interest you. After all, I want you to enjoy yourself.

Fred

But not if one is referring to attribute dualism"

I did. On Sat, 2008-12-13 in my post to you I wrote
"Apparently you relate to view forwarded by Spinoza (also called the dual-attribute theory)" in which the unitary substance God is expressed in the distinct modes of the mental and the physical." (Dictionary of Philosophy). Such a view contradicts every thing which Rand ever said. If anything, one may describe Rand as advocate of property dualism-assertion that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge." I also can add that Spinoza's theory presupposes existence of God or some kind of creator. Without it the whole theory is collapsing. Rand, for obvious reasons couldn't accept such an idea, hence she couldn't be attribute dualist.
" Is man "an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness?" I'm not denying his metaphysical substantial oneness, but I'm not ignoring his metaphysical attributional twoness."- If you recognize that consciousness is a faculty of man, then you also should recognize that there is no metaphysical attributional twoness. Faculty means inherent ability, power. Worm has faculty of locomotion, plant has faculty of photosyntesis, lion has faculty of hunting. Does recognition of these facts makes one attribute dualist?

Descartes was objective idealist, he believed in God and existence; Berkeley was subjective idealist, solipsist; he believed in God, but not in existence. I suppose one can call Descartes dualist, but to call Berkeley monist? His whole philosophy is based on total evasion.

"If you agree with Rand's position that consciousness is a faculty of human beings, how you can say that Rand is dualist?"

She may not be at the end of the day. I was just referring to the quotation in which she refers to consciousness as an attribute (and matter as another attribute of man). And you are right. In other contexts she does refer to c-ness as a faculty of human beings. I'm sure this can be explained.

Here allow me to quibble a little with your characterization of Descartes. You write, "Descartes was dualist and idealist." He was a dualist and an idealist and a materialist. It's the latter two that make he a dualist. If he was an idealist in Berkeley's sense then he would have been a monist. Which he wasn't.

"There is no place for dualism in Objectivist philosophy."
Well, yes and no. (And we've been down this street before). Your statement is true if you mean by "dualism" substance dualism. But not if one is referring to attribute dualism. Let use Descartes as an example. He was a substance dualist, but about a given substance, say, RES EXTENSA, he was an attribute monist, i.e, extension was the essential attribute of matter. Rand is a substance monist, but an attribute dualism, i.e., she does not believe that man has only one attribute, but two, viz., matter and c-ness.
I'm sure that doesn't help.

Fred

"Its nice to know how you arrived at your question, but it does not answer my question. "

Duh, that was the answer. It just didn't satisfy you. Sorry.

"And your point is PURE drivel."

Great. Those damn nuns told me I would never achieve purity. And your paragraph that follows the compliment about the purity of my drivel seems to agree with my point, i.e., we do not perceive matter. Or as you put it, "The concept 'matter' comes further down the line."

Fred

"Fred, I was talking about the piece of wood!!"

That's a nice twist. In an earlier post you insisted you were convinced that brown wasn't an attribute of the wood, but rather how we perceive the wood. All I can say is "You've changed your mind! You've changed your mind!"

"I am not making the same leap that you are, namely, that because attributes of wood do not interact it MUST be true of all entities. Linz pointed out this crude deduction to you act the beginning of the thread, and you glossed right over it."

If you're going to hang me, at least get it right. I did not DEDUCE. I used the wood example to illustrate a case where attributes don't interact and asked, NB, asked could matter and consciousness be like that. So don't accuse me of a "crime" I didn't committ.

Perhaps a better way to look at it is that consiousness is the process of awareness and works in coordination with the other process of the body.

"That is, when you form the concept of attribute from observing a certain aspect of two or more referents, you are dropping the context that these are aspects of entities and it is the entities that act, not the attributes."

But there are cases where attributes do seem to interact. So there. E.g., shape affects strength.

"In the case of rusted metal, it is the water and oxygen in the 'weather' that oxidizes the metal causing it to rust. This is an electrochemical 'process' called corrosion. Fred, you do not have the 'process' without the water and oxygen!!!"

And you don't have corrosion unless you have the process. You must have both entities and process. It's not simply the cue ball that moves the eight ball, it's the cue ball moving at a certain speed that moves the eight ball. If you doubt this, reduce to speed to zero and you'll get no movement from the eight ball.

"This discussion is deteriorating rapidly for me."

That's a sign you should stop. We can't seem to satisfy each other. Call it a day and move on. You can't seem to understand my simplest points--see--two can play the "lack of comprehension" card.

Fred

"I also was told -- by a different member of the Inner Circle -- that Rand regarded consciousness as "a nonmaterial entity."-consciousness is a faculty, as Rand observed, not an entity. Faculty is an inherent power or ability. - (American Heritage Dictionary)."An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing."(Leonard Peikoff, “The Philosophy of Objectivism” lecture series (1976), Lecture 3).Consciousness is ability or power of the certain entity-man-to be aware of existence that is-all other entities and as such it cannot be material or non-material.
For example man has faculty of locomotion. Is it material or non-material? The whole problem is misplaced and misrepresented.

"Roger alludes to his "soft determinist" views in the paragraph about material cause, and again in the paragraph about final cause on pg. 36, but he doesn't elaborate in that particular paper. However, I think that the whole thesis he's presenting there entails a determinist theory"

I disagree. Apparently you think that non-determinist approach presupposes causelessness. There is no such a thing. However it is such a thing as causality without antecedent cause, as Binswanger and Peikoff elaborate elsewhere. Life belongs to such category. It is self-organized, self-sustaining process and by definition cannot have antecedent cause. The process of life self-causality I've described at length in my previous post. The process without antecedent cause is not deterministic but also not causeless. I don't think that this is position of soft determinism. Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. soft determinism says that we are determined and are nonetheless still free (How? By chance) ( Wikipedia)
According to Objectivism any living process is always self-initiated goal-orientated action. Mind is such a process. Bissell describes a process which allow us to be aware of the activity of our own brain and for that he deserves huge credit. How it makes him soft determinist?

Thanks for the ITOE reference. I found it a bit confusing. For example, "I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms."
Do you know why she was against neologisms? As for how to refer to the concept "concept," since consciousness is an attribute, wouldn't that make a concept an attribute (or "aspect" to use Linz's word with a slightly different referent) of the attribute consciousness. I've got no problem with attributes of attributes.

Fred

The paper by Roger Bissell which Leonid linked is the one titled "Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena: The Ontological Status of Introspective Data."

Leonid,

Roger alludes to his "soft determinist" views in the paragraph about material cause, and again in the paragraph about final cause on pg. 36, but he doesn't elaborate in that particular paper. However, I think that the whole thesis he's presenting there entails a determinist theory.

Contra Linz's wondering (3 posts below) "[i]f the point of [Fred's] exercise [...] is to show further down the line that free will is illusory," thus far in the history of thought dualism of some form is the only way to escape that conclusion.

-

As an aside, Roger reports on pp. 34-35:

"It should be noted that several years ago, one of the members of the Inner Circle shared his opinion (in private conversation) that Rand definitely regarded consciousness as 'a nonmaterial entity.' If he was correct, that would go a long way toward explaining the persistence of the idea among Objectivists that consciousness has 'causal efficacy,' that it exemplifies (rather than contradicts) the Objectivist concept that all actions are caused by entities."

I also was told -- by a different member of the Inner Circle -- that Rand regarded consciousness as "a nonmaterial entity."

There's evidence on pg. 290 of the Expanded ITOE that Rand indeed thought that consciousness is "causally efficacious," since she makes no demur when "Prof B" thus describes consciousness.

-

Fred,

See the section in the Expanded ITOE on "Concepts as Mental Existents." Although she says that mental somethings don't exist as metaphysically separate existents, nonetheless she sounds to me as if she isn't thinking of them as something physical:

(pp. 157-58): "[W]e can call them [concepts] 'mental entities' only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a 'something.' For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn't exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of 'concept,' that is a mental something; it isn't a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, 'mental something' is the nearest to an exact identification. Because 'entity' does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since 'something' is too vague a term, one can use the word 'entity,' but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn't an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists.

"We have to agree here on the terminology, because we are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore I think the term 'mental unit' or 'mental entity' can be used, provided we understand by that: 'a mental something.'"

-

A general caution re a couple paragraphs of Roger's paper on pg. 25, the paragraphs introducing "Part C. Causal Inefficacy of Mind and the Bogus Specter of Epiphenomenalism":

I think that words are missing, inadvertently deleted from the first of the two paragraphs; either that or he didn't explain clearly what he meant when he says "then mind is an entity." The wording of the clause as written contradicts the thrust of the section's argument and his explicit statement on pgs. 28 and 31 that the mind is not an entity.

Also, when he says "the standard view of mind" in the next paragraph, I think he means the standard Objectivist view.

Ellen

The link for Edelman in Two Levels should have been this one.

In Objectivity:

Edelman, Gerald V1N3 7, 19, 34, 41, 72, V1N5 74, 102, V2N1 74, 82, 109, 112–13, 116–19, V2N2 85–90, 96, V2N6 104

Good contributions in this thread from Michael and Lindsay, there are.

If you agree with Rand's position that consciousness is a faculty of human beings, how you can say that Rand is dualist? Faculty means function, ability and cannot be separated from man. Idealism and materialism may be monistic or dualistic philosophy. Descartes was dualist and idealist. Marx was materialist and reductionist-he denied mind as such. My position is exactly as Rand's-that proposition of consciousness ready follows from the proposition of existence, human being exist and they have faculty of consciousness. Been faculty of existent entity it cannot be separated from it in any way, as you cannot separate from the ball its faculty of rolling. There is no place for dualism in Objectivist philosophy.

Very well done, though I fear you're beating your head against a pomowall. They slide back and forth between metaphysics and epistemology, smuggle in unwarranted questions which they then beg and state their case, whatever it is, proved.

Note how Fred kicked this off:

We can call this “attribute dualism” to distinguish it from the “substance dualism” of Descartes.

Whoa!! Who says we can?! We can, but we may not with epistemological impunity! Fred just threw that in and then based his whole confused case upon it. Rand wouldn't have had a bar of "attribute dualism." Did Fred miss the bit about "integrated"? Then of course we got the now-notorious shape/colour thing.

Fred, a thing is what it is. What its attributes are, what they do to each other, how they affect each other, whether they affect each other, are part of that thing's identity. Remember identity? It's one of the corollary axioms, the other being (gasp!) consciousness. Philosophically speaking, end of story.

But does it solve the problem, or simply relocate it.

What problem?! Fred's just smuggled in the assumption that Descartes' "problem" was authentic and then tried to show that Rand had it also and merely disguised it.

Wotta lotta rot.

Axioms are epistemological, and irreducible. They identify the metaphysical bases of knowledge.

Entities are metaphysical, and are reducible to constituent parts. Doesn't mean they are not integrated wholes qua entities, or that so reducing them means one is a "dualist," "triadist," "centurist" or any such nonsense.

If the point of the exercise (does it have a point?) is to show further down the line that free will is illusory, then again I say, we can discount the arguments of those who say that since by their own admission they can't help saying it.

"Take matter. Rand tells us that matter is "a very sophisticated piece of scientific knowledge at which logically and chronologically you would have to arrive at much later." 245-6. Since observation is the base of knowledge, then matter can't be observed if Rand is correct here. And eventually this led me to ask my question.

First, you did not answer my question. Its nice to know how you arrived at your question, but it does not answer my question. What do you observe about humans that makes this interaction not "real"?

Secondly, the question she is answering here is does not pertain directly to your point. And your point is pure drivel. Anyway, she is only stating that the *concept* of 'matter' chronologically happens after we form other concepts--i.e. it is antecedent to other concepts in the hierarchy of concepts. We first start at with lower level concepts like 'chair' or 'table', and later do we arrive at a concept like 'matter'. This is distinct from being aware of, perceiving the physical world. Perceptions are at the base, and it takes an act of mental integration to form the concept. A child may perceive a chair, but forming the concept 'chair' is an extra act of mental integration. The concept 'matter' comes further down the line.

"So I take it you're agreeing with one of my solutions!! I guess that makes you a Seddontary thinker. Hm."

Fred, I was talking about the piece of wood!! I am not making the same leap that you are, namely, that because attributes of wood do not interact it MUST be true of all entities. Linz pointed out this crude deduction to you act the beginning of the thread, and you glossed right over it.

Humans are a fundamentally different entity and you look at humans and their attributes and how they "interact". Essentially what you have done is look at wood and then say the same must be true of humans. That is why I asked you what observations you have made about humans that illustrates this interaction is not real. You gave me a complete non-answer.

Perhaps a better way to look at it is that consiousness is the process of awareness and works in coordination with the other process of the body. When we look at the concept of consciousness, we abstract those aspects that pertain to the process of awareness, but do not drop the context that it is integrated with the rest of the organism. Qua organism, these integrated attributes make man what he is. You are using reifying the concept and treating the attribute as a separate metaphysical thing apart from the entity, and hence your "problem" arises. You are not treating them as integrated, but rather a priori dividing the "indivisible" when setting up your "problem".

I detail this mistake below and its a failure of your epistemology, not of metaphysics. And no, Fred, I am not saying that attributes are abstractions and I do not know where you got that. I was speaking of your use of the *concept* of attribute.

"Now you seem to have changed your mind. Apparently the attribute of shape does affect the attribute of strength!"

No I have changed my mind, Fred, you are not following the argument. I said explicitly that strength is NOT an attribute, which you indeed quoted in your response. Part of it is my fault because I continued to refer to strength as an 'attribute' thereafter, but that was strictly out of convenience so I did have to make up a new concept.

Here's the point again. Strength describes an effect when a load is put to an object, a potentiality of the object WHEN acted on by another entity. Just like we call a 'property' of gold to melt at a certain temperature, or not to corrode. I do not consider these properties but rather effects when acted on by another entity--I just kept referring to 'strength' as a 'property' out of common parlance. I think a different concept is needed for these other aspects we refer to as 'properties', but I just did not want to introduce something new to make things more confusing. I should have known the point would go completely over your head.

Fred, do you think strength is an attribute? If not, why? Because, if so, then YOU have changed your mind that one attribute can affect another.

"You make Rand seem like she thinks attributes are abstractions, rather than metaphysical existents."

No, I don't Fred. I was talking about your use of the concept of attribute. I am saying you are treating the mental unit as a separate metaphysical unit. That is, when you form the concept of attribute from observing a certain aspect of two or more referents, you are dropping the context that these are aspects of entities and it is the entities that act, not the attributes.

And when I say 'invalid question', I simply mean that you are committing a logical fallacy in asking the question, namely, dropping the context.

And just so I don't get accused of "changing my mind" again, I am referring to strictly physical entities as distinct from conscious physical entities. The fundamental about consciousness is that it is some action with respect to the content of reality--i.e. the act of perceiving something, or thinking about something, etc., which integrated with the physical attributes that give rise to awareness. Again, Fred, you cannot simply take physical entities and apply your analysis to conscious physical entities because they are fundamentally different in this respect, but that is what you have done.

"Of course, you can form the concept of an attribute, but the referent is still "out there." And if it is out there, we can ask causal, metaphysical questions about it."

No kidding, Fred.

"Then pick another attribute. It's your example. Surely you don't think Rand didn't believe in attributes.

No, I don't. Where did you get that idea and what are you talking about?

"Whoa! Didn't you say in a previous post that color was not an attribute but, ala Kelley's car crash example, a relation between the object and consciousness. Or have you changed your mind yet again? Hm.

Fred, I was/am simply distinguishing that which is in the object from the form in which we perceive it. I am saying your example did not make such a distinction, and it is an important one for the discussion of attributes because it introduces the interaction between your perceptual faculties and the object. Or, as Rand states; "We perceive light vibrations as color. Therefore, you would say that color is not in the object. The object asorbs certain parts of the spectrum and reflects the others, and we perceive that fact of reality by means of the structure of the eye" (pg 279). "Color is a form of perception--something caused by existing phenomena, namely wavelength, acting on another phenomenon, namely, the retina of our eye." (pg 280-81)

"Surely that is not the only way an ENTITY can be altered. If a piece of metal is left outside and is affected by the weather, what ENTITY is affecting the piece of metal? Maybe a PROCESS is involved here?"

Are you serious? What *exactly* do you mean by 'weather'? Pure action on the entity without those things that comprise the 'weather' and act on the metal?

In the case of rusted metal, it is the water and oxygen in the 'weather' that oxidizes the metal causing it to rust. This is an electrochemical 'process' called corrosion. Fred, you do not have the 'process' without the water and oxygen!!!

Jeez louise, you are quite distant from Rand, eh? She writes: "If you come down to the ultimate particles and say they are pure action, they don't have any identity, they don't have anything except the capacity for action--the term 'action would not apply. By 'action' we mean the action of an entity." (pg 291)

This discussion is deteriorating rapidly for me. Your lack of comprehension of my arguments has caused you to make a complete mess out of what I said while at the same time yelping: "You've changed your mind! You've changed your mind!" Heaven forbid I become a 'Seddontary thinker'.

Michael

You've got to learn to be more careful. On your previous post you wrote,
"Consciousness is corollary of existence" which, of course, I called you on because it is wrong. In this post you get it right because you quote Rand: " Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists."

Now notice. She does not say consciousness is a corollary of existence--I don't even know what that means. The two corollaries are propositions and they are corollaries, not of Existence, but of the act of grasping the propostion that Existence exists. So, once more, Consciousness is NOT a corollary of existence.

What's wrong with your TIMAEUS analogy is that it will take us down a long, long road of Plato interpretation and it is not in the least illuminating. What is analogous to consciousness, existence etc.

"I posted to you "Consciousness, therefore, is a faculty of existence."

Again, this is wrong and Rand never said it. Consciousness is a faculty of human beings, not of existence.

""Let me recommend OPAR pp. 30-36"- in this part Peikoff rejects reductionism in the form of monism which rejects consciousness and describes man as collection of chemicals, not monism as such which recognizes consciousness but doesn't separate mind and body. I cannot see how my position is different?"

He rejects two kinds of monism--materialism and idealism. Your position is different in that you seem to think consciousness is a corollary of existence--which it isn't.

Fred

Leonid, the mind-body paper you note is at Bissell's website, in the essay collections. I think you may mean "A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem."

As for his "determinism," he may be fairly called a 'soft determinist,' as shown in his SOLOHQ essay, "Objectivism and Determinism."

Regarding his status on Lindsay's list, I have no idea. I tend to think he hasn't yet given up on OL as a repository of his thought, though he certainly gets exasperated with Emperor Stuart Kelly's noxious patrols. I doubt he would be interested in posting to SOLO, since Emperor Perigo sometimes mimics MSK's role as Arbiter of All Things O.

That said, Lindsay rarely approaches MSK's performance as Policeman/Emperor/Host/Great Thinker/Smug Overlord/Wielder of the Last Word/Deleter of Uncomfortable Posts by supposed friend, colleague and co-moderator . . .

WSS

Roger is not barred from posting. He used to post on the old SOLOHQ but I don't believe he set up an account at SOLOPassion. He's at perfect liberty to.

Linz:

I'm all for discussing the doings of The KASSless Society. I just wish there were some doings to discuss. But this was a posse out to lynch, not a discussion group. And I repeat, those who claimed that having Linz speak at the Summer Seminar would damage KASSless didn't bother attending once they'd secured his blackballing. Perhaps they realised that the thing was going to be that much duller without him.

Since you know that I consider your lynch-mob depiction mythic, you can hardly expect that I'll take your evaluation of the proceedings as a reason why it's not ok for OLers to discuss TAS doings whereas it is ok for you.

Also, you've admitted to not having really paid attention to what was being said on OL, so you don't even have a basis of awareness of the details.

As to people's supposed not bothering to attend upon having secured your blackballing, again, that's mythic. The reasons why people attended and didn't pertained to other issues in their life circumstances. (And some of those who discussed the invitation to you did attend.)

Here is a thread which partly indicates who went and who didn't and why. (The facts might be of interest to others, though I don't expect they'll make any difference to you.)

On a different subject: Perhaps you didn't notice my question in a post replying to Leonid as to whether Roger Bissell is barred from posting here or just doesn't post here. I'm reluctant to discuss his work on a site where he's not allowed to post.

Ellen

" Is this you or Rand?"-Rand. She said " Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists."( Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 124) Faculty of perceiving,function, not independend attribute.
""Consciousness is corollary of existence-as you yourself mentioned before."

Where? If I wrote it I didn't mean it and retract it here and now.

I posted to you "Consciousness, therefore, is a faculty of existence. It is an axiom only in terms that it is irreducible primary and cannot be reduced any further to its components. It doesn't mean that consciousness exists independently and necessarily."-and you responded "See my post to Linz. I think I agree with most of what you say." Do you retract this?
""Consciousness does not appear anywhere in the TIMAEUS"-No, it's doesn't. But Plato needed demiurg to shape the chaos and demiurg is conscious entity. I've brought it up as analogy.
"Let me recommend OPAR pp. 30-36"- in this part Peikoff rejects reductionism in the form of monism which rejects consciousness and describes man as collection of chemicals, not monism as such which recognizes consciousness but doesn't separate mind and body. I cannot see how my position is different?

"since I don't think of Roger Bissell's writings on mind/body "-Please check the link which I provided. http://www.objectivistcenter.o... .You'll know that Bissell published 50+ pages article on mind/body issue in which he developed Objectivist theory of itrospection.From what I've learned, I wouldn't say that he is determinist, not in Newtonian sense, anyway

"Man's attributes: high, weight, colour of skin and eyes, different shapes of the body and facial features, man is biped, can laugh-I'm sure you can add many others"

Yes, but they are all reducible to matter and consciousness. I wanted you to give a an attribute that is independent of both of those and yet necessary for the existence of man. Please try again. I can think of only one other, but that may be due to lack of imagination.

"But matter and consciousness are not two different attributes"

Huh?? and Double HUH? Is this you or Rand? She certainly thinks they are two and irreducible. You are trying to make her into a monist. But, as Peikoff writes in OPAR that Objectivism is "a philosophy that rejects the monism of idealism or materialism" as well as the substance dualism of Plato and Descartes. (35) I assume then that this must be you, because it surely ain't Rand. Recall the quotation, “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, . . .”

"Consciousness is corollary of existence-as you yourself mentioned before."

Where? If I wrote it I didn't mean it and retract it here and now. Perhaps you misquote. Rand would say, however, that "Identity is corollary of existence"

"Your view on matter and consciousness as two separate, independed attributes is similar to Plato's as described in "Timaeus". For if they are two, then you are in need of demiurg to create the second."

"Consciousness does not appear anywhere in the TIMAEUS, in fact, it makes its first appearance in philosophy in the writings of Francis Bacon. Why in heaven's name do you think that "two" requires a Demiurge? Needless to say, I disagree until I see your demonstration for that.

"This is Cartesian legacy that we use two different words to designate mind and body-and that what causes confusion. I suggest to use term Mind-Body Unit ( MBU)

This is not her position. Let me recommend OPAR pp. 30-36. He keeps pounding home the message that Oism is not monist--and that consciousness and matter are not two words for the same thing. I'm not saying he is right, but that his position and yours are DIFFERENT and CONTRADICTORY.

Fred

"So the proper question for me to ask you, here, is what observations about humans, or even other animals, makes the interaction "seem" rather than "real"?"

Wait. Are you now endorsing the position that the attributes DO interact? Well, leaving that aside, the idea come after a long reflection on the difference between observations and explanations. Once I realized that the same observation can and often does give rise to different and contradictory explanations, I began to ask what is the best account of the observation. Then I noticed that people began to refer to the observation as if it were the account. People who say in answer to the question, Do attributes interact? "yes, it's obvious." It's self-evident. That set me to wonder if we actually observe that we are made of two attributes, matter and consciousness. Take matter. Rand tells us that matter is "a very sophisticated piece of scientific knowledge at which logically and chronologically you would have to arrive at much later." 245-6. Since observation is the base of knowledge, then matter can't be observed if Rand is correct here. And eventually this led me to ask my question.

Your turn,

Fred

"you are asking an invalid question with respect to the wood--i.e. how do the "attributes" interact? You are dropping the context that the attribute is some aspect of the wood, but that it is ENTITIES that act."

That may be the answer, but in the context of my question, remember, I was asking Peikoff if mind and body interacted and he raised his hand and said that "obviously they did," but he didn't know how. If you claim they don't interact, remember this will have consequences for free will etc.

"the attributes did NOT interact."

Please recall this is one of the "answers" I suggested in my original post when I wrote "if it is the case that attributes cannot affect each other." So I take it you're agreeing with one of my solutions!! I guess that makes you a Seddontary thinker. Hm.

"If I change that shape of a piece of metal it will affect its strength."

Now you seem to have changed your mind. Apparently the attribute of shape does affect the attribute of strength!. Now you are, in this case, the efficient cause, but you acted the way you did because you knew that shape does affect strength. So, what is it. Do they or don't they affect each other?

"Rand goes through the whole explanation in ITOE and she is asked a myriad of questions about attributes/properties--you are not following her epistemology at all." and "you are treating the attribute as a sort of entity rather than an abstraction formed for observing certain aspects of entities."

You make Rand seem like she thinks attributes are abstractions, rather than metaphysical existents. So I checked ITOE and on 185 see gives the traditional characterization of attribute as an existent that "can't exist independently" of the entity. But it is still a metaphysical item, and not an epistemological one. Of course, you can form the concept of an attribute, but the referent is still "out there." And if it is out there, we can ask causal, metaphysical questions about it.

"Strength is not an attribute,"

Then pick another attribute. It's your example. Surely you don't think Rand didn't believe in attributes. If you think she did, then ask yourself, do they interact or not. It may be the case that they all do; they all don't; some do and some don't. But the question certainly seems to be a valid one. If you have trouble coming up with an example, try Rand's, i.e., matter and consciousness.

"the entity's actual attributes like color,"

Whoa! Didn't you say in a previous post that color was not an attribute but, ala Kelley's car crash example, a relation between the object and consciousness. Or have you changed your mind yet again? Hm.

"The attributes are certain aspects of the ENTITY that can be altered when the ENTITY is acted on by another ENTITY."

Surely that is not the only way an ENTITY can be altered. If a piece of metal is left outside and is affected by the weather, what ENTITY is affecting the piece of metal? Maybe a PROCESS is involved here?

Your turn,

Fred

I'm all for discussing the doings of The KASSless Society. I just wish there were some doings to discuss. But this was a posse out to lynch, not a discussion group. And I repeat, those who claimed that having Linz speak at the Summer Seminar would damage KASSless didn't bother attending once they'd secured his blackballing. Perhaps they realised that the thing was going to be that much duller without him.

I don't understand your puzzlement as to the question.

You've claimed that it was no business of persons on OL to discuss your being invited to talk at the Summer Seminar (even though most of those who did the talking are TAS contributors), but you've fulminated here on SOLO about doings of what you call the KASSless Society. Why is it ok for you to express opinions but not ok for OLers?

Ellen

since I don't think of Roger Bissell's writings on mind/body as even agreeing with Rand in some ways.

For instance, are you aware that Roger considers himself a determinist?

I'm not so sure he really is. He and I have had some go-rounds on that issue, but in any event I think he differs from Rand.

Question, this for Linz: Is Roger barred from posting here, or does he just not post here?

I feel reluctant to talk about his views in a venue where he's prohibited from responding.

Ellen

"For example, you keep referring people to Roger Bissell's work. Are you of the opinion that he's saying the same thing (with extensions) as Rand was?"
I think,Bissell is developing Rand's ideas in the right direction. He is using different terminology and brings up new ideas within Objectivism. I think, Rand put good,solid foundation of philosophy of life and mind, but she never developed it in full. Bissell and others do this job.

PS: You talk often about what TAS is up to. Why is this ok for you but not for others?

What do you mean, Ellen?

I characterized it as such, a long way back... I agree.

Linz:

I doubt that any donor would demand, or be granted, the right to ban speakers, especially provenly popular ones.

However, donors have the right and some of them have availed themselves of the right to drop or decrease their contribution. I decreased mine after the summer seminar business. It wasn't only the invitation to you, and the manner in which getting out of that was handled. There's been a lot else, too, which leaves me concluding that TAS is missing a rudder. On that one point I agree with you (though for different reasons).

Ellen

PS: You talk often about what TAS is up to. Why is this ok for you but not for others?

My little line drawing was an attempt to convey, as best I can in this medium, an image of what I see as the mechanics schema implied by Rand's (I repeat, frustratingly sparse and non-explicit) hints as to the workings of mind/body. It was not meant as an attempt to convey what I'd call an accurate picture.

Also, a general point: I think you keep mixing together your views as to a correct understanding of mind/body with Rand's views, as if you believe that of course she held the views you consider right. This makes difficult disentangling Rand from you in your explications.

For example, you keep referring people to Roger Bissell's work. Are you of the opinion that he's saying the same thing (with extensions) as Rand was?

Ellen

"I wonder if you keep harping on the Summer Seminar incident, Linz, in order to divert attention from how out of your depth you are on the substantive issues."

Oh please, get over yourself. You're "how can you integrate two of tht which was only one in the first place" comment only solidifies for me that you never got Rand's epistemology, including discussions about "stipulative" definitions and agreement with a lame critique of Peikoff's essay on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Nah, instead you'll retreat to some jibberish musings, academicspeak, semantic strawman, word games, and quoting so-and-so on X, as if it is superior form of erudition. Oh its a safe world, I am sure. You bring that same nonsense to other fields and you would get put through the shredder.

Here's something novel, if you don't like what an organization does, then withdraw your support. I highly doubt your contributions come with strings attached that allow your input into management decisions.

I wonder if you keep harping on the Summer Seminar incident, Linz, in order to divert attention from how out of your depth you are on the substantive issues.

No, but nice try. Argument from Intimidation I believe, with a touch of "Do you still beat your wife?"

(1) Ellen doesn't think there was a "lynch-mob"; she'd hardly disavow something which she doesn't think existed;

That's where we differ. The hysterical baying for blood that went on was a travesty of the spirit of Truth and Toleration.

(2) Ellen did not liken you to Yasser Arafat; she likened your being invited to talk about what's wrong with O'ist behavior to Arafat's being awarded a Peace Prize. She also said, in one post or another on the same or a different thread, that she'd made the comment with a certain amount of mischievous intent, anticipating that you wouldn't grasp the difference between likening you to Arafat personally and likening the invitation (which she said was of course a different degree of offense) to Arafat's being awarded a Peace Prize.

I can't say I paid close attention to the details of all the hysteria. I seem to remember Hitler being invoked as well, or was it Mussolini? What with Prof. Campbell's conspiracy theories added to the mix and the near-lethal mirth induced thereby, I scarce could take it in.

(3) It's very much Ellen's business what an organization she's steadily supported with financial contributions since its founding does with its funds.

I doubt that any donor would demand, or be granted, the right to ban speakers, especially provenly popular ones.

The thing is, if it were the ARI that invited and then dumped a maverick and controversial speaker in comparable fashion, the Brandroids would have been all over it.

I do believe TAS has lost its way, and ARI has found its.

" Epistemological dualism claims we have radically different ways of observing the brain's activities, but they are descriptions of the same thing."
For the full discussion of this issue I'd like to refer you to " Mind and Will as Objective Phenomena
The Ontological Status of Introspective Data
by Roger E. Bissell" http://www.objectivistcenter.o...

Linz:

Neither Fred nor Ellen disavowed the lynch-mob. Fred, the great advocate of academic freedom, remained mute, while Ellen, if I recall, likened me to Yasser Arafat. And I say again, Ellen's objections to my speaking on certain topics were irrelevant—it was a done deal, and none of her business. She could have boycotted me and attended the competing lecture. Did she even turn up in the end? Did you?

I wonder if you keep harping on the Summer Seminar incident, Linz, in order to divert attention from how out of your depth you are on the substantive issues.

(1) Ellen doesn't think there was a "lynch-mob"; she'd hardly disavow something which she doesn't think existed;

(2) Ellen did not liken you to Yasser Arafat; she likened your being invited to talk about what's wrong with O'ist behavior to Arafat's being awarded a Peace Prize. She also said, in one post or another on the same or a different thread, that she'd made the comment with a certain amount of mischievous intent, anticipating that you wouldn't grasp the difference between likening you to Arafat personally and likening the invitation (which she said was of course a different degree of offense) to Arafat's being awarded a Peace Prize.

(3) It's very much Ellen's business what an organization she's steadily supported with financial contributiions since its founding does with its funds.

Ellen

Epistemological dualism is separate from both substance and property dualism. Epistemological dualism claims we have radically different ways of observing the brain's activities, but they are descriptions of the same thing.

There is no problem of interaction with an epistemological dualist view, but there is a very big burden to give an account of introspection that delivers an explanation of how we can make these other observations of our brain activity, and how our mental terms can be a literal fit to our biological observations of the brain and its activity.

A second observation: The dispute over axioms seems burdened with multiple foci. Axioms as self-evident concepts or propositions is one issue. Both existence and consciousness are on a par in that respect. Axioms as bases of other knowledge is a different issue, and the relative metaphysical fundamentality of the subjects of axioms is still a different issue.

= Mindy

"-->B-->B1-->B2--> (etc.)
-->A-->A1-->A2--> (etc.)"

Mind is biological autonomous far-from equilibrium system and as such with every choice it's going through bifurcation. Your line should be two or three-dimensional.

Man's attributes: high, weight, colour of skin and eyes, different shapes of the body and facial features, man is biped, can laugh-I'm sure you can add many others.But matter and consciousness are not two different attributes. Consciousness is corollary of existence-as you yourself mentioned before. It depends on existence, it is existence's function. Your view on matter and consciousness as two separate, independed attributes is similar to Plato's as described in "Timaeus". For if they are two, then you are in need of demiurg to create the second. Rand's position on this issue is clear:" the rules of cognition must be derived from the nature of existence and the nature, the identity, of his cognitive faculty." (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 110). Mind and body don't interact. They are simply one. This is Cartesian legacy that we use two different words to designate mind and body-and that what causes confusion. I suggest to use term Mind-Body Unit ( MBU) instead.

"If you claim it is a real interaction, then how does it happen."

AND

"If the "obvious interaction" is real rather than a seeming, then there is interaction. But if it is a seeming interaction but a real, say, coordination, then there is NO interaction, even if it appears that way."

Ugh. Fred, don't you see what is wrong with the first question? We make more inductions as more facts become available, but it does NOT negate your previous ones.

Let me give you an example. I observe the table salt dissolves in water. I hypothesize that the water corrodes the salt making it dissipate. Now, we later observe more facts and realize that the explanation is that each molecule is polar and the opposite charges attract and break the ionic salt bond. Does this new induction negate that table salt DOES dissolve in water because my hypothesis was invalid? NO, we still can observe that table salt dissolves in water and it is REAL. If I later find out that other salts do not dissolve in water because they are non-polar, does this negate that table salt does dissolve under certain conditions? NO. Each is an integration of new facts and clarifies under what conditions the occurrences happen, it does NOT negate the previous observaton or make it "seem" rather than "real".

Similar to why the salt dissolves, the interaction of mind/body will not be negated by an invalid hypothesis. I will not even attempt because I do not know, but this does not negate that I observe it as real from introspection and observing other people. New integration and new inductions from more facts will clarify the interaction. And Fred, I certainly would not make up a "problem" or categorical statements about whether it is even possible without drawing on more observations.

So the proper question for me to ask you, here, is what observations about humans, or even other animals, makes the interaction "seem" rather than "real"?

The ball is in your court.

My turn. I am trying to explain why your deductions from the piece of wood do not fly. I realize this could be a failure of explanation, so I will try to explain differently.

Fred, you are asking an invalid question with respect to the wood--i.e. how do the "attributes" interact? You are dropping the context that the attribute is some aspect of the wood, but that it is ENTITIES that act. For instance, me cutting the rusted metal, it is not the change in shape that caused the change in color, it is the fact that I sawed the metal exposing the non-oxidized surface. Or, the change in shape in your wood is the fact that you put a saw to it. Or the change in color is the fact that you painted it. It is entity-to-entity interaction that altered the attributes, the attributes did NOT interact.

Fred, you abstract a certain aspect of the entity, like length or color or shape, to come to the concept of that attribute, but you do not drop the context that you are observing entities and it is entities that act.

Your response is: "Yeah, so what, I am talking about attributes and how they affect each other". Its an invalid question, they do not because they are dependent on the entity and the entity acts, not the attributes. Epistemologically, you are treating the attribute as a sort of entity rather than an abstraction formed for observing certain aspects of entities.

Rand goes through the whole explanation in ITOE and she is asked a myriad of questions about attributes/properties--you are not following her epistemology at all.

You also have to ask yourself--what is a property/attribute? Is strength an attribute? If I change that shape of a piece of metal it will affect its strength. For instance, you could use the same metal to form an I-beam, or a rectangular beam, but I-beams are used in bridges because of the higher moment of inertia and therefore greater strength.

Do I then ask, does the attribute of shape affect the strength? NO!!! Again, an invalid question. Strength is not an attribute, in this case strength describes what happens when load acts on a beam--a potentiality, as distinguished the actuality of its shape, color, etc. But again, we are talking entity to entity interaction--NOT attribute to attribute interaction.

Therefore, I would say it is imprecise epistemology to say that shape affects strength. Instead, I would say that the beam has some actual shape, and has the potential to bear a certain load because of its shape. The latter maintains the context that entities act on each other and the properties are certain aspects of the entity.

The same is true of the entity's actual attributes like color, shape, and extension. The attributes are certain aspects of the ENTITY that can be altered when the ENTITY is acted on by another ENTITY. To speak of attributes affecting each is to drop this context.

Your example also mixes in how one experiences a property, such as color--i.e. one's perception. This takes you away from your central question, as I explained earlier.

"One does not talk about the "redness" of the wood outside the context of the person that perceives the "redness"."

Doesn't miss the point so much as divert it. Drop the "redeness" if that pleases you and replace it ala Kelley with "reflective surface" which is "in" the wood, and my point remains. Unless of course you want to deny that the wood has any qualities or properties.

"When you read this post and other posts, you scan your eyes across the screen, you process the arguments, and then proceed to use your fingers to type out your thoughts--do you doubt the 'interaction' of these two 'attributes' here?"

I want an explanation. Is this supposed "interaction" a real interaction or coordination or even some third thing? Descartes or Spinoza (or even Kelley if you buy his "1st person/3rd person" account. if you want it historically. If you claim it is a real interaction, then how does it happen.

"Speaking of missing the point. The "how" or the "explanation" does NOT negate the observation that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Right, Fred? Similarly, a lack of explanation or wrong explanation for how the mind interacts with the body does NOT negate the obvious observation that they do interact."

I made this 'clear' in my post but let me try again. If the "obvious interaction" is real rather than a seeming, then there is interaction. But if it is a seeming interaction but a real, say, coordination, then there is NO interaction, even if it appears that way. That by the way is why it's called an "appearance." When I try the cursor seems to move across the screen, but we all know that it doesn't. Your in the same position via-a-vis your "obvious observation that they do interact." So, I'm not deny that they seem to interact. I asking Do they really interact?

Your turn,

Fred

Ellen, thank you very much for those thoughts. Somewhere in your schematic, we need the notion that humans are able to assess their perceptual experience all along the way, as here for Rand. The two levels you are drawing from Rand might correspond to Edelman's distinction between primary consciousness and higher-order consciousness.

More on Descartes: here and Spirits and Clocks: Machine & Organism in Descartes by Dennis Des Chene.

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Resources in Objectivity concerning consciousness, in addition to those I showed early in this thread, are these:

Consciousness V1N5 29–64, V2N1 93–106, 116–19, V2N2 136–38, V2N6 1–38

Consciousness and Animal Action V1N2 47–63, V1N5 30, 36–42, 46, 52–54, 102, V2N1 103, 105–6, 112–13, 117, 119, V2N2 77–78, 88–89, 92–95, 136, V2N3 20–21, V2N4 191, 197–98, 200–202, V2N6 16–17, 20–21, 70–71

Consciousness at Birth V1N1 14, V2N2 101

Dissociation of Consciousness V1N5 59–60, V2N6 12, 20

Efficacy of Consciousness V1N2 52, V1N5 45–46, V2N1 99–106, V2N4 12–13, V2N6 16–17

Evolution of Consciousness V1N2 54, 69, V1N5 22, 36–42, 46, V2N2 88–96, V2N6 4–5, 36

First-Person v. Third-Person Consciousness V2N6 5–8

Focal Consciousness V1N1 20–22, V1N2 14, 24–25, V1N3 79, V1N5 43–44, 47, V2N1 119–21, V2N2 136–38, V2N3 21–22, V2N4 152–54, V2N6 11–12, 32

Consciousness and Free Will V1N2 47–63, V1N5 79, V2N1 104–5, 111–21, V2N3 21–22, 101–2, V2N4 193, 195–96, 202, V2N6 12, 32, 34

Hard Problem of Consciousness V2N6 1–2, 8, 34

Consciousness as Identification V1N2 33, V1N3 44, V1N4 34, V2N1 134, V2N4 110, 195–98, V2N6 5

Intentionality of Consciousness V1N4 34, 36–37, V1N5 29, 35–36, 102, V2N1 96, 119, V2N5 37–38, V2N6 6

Consciousness and Mind V1N2 52, V1N5 51–52, 100–105, V2N1 95–96, 111–19, V2N4 115–16, V2N6 11–27, 34–37

Multiple-Drafts Model of Consciousness V1N5 55–56, V2N6 14–17

Multiple-Realizability of Consciousness V1N5 101–6, V2N6 4, 21, 34–37

Neuronal Bases of Consciousness V1N3 81, V1N5 37–39, 41, V2N1 94, 98–99, 104–6, 111–17, 124–26, V2N2 85–88, V2N4 152–57, V2N6 16, 20–27, 29–32, 34–35

Perceptual v. Conceptual Consciousness V1N1 3, V1N4 61, V1N5 47, V2N1 113–18, 132–34, V2N2 87–90, V2N4 194–96, V2N6 31–32, 66–68

Primacy of Consciousness V1N1 11, V1N2 23, 60, V1N3 27, 64–65, V1N4 36, V1N5 30, 109–13, V2N4 99–100, V2N6 7–8

Primary v. Higher-Order Consciousness V2N1 116–19, V2N2 88–89, 138, V2N4 195

Reality of Consciousness V1N2 52, V1N4 37, V2N1 93–99, V2N2 9, V2N6 1–3, 20

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness V1N2 48–51, 59–61, V1N5 31–32, 52, V1N6 29–31, V2N1 116–18, 133–34, V2N2 88, V2N3 98–99, V2N4 191, V2N6 12, 33

Consciousness and Self-Mirror V1N2 67–75, 80, V1N3 96–97

Consciousness and Time V1N1 11, V1N2 10–11, V1N3 19–20, 64, V1N4 24, V2N1 111, 118, V2N2 88–89, V2N4 155, V2N6 12–18, 184–85

Vigilant Consciousness V1N5 20–22, 37–38, 48, V2N4 153–54

Volitional Degrees of Consciousness V1N2 47–63, V1N5 29, 42–47, 49–51, V2N1 118, 120–22, V2N6 70–71

Consciousness and Zoological Taxa V1N2 69, V2N2 137

“Ascent to Volitional Consciousness” by John Enright

ABSTRACT

Enright assembles our best understanding of the degrees of conscious control in higher animals. By comparison with these capabilities, the nature of human volitional consciousness is brought into richer relief.

The following theses are defended: Animals have a kind of awareness, which guides their actions, particularly their locomotion. An animal’s actions are limited by its range of awareness. Higher animals contemplate possibilities. The conceptual faculty of humans opens a vast set of possibilities for them. Humans are far more self-aware than any other animal. One’s understanding of one’s own habits allows one to control them and hence control the development of one’s own character. The choice to think has enormous ramifications in human existence.